

ԵՐԵՎԱՆԻ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԼՍԱՐԱՆ
ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿՐԹԱԿԱՆ ԵՎ ՄՇԱԿՈՒԹԱՅԻՆ
ՀԵՏԱԶՈՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԿԵՆՏՐՈՆ

Վերլուծական տեղեկագիր

ՏԱՐԱԾԱՇՐՁԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԵՎ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ
ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ.

ՀԱՅ-ԹՈՒՐԻՔԱԿԱՆ
ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ

№ 11

Երևան – 2017

YEREVAN STATE UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR CIVILIZATION AND CULTURAL STUDIES

Analytical Bulletin

Regional and National Security Dynamics:
Armenian-Turkish Relations

№ 11

Yerevan 2017



Support to the Armenia-Turkey
Normalisation Process
European Union Initiative



This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union within the framework of the [Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process](#) programme. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union, Eurasia Partnership Foundation or any other Consortium partner in the Programme.

Այս նյութը ստեղծվել է Եվրոպական միության ֆինանսական աջակցությամբ՝ «[Աջակցություն Հայաստան-Թուրքիա կարգավորման գործընթացին](#)» ծրագրի շրջանակներում: Նյութի բովանդակության համար պատասխանատու են հեղինակները: Բովանդակությունը կարող է չհամընկնել Եվրոպական միության, Եվրասիա համագործակցություն հիմնադրամի և ծրագրում ընդգրկված մյուս գործընկեր կազմակերպությունների տեսակետների հետ:

Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normalisation Process: Stage Two (ATNP2) is a programme implemented by a Consortium of eight civil society organisations from Armenia and Turkey with the financial assistance of the European Union under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. ATNP2 builds upon the achievements of ATNP1 implemented between 2014-2015.

The overall objective of the programme is to empower and engage civil societies of Turkey and Armenia to contribute to the enhanced regional peace and stability, democratic pluralism and social inclusion across and within their societies. This will be achieved through engaging new actors in economic, cultural, educational, and awareness-raising activities between Armenia and Turkey, and improving information flow, communication exchange and networking between media, expert communities and institutions.

The Consortium partners include Civilitas Foundation (CF), Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), Public Journalism Club (PJC), Regional Studies Center (RSC) from Armenia; and Anadolu Kültür, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Citizens Assembly (CA), and Hrant Dink Foundation from Turkey.

«Աջակցություն Հայաստան-Թուրքիա կարգավորման գործընթացին. 2-րդ փուլ» ծրագիրն իրականացնում է Հայաստանի և Թուրքիայի ութ հասարակական կազմակերպություններից բաղկացած կոնսորցիումը: Ծրագիրն իրականացվում է Եվրոպական միության ֆինանսական աջակցությամբ «Կայունության և խաղաղության ամրապնդման գործիքի» շրջանակներում: Ծրագրի երկրորդ փուլը հիմնված է 2014-2015թթ. իրականացված առաջին փուլի արդյունքների վրա:

Ծրագրի նպատակն է աջակցել Հայաստանի ու Թուրքիայի քաղաքացիական հասարակության ներկայացուցիչներին՝ նպաստելու տարածաշրջանային խաղաղության և կայունության հաստատմանը, ինչպես նաև ժողովրդավարական բազմակարծությանը: Այս նպատակին հասնելու համար նախատեսվում է իրականացնել տնտեսական, մշակութային, կրթական և հանրային իրազեկման տարաբնույթ գործողություններ՝ ամրապնդելով հասարակության տարբեր խմբերի միջև տեղեկատվական հոսքերը, հաղորդակցությունը և կապերի հաստատումը:

Կոնսորցիումի անդամներն են. Հայաստանում՝ Միվլիլիթաս հիմնադրամը, Եվրասիա համագործակցություն հիմնադրամը, Հանրային լրագրության ակումբը, Տարածաշրջանային հետազոտությունների կենտրոնը, Թուրքիայում՝ Անադոլու Քյուլթյուրը, Թուրքիայի տնտեսական քաղաքականության հետազոտությունների հիմնադրամը (Տեպավ), Հելսինկյան քաղաքացիական ասամբլեան և Հրանտ Դինք հիմնադրամը:

ISSN 1829-4502

Հրատարակվում է ԵՊՀ Քաղաքակրթական և մշակութային հետազոտությունների կենտրոնի գիտական խորհրդի որոշմամբ:

Համարի գլխավոր խմբագիր՝ Դավիթ Հովհաննիսյան

Խմբագրական կազմ՝ Սաթենիկ Մկրտչյան (համարի պատասխանատու), Լենա Գ. Կրիկոբյան, Գևորգ Տեր-Գաբրիելյան, Աննա Գևորգյան, Շուշան Կյուրեղյան, Տաթևիկ Պետրոսյան

Խմբագրական խորհուրդ՝
Դավիթ Հովհաննիսյան

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Սերգեյ Մինասյան

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The current publication is a collection of papers presented at the international conference titled “Regional and National Security Dynamics: Armenian-Turkish Relations,” which took place on September 29, 2017. It was co-organized by the Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University (YSU CCCS), and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF).

The conference was organized according to the following methodology: the YSU CCCS researchers were assigned to analyze the state security concepts of the U.S., the EU, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. This collective analysis was then sent to experts from each country for review. Then, the researchers and diplomats from the same countries were invited to participate in the conference and present their papers on the same issues.

This methodology enabled the participants to understand what official approaches countries with an active role in the region have. It also delivered these actors’ real perspectives formed by the implementation of Armenia’s national priorities and possibilities, their attitudes and understanding of the term “security” according to their interests.

I want to express my special gratitude to the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and to the leadership of Yerevan State University for their constant support in organizing the conference, for their motivation and for their creative ideas, and also my gratitude towards all participants for their invaluable scientific contributions.

David Hovhannisyán
Volume Editor-in-chief

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**REGIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS
IN THE “THREE SEAS SYSTEM”**

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After the fall of the Iron Curtain and end of the Cold War between the antagonist camps, a significant and important phenomenon that was hampering the natural development of humanity was also abolished: border impenetrability and passage difficulties. This aspect provided the possibility to the different power centers to create new and global projects in order to enhance (disseminate) their influence and to strengthen their positions.

Naturally, the ideas of dissemination and strengthening influences of the aforementioned power centers turned into systems of concrete actions. These systems were deemed as “globalization projects,” and entered into the competition amongst each other.

This discrepancy is quite obvious in the field of global infrastructure systems, which are necessary from a geo-economic standpoint because creating a joint global economic system is one of the most important preconditions for development. However, from the geopolitical perspective, this objective creates fierce competition for global infrastructures in control.

In the actual area pertaining to Armenia, this competition in total essence (wars, activation of latent conflicts – which are causing civil wars and outbreaks of violence, – massive and uncontrollable migration processes) is displayed in the “Three Seas System:” the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas.

The concept of the “Three Seas System” relies on both traditional political and geographic/taxonomic perception of the term “region,” and also on its actual meaning¹.

The principal characteristics of the “Three Seas System” are the (1) objective necessity of unified access to the natural resources available in the region, (2) the peculiarities of the professional development of the work resources, (3) the relative easiness of unification of communication and transport infrastructures, and (4) the joint dominating values and threats (the most important trait.)

The first rationale for this system to be perceived as a region was seen immediately after the end of the Cold War when the Euro-Atlantic and European “Greater Middle East” and “Wider Europe” projects were publicly introduced. In the framework of these mega-regional projects, conventional infrastructural NABUCCOs were developed and were considered propaganda-based and aggressive.

The objective is that the power centers (whose resources are sufficient for the implementation of such global programs) face the resistance of the power centers with inadequate/insufficient resources for project implementation.

These centers attempt to obstruct those who aspire to get involved, which will make those claims impossible.

In other words, all of those tools, which can block communication and transportation lines, are applicable for this purpose. In turn, a chaotic situation prevails in the “Three Seas Systems.” Eventually, the Chinese “One road, one belt” was joined to these projects.

It is clear that different means and tools are used for the implementation of these goals. The economic projects are also ideological and political, as they utilize propaganda, military, cultural and migration subjects. NATO is expanding, CSTO has been established, the borders of the EU are enlarging, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Economic Community strive to develop their economic and cultural spheres, and so on.

¹ For the details about “Three seas theory” see: Hovhannisyan D., Regional tendencies in the context of “Three seas theory” // Analytical bulletin: The system of three seas - Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies, vol. 9, Yerevan, 2016, pp. 8-36.

As a result, proxy wars begin such as the “Arab Spring,” and several important areas of the “Three Seas System” are being destroyed. This phenomenon impacts the whole system. Simultaneously, regional players are trying to gain a bigger share upon receiving their role and placement in the different management positions associated with communication and transportation structures.

For that purpose, the inherited mythologems are reinterpreted and reenacted, and new mythopolitic fields are created with old names originating from the content and goals under the flags of new ideologems. Such types of ideologems are from the “Islamic world,” “The Kalifate (ISIS),” “The Turkish world,” etc.

These ideologems are widely used in propaganda and information fields. In some cases, the ideologems help implement infrastructural projects reaching their goals. On the one hand, this phenomenon is important from the regional development perspective, but on the other hand, it aggravates conflict and increases instability and tension. As a result, the little sub-region called the “South Caucasus” has recently reappeared in the political center of attention of the world.

There are clear reasons to explain this: the Black Sea within the “Three seas system” sharply increases tension. This is evident in the case of the developments around Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the increasing tensions of Georgian-Russian relations, and the unpredictability of Russian-Turkish relations in light of recent developments.

There are also tensions in NATO-Russia relations, which are especially dangerous in the Black Sea basin where military and naval subdivisions belonging to these two forces are deployed.

The additional tension to these gives the issue of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, which is constantly at risk of increasing into war. The outbreak of military tension in 2016 was possible to prevent, but its threat remains.

When engaged in wider contexts, this sub-region that was peripheral in the past, is turning into a link of important communications. Currently, the South Caucasian countries are impacting inter-regional challenges and contradictions, and interests and occasional power confrontations which were assumed external for this region in the recent past.

Developments in the Middle East with refugee migration, increasing threats from fighters returning from military operation zones, and other migratory threats (i.e. smuggling, trafficking, limiting and interrupting economic projects and links,) are multiplying due to the dangers faced by the sub-region.

In this framework, there are urgent indefinite questions: (1) how do all the stakeholders see the security system structure, (2) what future developments can be expected from the aforementioned and from the unstated but nevertheless important processes, (3) what solutions are the regional players introducing, and (4) what kind of new conflict zones can develop in the foreseeable future.

In the 1990s, a number of proposals were made regarding the South Caucasus security system. Some examples include the “Caucasian Home” initiative raised by Eduard Shevardnadze, the “4+1” format initiated by Russia and contained Russia+ Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the EU proposal called “2+3+3” that included the U.S., EU+ Russia, Iran, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, to name a few. Shortly following the August 2008 War, Turkey created a proposal that did not include Iran; this is why it was doomed to fail.

All of the aforementioned examples of security systems did not consider specific motions within the modern world, and they did not logically coincide with the “Three Seas System.”

Meanwhile, this logic is present in the actions of existing military-political field, primarily the NATO and CSTO- organizations, and it is possible that a third power will join them soon: the military organization of the EU. The formation of this organization was suspended as a result of the failure of the constitution of the EU, but the process of its creation was restarted after Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU.

The main issue, however, is that these systems are in a competitive state and before this competition eventually ends, both the mega-region and our small sub-region will continue to remain unstable and endangered.

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: ARMENIA

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Keywords: *National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine, Armenia, Regional Security, Military security, Nagorno Karabakh, Strategic Defense Review, Network state.*

Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the vision of national security in the South Caucasus was mainly dominated by the maintenance of independence and the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Shortly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia was confronted with two blockades on its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey; another troubling obstacle in addition to its geographically landlocked position. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict defined the external dimension of threats to its national security in its newly independent state amidst the unpredictable regional situation. The external threats and the internal chaotic situation within The Republic of Armenia (RA) called for an elaborated and organized system found in its National Security Document/Strategy. ‘The Development of National Security Strategy’¹ was initiated in 1992 and finalized in 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, as a part of a process of deepening cooperation with NATO, the South Caucasian states adopted their respective national security documents. There was a clear lack of experience in developing the National Security Strategy of

¹ National Security Strategy of Republic of Armenia, (approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on January 26, 2007), Official web site of MOD RA, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=49> (14.06.2017)

Armenia. Therefore for the state institutions; collaboration with international stakeholders is of high importance. Reviewing the evolution of Armenia's National Security Strategy shows that the document was drawn up by the following collaborative interagency commission: the Secretary of the Armenian Defense Ministry, and local and foreign experts. Consultations with NATO Partners on the development of a National Security Strategy and a Military Doctrine were held.

The National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as NSS) is perceived as the second most important document following the Constitution, and has high importance in terms of evaluating and analyzing Armenia's security and its regional cooperation and international engagement. The National Security Strategy serves as the basis for any policies that the Republic of Armenia may develop and implement to prevent and overcome threats and risks to national security. Additionally, the document provides a guide to guarantee the sustainable development of the Armenian state and society. The Military Doctrine (hereinafter referred to as MD) of RA specifies some important details in the Strategy that are related to the military field.

In the NSS introduction, one can find the paragraph on the issue of further amending this document: "in order to better address the domestic and international situation and to address the changing security threats and challenges, as well as to reflect the needs related to the effective implementation of the aims of this document" (NSS, Introduction.) However, no new institutional amendment was held during the past ten years.

In the MD, a paragraph on the provisions of the Doctrine states: "it may be amended based on the shifting realities and developments in the political-military situation, the changing nature of military threats and challenges, the building, development and application of the Military Security System, and according to other factors deemed necessary for ensuring military security, as well as specified and articulated by the President of the Republic of Armenia through addresses and public speeches."² The provisions of the Doctrine are implemented through the

² The Military Doctrine of Republic of Armenia, Official web site of MOD RA, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/media/2015/07/825.pdf> (14.06.2017)

application of the Defense Strategy (Strategic Defense Review 2011-2015,³) and military planning.

With its specific departments, the Presidential Administration and the National Security Council's staff⁴ are allowed to evaluate the implementation of the NSS and further amendments, and address the challenging new workload of Armenia's national security.

In the concluding revision of the NSS, it is stated that "any declarations made on behalf of the Republic of Armenia and by its state officials should preserve the wording, intent and the spirit of the National Security Strategy." In this context, the declarations and speeches by the President of the RA who also serves as the chairman of the National Security Council, and the Minister of Defense should be analyzed in order to review the NSS and MD documents.

1. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The definition of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia "is a system of state policy aimed to guarantee state, public, and individual security, sustainable development and the maintenance of the Armenian identity. It is implemented through the development and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic values for all spheres of life." (NSS, Introduction).

The main guarantees for the implementation of the National Security Strategy are the following: an efficient system of governance, the rule of law, a consolidation of democratic values, an independent and impartial judiciary, compatibility of the armed forces, efficient security and law-enforcement structures, foreign policy ensuring effective international engagement, and comprehensive social justice (NSS, Introduction.)

This list of guarantees reveals an important concept: the efficiency of the state's national security is greatly dependent on Armenia's internal situation. Armenia should be strong and/or stable enough to tackle its internal challenges while strengthening its sovereignty and statehood simultaneously.

³ Strategic Defense Review, Public Release, 2011-2015, Available at <http://www.mil.am/media/2015/07/779.pdf> (14.06.2017)

⁴ National Security Council's official website <http://www.nsc.am>.

From this perspective, Armenian foreign policy should ensure effective international engagement. Armenia's rank in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception index (95th in 2015 and 113th in 2016 among 167)⁵ shows that the implementation of these guarantees of the National Security Strategy are under question.

According to the NSS, Armenia's threats to national security – both internal and external – are defined as events, actions (or the absence thereof) that may threaten the existence of the Armenian state, society, family or individual. (NSS, Chapter I, 3)

The key issue in the National Security of the Republic of Armenia is the settlement of *the Nagorno Karabakh conflict*.

In the NSS, the source of its main domestic threats is considered as *Armenia's engagement in a difficult process of transition since attaining independence at the end of the 20th century*. A cursory reading of the chapter on 'Domestic Security Strategy' reveals the important fields in need of reform such as efficient public administration, building the armed forces, liberalization of the economy, and new quality of life and morale. (NSS, Chapter III, 3)

In addition to the difficulties of onset by the transition period, the National Security of the Republic of Armenia has also been faced with the emergence of several new inter- and intra-regional threats. Inter-regional threats stem mainly from unresolved ethnic and armed conflicts in neighboring states, whereas intra-regional threats are rooted in a clash of interests of the main regional powers.

In the document, the internal and external threats were discussed within the interregional and intra-regional/international levels, and within Armenia's bilateral relations.

2. NAGORNO KARABAKH ISSUE

In the NSS of Armenia, the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh is in a separate chapter. The just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a key issue for the National Security Strategy of the Republic of

⁵ Corruption Perception indexes available at: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi20150> and <https://www.transparency.org/country/ARM>. (16.06.2017)

Armenia, which is the guarantor of the safety and security of the population of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh).

The parties in the conflict have each assented to the mediation by the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Minsk Group, and continue to support the Minsk Group co-chairing states (France, the Russian Federation, and the United States) in their effort to support a negotiated resolution to the Karabakh conflict.

The Republic of Armenia advocates for a peaceful and compromise-based solution to the conflict. The legal aspects for the foundation of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh are sound and not in question. The position of the Republic of Armenia is based on the principle that any final solution or final document should be approved by the Karabakh side, and where Armenia is ready to only accept a resolution that would affirm the irreversible reality of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (NSS, Chapter III.)

The following paragraph shows Armenia's resolution model for the Nagorno Karabakh issue: *“Nagorno Karabakh should have a geographic link to Armenia and its security should be guaranteed. Azerbaijan's militant policy vis-a-vis Nagorno Karabakh and its readiness to opt for the military solution of the problem are direct threats to the security of Armenia. Under such circumstances, Armenia needs to have an army with increased defense capability to guarantee its security. The main priority of the army is to safeguard the inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Armenia and to be the guarantor of the physical safety of the peoples of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.”* (NSS, Chapter III)

The same language has been repeated by the President of Armenia on several occasions and in statements. Moreover, after the April 2016 events, President Serzh Sargsyan reasserted that in a continuity of the military escalations, the Republic of Armenia will recognize the independence of Nagorno Karabakh⁶.

⁶ Serzh Sargsyan's opening remarks at the meeting with the Ambassadors of the OSCE Participating States, 04.04.2016, Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/press->

The current document developed by the Minsk Group is known as the “Madrid Proposals.” The published main principles show that the document is compromise-based that meet the principles declared in NSS, but did not secure the principle of irreversibility of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence.

3. MILITARY SECURITY

Following the approval of the NSS (January 26, 2007), in December 2007, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter referred to as MD/Doctrine) was approved by the following Presidential Decree: “The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia is a set of official views embracing the political-military, military-strategic, military-economic and military-technical basis for ensuring the military security of the Republic of Armenia.”⁷

After analyzing two critical documents, – the National Security Strategy, and the Military Doctrine – the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict remains as the core issue for Armenia’s security. In addition to the aforementioned external threats (especially those involving the use of force,) Armenia’s position in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict makes the role of the army in the significant and prestigious in its security system.

The doctrine identifies Azerbaijan’s aspirations to resolve the Karabakh conflict through military means as a main threat to the security of the Republic of Armenia and to Nagorno Karabakh. (MD section 1 chapter 1), (NSS, Chapter III)

The doctrine establishes the prioritized directions for military and military-technical cooperation. The first position is strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, and the establishment of permanently acting combined forces such as joint forces. The second priority is active and practical participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO.) The third and fourth positions are bilateral military cooperation

release/item/2016/04/04/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-meeting-with-Ambassadors-of-OSCE-states/ (10.06.2017)

⁷ The Military Doctrine of Republic of Armenia, Official web site of MOD RA, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/media/2015/07/825.pdf>. (14.06.2017)

with the USA and NATO and its member partner states. The final priority position is “the cooperation with regional and non-regional states, the policy of which does not contradict the fundamental values of national security of the Republic of Armenia,” (MD chapter 5, art 23)

The Military Doctrine review was conducted by the Strategic Defense Review (2011-2015.) The conflict between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia in August 2008, and the regular ceasefire violations on the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line provide the rationale behind NSS and MD, and its modernity. The identified threats and changes in the security environment also impacted the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) process.⁸

In the SDR, the strategic planning assumptions were considered for the short-, mid-, and long-term perspectives. It states: “taking into account the geopolitical situation in the region, two sets of *planning assumptions* were devised, based on two probable development scenarios. The first set assumes that the NK conflict will continue to stay unresolved, and the second set assumes that a peaceful and lasting solution has been reached in the course of the ongoing negotiations.”⁹

SDR is an excellent tool to bring the national defense system into conformity with the existing security environment requirements, which improves the interaction between the civilian and military bodies. The **Nation-Army Concept** can be described as the outcome of the implementation of SDR. Defense Minister Vigen Sargsyan launched the program known as the “Nation Army Concept” in October 2016.¹⁰ The concept, as it has been articulated thus far, is vague yet seemingly far-reaching: it appears to potentially allow for the total mobilization of society in national security services. In initiating the program, President Serzh Sargsyan stated: “All the governmental bodies, civilians and anybody else

⁸ Strategic Defense Review, Public Release, 2011-2015, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/media/2015/07/779.pdf> (14.06.2017)

⁹ Ibid. p.6.

¹⁰ The “Nation Army” concept, Speech of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Vigen Sargsyan at the Meeting of the Board under the Minister of Defense, 29.10.2016, published in a monograph related to the Nation-Army concept. Available at: <https://razmavaraget.wordpress.com/2017/01/09/nation-army-collective-monograph-armenian-army-defense-academic-journal-ndru-mod-armenia/>

must correctly carry out their role in the defense of the country.”¹¹ In January 2013, the President Serzh Sargsyan’s statement at the extended meeting held at the RA Ministry of Defense showed the trend for developments of the concept: *“It happened that from the first years of independence, the Army has been playing a special role in our society. It was the war, whose spirit was felt all over Armenia – in some places more than in the others. In those days, every family had a close or a distant relative in the Armenian Army; and the Army was in everyone’s heart. That feeling became stronger when our Army attained victory which was so important, which was vital. Twenty years later, we have the affection and respect towards our Army which must be engraved in the institutional memory of our country once and for all. That is, we have to do our best to keep the attitude of every strata of the society towards the Army explicitly positive. We have to get to that through the serious reformation of the Army, enhancement of information activities and everyday efforts aimed at the shaping of the proper public attitude to the Army related issues.”*¹²

This concept raises concerns about the militarization of the Society. However, during the Meeting of the Board Adjacent to the Minister of Defense (29 October, 2016) the Minister of Defense Vigen Sargsyan stated: *“The Nation Army is a society that acts as one whole. That does not mean the militarization of society, or the state. On the contrary, it means democratization of the army, its full integration into society, economy, culture, education, science, ecology and sports. ...This means using what*

¹¹ On April 20th, 2017, at a conference entitled “Nation-Army 2017,” dedicated to fundamental themes in military education Minister of Defense Presented two new programs, entitled “My Honor” and “I Am”. The aim of the “My Honor” state program is to link temporary exemption from military service for higher education with professional military service and the “I am” program aims to reward those, who volunteered to serve on the front line. For details see: Discussion of the fundamental topics in military education, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/en/news/4728> (18.06.2017)

¹² Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the extended meeting held at the RA Ministry of Defense, 15.01.2013. Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2013/01/15/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-session-Ministry-of-Defense/> (14.06.2017)

has been created by the army for the whole society and state, and building up the armed forces with all the achievements of civilian life.”¹³

The Proclamation of the Nation-Army Concept includes the development of a new military and defensive-oriented system, and the adoption of a new law on military service. It should be noted that the process of drafting a new law at the stage of this research was initiated, but the document’s absence does not provide an opportunity to address the issue thoroughly.

4. EXTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Due to the NSS, Armenia implements its external security strategy based on the basic principles of *complementarity and engagement*. (NSS, Chapter IV)

In the NSS, Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO,) and its intensification of the cooperation with the NATO alliance explained as contribution to the consolidation of the potential of Armenia’s policy of complementarity. (NSS Chapter IV)

In his public statements, the President preserves all of the aforementioned definitions. One excerpt from the President’s statement at the European People’s Party Congress on March 29th, 2017 vividly shows the intent of complementarity and engagement of the Armenian State. While discussing the successful partnership between Armenia and the European Union, the President stated: “Throughout this process Armenia has vividly demonstrated that it has been possible to make compatible various integration processes while harvesting and sowing everything positive and useful, which unite and does not divide nations.”¹⁴

¹³ The Speech Delivered by Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Vigen Sargsyan During the Meeting of the Board Adjacent to the Minister of Defense Available at: <http://www.mil.am/en/news/4466>. (16.06.2017)

¹⁴Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Congress of the European People’s Party, 29.03.2017, Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2017/03/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-statement-at-the-EPP-congress-in-Malta/> (16.06.2017)

There are three layers of Armenia's external security strategy: the international, regional, and pan-Armenian.

4.1. International dimensions

Relations with the **Collective Security Treaty Organization** (CSTO) and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) were seen as the military-political components of Armenia's external security strategy. Armenia's interest in further integration into international organizations such as the UN, EU, CoE, OSCE, and economic ones (World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)) contributes to the efficiency of ongoing reforms in Armenia.

As a founding member of the CSTO, Armenia still views its participation in this organization as a security component. Furthermore, one of the key priorities for Armenia is the military component of this membership. The CSTO membership provides privileged conditions for the supply of military equipment.

In the last several years, however, the President of Armenia raises questions regarding the Organization's reputation and significance in his speeches at CSTO meetings. For example, in the paragraph from the President's speech at the CSTO Collective Security Council session December 21st, 2015: *“There is no doubt that each country has its own interests and priorities, but they should not be cited against our shared interests and mutual obligations. Every time when the armed forces of Azerbaijan use guns, rocket mortars, or artillery against the Republic of Armenia, they are firing at Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Moscow, and Minsk. I would like to remind that we have a corresponding article in our Charter, and if we don't implement that article, if we don't discuss the situation, if we don't view it as necessary to pick up the phone and make a call to learn what's going on in the allied Armenia and along with that vote against each other's interests in international organizations, adopt with third countries bilateral declarations the essence of which is aimed against*

the CSTO allies, we simply bring under that fire our entire Organization, its reputation, and significance."¹⁵

Armenia strives to establish intensive relations with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC,) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP.) The successful implementation of the PfP Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) will foster greater modernization and efficiency of the Armenian defense system. It will also bring it closer to conforming to the defense systems of advanced states, including their armed forces. Armenia is intensifying its political dialogue with NATO, and is establishing compatible military units such as the current peacekeeping battalion, which is capable of participating in NATO peacekeeping operations. Armenia is also a part of NATO's Planning and Review process. Based on the President's and the Defense Minister's speeches, there is proof of the deepening of relations with NATO.¹⁶

In a joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President Sargsyan, the question of to what extent is the broad NATO-Armenia agenda compatible with Armenia's membership in other security structures and the commitments assumed there. President Serzh Sargsyan's answer is the following: "...Of course the CSTO and NATO pursue different objectives but I reiterate that our practice has come to demonstrate that it is possible for a country in order to assure its security to find areas of cooperation with different organizations and in different formats."¹⁷

¹⁵ The Statement of the President of RA at the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council, Working visit of president Serzh Sargsyan to Russian Federation, 21.12.2015, <http://www.president.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2015/12/21/Working-visit-of-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-to-Russia-December-21/> (14.06.2017)

¹⁶ Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member and non-member states dedicated to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, 09.07.2016, Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2016/07/09/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-speech-at-NATO-summit-in-Poland/>, The interview of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Vigen Sargsyan on RIA Novosti, February 22, 2017, Available at: <http://www.mil.am/en/news/4653> (14.06.2017)

¹⁷ Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Republic of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, 27 Feb 2017, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_141844.htm?selectedLocale=en (20.06.2017)

One of the most commonly discussed issues is the possibility of having balanced participation in competitive organizations such as CSTO and NATO. The Georgia-NATO Agile Spirit 2017 (September 3-11) multinational drills has been an interesting case. In addition to Georgia and the US, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Ukraine, and Armenia will participate. In reality, however, Armenia did not participate, and Azerbaijan did. The Armenian official response did not reveal the real reason of non-participation.

Armenia's **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** membership provides the potential to establish greater cooperation in various domains in the politico-military arena, the security of external borders in combating international terrorism and in fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration, and the promotion of economic, social, and humanitarian ties between its members.

In the NSS, the development and consolidation of Armenia's relations with European structures, and above all, with the **European Union (EU)** is considered as a priority direction for the country's foreign policy, which dates back to the EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) on January 1st, 1999. After Armenia gave up its potential Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU in 2013, and took the 'surprise decision' in light of Russian pressure to join the Eurasian Economic Union, relations between the EU and Armenia entered a period of 'strategic pause.' By becoming a member of the Eurasian Economic Union¹⁸ in February 2015, Armenia transferred core elements of its external trade policy to the Eurasian Economic Union and is bound by the Eurasian Economic Union's common external tariff, albeit with ~800 exemptions until 2020.¹⁹ The EU is Armenia's main trading partner, accounting for around 29.7% of

¹⁸ Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 29 May 2014, Available at: <https://docs.eaeunion.org/en-us/Pages/DisplayDocument.aspx?s=bef9c798-3978-42f3-9ef2-d0fb3d53b75f&w=632c7868-4ee2-4b21-bc64-1995328e6ef3&l=540294ae-c3c9-4511-9bf8-aaf5d6e0d169&EntityID=7297> (15.06.2017)

¹⁹ Hrant Kostanyan, The Rocky Road to an EU-Armenia Agreement: From U-turn to detour, 3 February 2015, available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/rocky-road-eu-armenia-agreement-u-turn-detour> (16.06.2017)

Armenia's total trade, while Russia's share of its foreign trade is roughly 25%.

Moreover, the negotiations between Brussels and Yerevan are complex and face several constraints, such as Armenia's commitment to the EEU, and with inherent limits stemming from the Armenia-Russia bilateral gas deal signed in December 2013. This deal grants Gazprom a monopoly to operate pipelines in Armenia and prevents the Armenian government from making regulatory changes in this area until December 31st 2043, and some other legal issues.²⁰

Currently, Armenia's path to European integration means taking consistent steps towards institutional cooperation with Europe while carefully avoiding any declarative moves or ideological rhetoric that could make Russia, its strategic partner, nervous.

4.2. Bilateral dimensions

The main priorities in a bilateral context (both international and regional) are relations with the **Russian Federation, United States, European states, Middle Eastern, and Asia-Pacific countries (especially with China, India, and Japan,) and** all four of Armenia's neighbors: the **Islamic Republic of Iran, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey**. The relations between IRI and Georgia were considered as traditionally friendly, of which are based on a number of shared realities: borders, historic and cultural ties, and mutual economic interests.

In contrast of these two neighbors with high prospective for cooperation in many fields, the other two – Turkey and Azerbaijan – were considered as threats to Armenia's security. Closed borders by Turkey and the absence of normalized relations adversely affect the stability of the region as a whole and impede the development of regional cooperation. The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations would decrease the risk of new dividing lines emerging in the region and would help create a conducive environment for the final settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh

²⁰Hrant Kostanyan and Richard Giragosian, EU-Armenian Relations: Seizing the Second Chance, CEPC Commentary, Thinking ahead for Europe, 31 October 2016, available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-armenian-relations-seizing-second-chance> (14.06.2017)

conflict. Due to this conflict, Azerbaijan has adopted a policy aimed at the exclusion of Armenia from all regional cooperation projects.

Armenia's isolation from regional projects and its energy dependence significantly influence the economic growth of the country and affect its internal stability. Economic stagnation is causing growing social dissatisfaction in Armenia.

President Serzh Sargsyan referred to this isolationist threat for Armenia in his speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference while discussing the stability in the South Caucasus and the exclusionist approach from regional projects that apply to Armenia repeatedly: "... *Contemporary South Caucasus is a model of the multi-polarity of the world. It is one of the regions, where there are seemingly unyielding dividing lines, where internationally recognized political map is very different from the real one, where stability is extremely vulnerable, and the re-establishment of peace requires joint and concentrated titanic efforts.*"²¹

Relations with Russia and the US are two of the National Security Strategy priorities. In the NSS, Armenian-Russian relations were considered as a strategic partnership: (NSS, Chapter IV, 1.3) "*The foundation for this strategic partnership was established through a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the Collaboration towards the 21st Century. Both these agreements and a bilateral agreement on defense cooperation, including within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), serve as the main pillars of the Armenian security system*" (NSS, Chapter IV, 1.3). All these definitions in the National Security Strategy document and Military Doctrine vividly demonstrate that the military security dimension is a priority.

All international and intra-regional/inter-regional cooperation models which increase the security in the military field become preferable for Armenia's national security.

In the NSS, the US is considered as a global power with its own interests in the region; it plays a significant role in regional economic,

²¹ Munich Security Conference Speech of President Serzh Sargsyan, Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2009/02/07/news-30/> (14.06.2017)

military, and political developments. NSS considers the Armenian Diaspora, through its various organizations and centers in the US, as an additional asset in the development of bilateral relations between Armenia and the US.

5. ARMENIA-DIASPORA RELATIONS

Before the NSS provisions found in the conclusion, the third subchapter of Chapter IV is about Armenia-Diaspora relations. The main idea behind Armenia-Diaspora relations is “to preserve and develop the identity of Armenian nation, within both Armenia and throughout its Diaspora.” (Citation) The decline of national and cultural identity in the Armenian Diaspora is mentioned as threats to Armenia’s national security. Although the preservation of the Armenian identity is a key element in the NSS, there is no definition, which can be explained dubiously; either everyone knows what it means, or it is not defined in order to have a broad spectrum of its usage:

“Well-organized and efficiently integrated Diaspora communities are important contributions to the overall increase in Armenia’s international involvement. Any weakening of the Armenia-Diaspora ties and the absence of mutually enriching contacts may threaten the fundamental values of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia.” (NSS, Chapter IV).

NSS sees the consolidation of relations with the Diaspora in efforts to prevent the assimilation and loss of lingual and cultural identity among the Armenians living abroad. In general, Armenia considers the Diaspora as an important tool in the solutions of vital problems facing Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.

Besides such formulations, the NSS did not provide any mechanisms of implementation of the aforementioned goals. As a result, the implementation of Diaspora-related ideas did not succeed.

CONCLUSION

1. Since 2007, when the NSS of RA was adopted, the different circumstances in Armenia’s external environment (global and regional,)

domestic policy environment, and the changed priorities are the main factors that create the need for a review and renewal of the National Security Strategy. The introduction to the security documents and the amendment processes shows that decision-making power was concentrated into the President's hands. December 6, 2015, after the Constitutional referendum the country's semi-presidential system transformed into a parliamentarian. As a result, this creates an unbalance between the previous decision-making power center (the President and its administration of 2007 National Security Strategy,) and the new one (Parliament.) Given the shift in power over decision-making, the Parliamentary governmental system needs to renew the document

The examination of the NSS of RA shows that the Strategy lacks a description of the necessary mechanisms and means for achieving its ends. Moreover, Armenia's National Security Strategy fails to discuss three important variables: goals, means, and ends.

2. In the NSS, conflict settlement negotiations are assented to the mediation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship (Russia, the US, and France,) which advocates for a peaceful and compromise-based solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Currently, negotiations are held on the basis of the Madrid proposals (November 2007.) The latest document suggested by the Minsk Group is the so-called Madrid proposals. The Madrid proposals are on the negotiation table, and its content (which is available to the public) does not contradict Armenia's NSS formulations with the exception of the following: Armenia is only ready to accept a resolution which would affirm the irreversible reality of the existence of the Republic or Nagorno Karabakh. (NSS, Chapter III).

The basis and foundation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan – forms two significant contradictory concepts of International Law: the right of nations to self-determination, and the principle of territorial integrity. Moreover, Azerbaijan's aggressive policy, in addition to the fact that after the Madrid proposals, nothing new was on the negotiation table, military solution of the conflict became a real threat.

3. A review of the military components of the NSS and Military Doctrine vividly shows that the military security dimension is a top priority for Armenia. All international and intra-regional/inter-regional cooperation models, which increase the security militarily, become preferable for Armenia's national security.

4. The National Security Strategy stipulates that Armenia's main security threats are from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia has only two functional neighbors – Iran and Georgia – with which it sustains positive relations that it entirely depends on for communication and trade with the outside world.

Notably, Armenia's largest trade partner is the European Union, not Russia despite all impediments and perceptions to the contrary. However, Russia's weight remains crucial in two decisive and important spheres: military security and investments, first and foremost in energy production.

In the regional and international contexts, the Republic of Armenia as one of the South Caucasian states tries to find or be a part of regional cooperation models, which can guarantee Armenian security and securing new opportunities of regional and international cooperation. The NSS document shows Armenia's engagement and complementarity policies toward its neighbors and internationally. While Armenia has served as an important Russian ally in the South Caucasus, it has a close and active relationship with NATO, and expanded bilateral military cooperation with key Western countries: US, France, Germany, and Italy. Moreover, Armenia has developed its participation in peace operations, pursuing both domestic defense reforms and modernization, and valuable international experience for its elite peacekeeping battalions.

However, the past and present models of cooperation do not counter the regional and international actors' real balance of power. In turn, Armenia is creating internal contradictions from the beginning. Among the challenges for regional cooperation and a stable security environment is the ethno-political conflicts. With different approaches to conflict resolution by each involved party, this leads to the absence of any perspective for regional cooperation even in the long-term. The next common challenge to the South Caucasus is the different levels of democratization and freedoms,

and the speed of democratic transformations in all three states. Another challenge is rooted in the existence of different types of security systems in the region, which also leads to the mutually-exclusive strategic interests between the regional states.

While reviewing the NSS and the President's speeches, it can be claimed that the basic goals, interests, instruments, and milieu of Armenian national security policy are unchangeable, especially within its external security strategy. The Nagorno Karabakh issue and Genocide "memory" (the enduring legacy of the Genocide) create the main platform of threats and "permanent" challenges for Armenia. Interdependence on Russia is considered as a strategic alliance in the military and energy sectors, and is justified within the security context.

5. Though the NSS stressed the broad spectrum of cooperation between Armenia and its Diaspora (which is supposed to utilize the Diaspora's potential in Armenia's interests broadly *and* preserve the Armenian identity,) the realpolitik reveals Armenia's unsystematic activities in its relations with the Diaspora.

Taking into account that states and societies become more interdependent, and given that today's information age creates new intertwined connections between the members of the states and societies with other members all over the world, the possible solution lies in a way of making horizontal networks and creating a Network State. Today, the flow and speed of information exceeds the policy decision-making rate and possibilities. Therefore, having Armenian communities in important places Armenia has relations with; RA should use the possibilities in receiving and sending necessary information to create a compatible "Armenian" global network. Every network from the state institution-society sector-diaspora connection will help resolve and overcome the challenges and threats to the National Security of Armenia.²²

²² For more details see D. Hovhannisyán, Network State, *Jam Session 16*, Available at: <http://am.epfarmeria.am/network-state-jam-session/> (24.06.2017)

**ՏԱՐԱԾԱՇՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ. ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆ**

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***Բանալի բառեր՝** Ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարություն, ռազմական հայեցակարգ, Հայաստան, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, ռազմական անվտանգություն, Լեռնային Ղարաբաղ, ցանցապետություն, Պաշտպանության ռազմավարական վերանայում*

Հետազոտությունը խնդիր է դնում հասկանալ տարածաշրջանային անվտանգության փոփոխվող դինամիկան և դրանց վերաբերյալ Հայաստանի Հանրապետության պաշտոնական դիրքորոշումը և արձագանքը այդ մարտահրավերներին ընդունված փաստաթղթերի մակարդակում: Սույն հետազոտության ուսումնասիրության հիմքն են կազմում Հայաստանի Հանրապետության անվտանգության ոլորտի փաստաթղթերը, մասնավորապես, Ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարությունը և ռազմական անվտանգության հայեցակարգը, ինչպես նաև միջազգային հարթակներում ՀՀ բարձրաստիճան պաշտոնյաների արված հայտարարություններ, որոնք վերաբերում են անվտանգության հարցերին:

Հետազոտության հիմնական եզրակացություններից է Անվտանգության հայեցակարգի վերանայման անհրաժեշտությունը՝ պայմանավորված գլոբալ և տարածաշրջանային նոր մարտահրավերներով, ինչպես նաև ՀՀ կառավարման նախագահական մոդելից խորհրդարանական կառավարման մոդելին անցմամբ:

**PERSPECTIVES FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE
SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE ROLE OF NORMALISATION
BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA**

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Keywords: *South Caucasus, Turkey's foreign policy, normalization, Armenia-Turkey relations, Regional Security.*

Introduction:

The disintegration of the former USSR in 1991 has created a major transformation in international relations and in the international system. The last twenty-five years have been affected by the developments in the aftermath of this tremor in the international system. One of the immediate effects of this change has been the emergence of new conflicts, particularly in the former Soviet territory. Today, those post-Cold War conflicts remain unresolved and prevent the widening and deepening of stability and security in neighboring geographical regions.

Political geography in the South Caucasus has also been affected with the post-Soviet and post-Cold War developments. The newly independent states in the South Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia immediately embarked upon the task of establishing their sovereign and independent nation states. During the Cold War, the USSR was bordering Turkey and Iran in the region. In the post-Soviet setting of the South Caucasus, Russia, as a successor state of the former USSR found three new neighbors.

The new configuration in the South Caucasus has affected Turkey's look at the region, too. During the Cold War, Turkey's relation with the USSR was under the influence of bloc-to-bloc relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and was mainly defined through the parameters of security. After the collapse of the USSR, however, Turkey ceased to have a direct land border with Russia and found three new neighbors in the region.

The three South Caucasus countries on the eastern border of Turkey gave a new opportunity for creating lines of direct transport and communication between the north and the south, as well as the west and the east. South Caucasus became Turkey's gateway to Central Asia.

Furthermore, South Caucasus has become an important region for Turkey in terms of energy, too. As Turkey is heavily dependent on energy imports, the rich hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Basin make the region an important source of supply through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), on the other hand, gives an opportunity to Turkey to become a major hub in the east-west energy corridor by means of offering diversification of routes and supplies to Europe. This, in return, is expected to enhance EU's energy security.

Turkey's policy vis-a-vis the South Caucasus region is based on the following principles:

- Development of regional stability and security,
- Facilitation of peaceful, lasting and just solutions to the conflicts of the region,
- Support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the region,
- Ensuring the sustainability of democratization as well as economic and political reform processes in the region,
- Deepening of regional and inter-regional cooperation as well as bilateral and regional economic integration,
- Strengthening of the concept of regional ownership,
- Support for the development of relations between the countries of the region and Euro-Atlantic institutions¹.

Upon these principles, Turkey's foreign policy in the region was shaped through development of both bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation schemes in South Caucasus. Turkey, after the dissolution of the USSR, recognized all the three South Caucasus post-Soviet states as sovereign and independent subjects of international law, without exception.

¹ For general reference to Turkey's relations with the Caucasus countries the following link would help: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-guney-kafkasya-ulkeleriyle-iliskileri.tr.mfa

In time, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, Turkey has developed extensive bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. It would be a fair statement, however, to mention that Turkey's Caucasus policy fails to be comprehensive due to lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia. Turkey closed its border with Armenia on the 3rd of April, 1993, as a reaction to Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan's territory in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, efforts to launch a reasonable normalization of bilateral relations between the two countries remained in vain. Turkey's Caucasus policy, therefore, cannot be defined to be objective and impartial, as it is not equidistant to both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, thus prevents Turkey from fulfilling the role of an honest broker in the South Caucasus.

Transformation of Turkey's foreign policy in the South Caucasus:

The dissolution of USSR can be considered as a significant motivational factor in transforming Turkey's foreign policy from a reactionary conduct to a more proactive one. Turkey has taken immediate action by means of launching several initiatives, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Summit of the Turkic Languages speaking countries as well as establishing the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) to reach out to the post-Soviet states for assisting them in their economic development on project basis. BSEC has transformed into a regional organization and the Turkic Summit is now restructured under the Turkic Council. TİKA continues to expand its projects in Eurasia.

During the initial years of post-Soviet political setting in the South Caucasus, Turkey expected to become a significant regional actor by means of expanding its political, social, cultural and economic ties with the countries of the region. This policy was particularly important to widen Turkey's influence in Central Asia because South Caucasus provided the physical link to reach out to this vast geography where Turkey hoped to find a "Turkic world". Turkey's policies, inevitably, were carefully monitored by Russia to prevent the emergence of a new competitor in the region. Turkey, on its behalf, believed that the newly independent states in

South Caucasus and Central Asia would be inspired by Turkey's democratic, secular and western-oriented state system and would incline to look at Turkey as a role model instead of Iran or Russia.

Turkey's policies to reach out to Central Asia and to expand its influence in the region coincided with the efforts of Russia to regain its self-confidence and to overcome the psychological effects it has undergone due to the disintegration of the USSR. By mid 90's, Russia began to fill in the gap that emerged in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR. This caused Turkey to reluctantly accept the fact that social, political, economic and cultural dominance of Russia in the region could not be easily undermined and that Russia's influence there was bound to persist. This recognition has affected Turkey's foreign policy vis-a-vis the former Soviet geography and resulted with a more prudent conduct in Central Asia, carefully avoiding confrontation with Russia.²

If the USSR's dissolution in 1991 had been a major determining factor in the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy conduct, the other significant effect had been the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in November 2002. The former has resulted with a more proactive and forward looking foreign policy whereas the latter has caused a more autonomous and assertive conduct. There is a general consensus in the academia that Turkey's foreign policy pursued by AKP has been primarily inspired from Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision, as it is described in his book called "Strategic Depth". The main philosophy behind this theoretical framework is based on the perception that change in the international environment can be a source of both risks and opportunities and that the end of Cold War offered Turkey a historic opportunity to become a global power with the promotion of Islamist ideology.³

Davutoğlu argues that such a foreign policy vision would allow Turkey to be more influential in the Middle East, the Balkans and the

² For an extensive account on Turkey's changing priorities and foreign policy in Eurasia, please see: Oran, Baskın, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. II, İletişim Yayınları, 2005, pp. 371-372, and Oran, Baskın, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. III, İletişim Yayınları, 2013, p.466.

³ Özkan, Behlül, "Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy August-September 2014*, vol. 56, ed. No: 4, pp. 119-140.

Caucasus, those regions which he defines as Turkey's hinterland and believes that Turkey could create new spheres of influence there. In this context, Davutoğlu also envisions continuity between the Caucasus and the east of the Caspian Sea, which together comprise the gateway to the rest of the Asian continent. As for the South Caucasus, his vision is defined in the context of relations between three regional powers, namely Russia, Turkey and Iran⁴ (Here, the changing international position of the Caucasus is defined in its relation to changes in three spheres: 1. The changing global balance and its effect on the region itself, 2. The change in the regional sphere itself, and, 3. The changes in intra-regional balance and contradictions which include ethnic and religious diversification. It is further argued that competition between Russia, Turkey and Iran in the regional sphere contains the ramifications of the global competition in the first sphere and the geopolitical and diplomatic maneuverings of the regional actors in the second one. The regional sphere is important because the policies of Russia, Turkey and Iran have implications for the Black Sea and the Balkans as well as for the Middle East and Central Asia.)

It is necessary to underline, however, that although Turkey's look at the South Caucasus has been under the influence of this new foreign policy vision, it is also affected by the disappointment that Turkey has faced in the policies that it has pursued in Central Asia in the 1990's. AKP's foreign policy, therefore, has been based on more tailor-made policies, favoring bilateralism rather than regionalism. This has also resulted with more focus on energy issues which increased emphasis more on the Caucasus and the Caspian region rather than Central Asia⁵.

Attempts for normalization of Turkey's relations with Armenia:

Turkey's relations with Armenia have not been developing in compliance with the pace that Turkey had with other two South Caucasus countries. Turkey has recognized the independence of Armenia in 1991 but the two countries have not been able to establish diplomatic relations since then.

⁴ Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, p. 125.

⁵ Oran, Baskın, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası*, vol. III, İletişim Yayınları, 2013, p.466.

The main difficulty blocking the development of bilateral relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations has been the basic differences of opinion on a certain episode of the common history of two nations. Armenia wants the events of 1915 to be labeled as an act of genocide whereas Turkey acknowledges mutual massacres between Turks and Armenians during the First World War but refuses to call this incident as genocide on the basis of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide.

Turkey, having established extensive relations with Azerbaijan, also considers the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh as another hindrance in front of the development of Turkey's bilateral relations with Armenia. On 3 April 1993, Turkey has closed its land border with Armenia due to the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent invasion of Kelbecer, an Azeri region bordering Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, Turkey has continued to pursue the policy of supporting the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem based on the UN principles, with respect to the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of sovereign and independent states. Turkey still considers the unresolved problem in Karabakh as a major obstacle preventing the development of stability and security in the South Caucasus region.

AKP foreign policy continued to build on the forward looking and proactive foreign policy conduct of Turkey developed from 1991 to 2001. During the first governing term of AKP from 2002 to 2007 Turkey has emerged as a prominent regional actor in the Black Sea, Caucasus, Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa regions. Turkey, at that time, tried to address all the pending bilateral issues with its neighbors in order to create a favorable environment for enhancing its foreign policy objectives in its immediate neighborhood. This approach, later, has been called by Davutoğlu himself as the “policy of zero-problems with neighbors”.

Obviously, Turkey's non-existent relations with Armenia represented the weakest link in Turkey's South Caucasus policy and also needed to be addressed in compliance with this constructive and visionary approach. This is the time when the famous “football diplomacy” has been developed into a substantial process of attempts for normalization of bilateral relations, facilitated by Switzerland.

Between 2008 and 2009, Turkey and Armenia embarked upon an intensive effort of normalization of their bilateral relations. For Turkey, this was a genuine effort to address the essence of bilateral relations with Armenia, without being affected by the pursuance of Armenia's policy to widen the recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide in the parliaments of third countries. From Armenia's point of view, it was also the first time that the Armenian government believed that Turkey's engagement was not directed to counter Armenia's policy but rather to embark upon a constructive and promising commitment to normalize the bilateral relations. Switzerland's skillful efforts of facilitation eased the process and helped its fruition.

As a result of these efforts, the two governments have been able to undersign jointly two protocols on the 10th of October, 2009, in Zürich. The "Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey" and the "Protocol on development of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey" are the only two documents which have been signed between the two countries since the Kars Treaty of 1921. Although those two documents form the only available context for the process of bilateral normalization, they have never been ratified by the legislative organs of the two countries. On the Turkish side, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan linked the ratification process and the normalization of Turkey's relations with Armenia to the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Many hold the view that Erdoğan's position was particularly influenced by the strong reaction against the normalization process coming from Azerbaijan. As for Armenia, the ratification process in the parliament was hampered mainly due to the pressure exerted on the Armenian government by the Armenian diaspora. Armenia also reacted to Turkey's position and considered it as preconditioning and insisted that it would only consider ratification of the protocols once Turkey had affected that process in its own parliament. In February 2015, President Serzh Sargsyan finally withdrew the two protocols from the Armenian Parliament.

Normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia would have opened a new chapter in South Caucasus. It would have

allowed the two countries to establish diplomatic relations, address the disputed issue of history, develop bilateral trade and commerce and end what Armenia considered as “Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan’s policy of blockading Armenia”.

Today, although there are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey and the land border is closed, there is a limited amount of trade between the two countries. In 2014, the total trade volume was reported by the Armenian sources as 234 million US dollars. Same sources indicate that the figure has been reduced by half in 2015. About 99% of this trade volume is Turkey’s exports to Armenia, mainly consumer goods and food. This figure, in spite of its low amount, accounts for more than 5,5% of Armenia’s overall imports.⁶

Why is normalization between Turkey and Armenia important?

Eight years after the signing of the two protocols in Zürich, Turkey and Armenia still fail to establish diplomatic relations. This situation presents an anomaly for the stability of the South Caucasus and needs to be addressed constructively and with open mindedness. It is obvious that there is lack of mutual trust and confidence between the leaders of the two neighboring countries. However, lack of dialogue does not help to overcome the difficulty and will not contribute to regaining trust and confidence.

As the normalization between Turkey and Armenia fails to take hold, the security situation in the South Caucasus remains fragile. There is no possibility of substantial multilateral cooperation schemes and almost all such attempts exclude Armenia. The two major energy pipelines, namely Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline bypass Armenia. The railroad connection which will make the South Caucasus an important passage from west to east is connecting Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and is envisaged to establish an uninterrupted link from London to Beijing. This project also bypasses Armenia.

The most significant multilateral scheme between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan which also excludes Armenia envisages a cooperation

⁶ These figures are taken from the web site of Armenian Foreign Ministry.

process which focuses on defense cooperation, harmonization of foreign-security policy, energy and transport cooperation, as well as business, trade and commerce between those three countries. In their first meeting which took place in Trabzon, Turkey, on 8 June 2012, the trilateral declaration stated “determination to build a better future for the region characterized by peace, stability, cooperation and increasing wealth and welfare”⁷.

It is hard to conceive the development of a favorable environment for security and stability in the South Caucasus by alienating Armenia. One of the essential prerequisites for correcting this anomaly is certainly the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The other is normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.

A number of reasons require a more positive approach to the resolution of this impasse and both Turkey and Armenia need to look at their common future with pragmatism.

First, Turkey and Armenia, after having failed to ratify the two protocols they have signed in 2009 lost their mutual trust and confidence. Although Turkey’s commitment to the normalization process was seen as a genuine effort by Armenia, the linkage of the development of Turkey’s relations with Armenia to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered to be a preconditioning and is flatly rejected by the Armenian leadership. Turkey, in that respect, is thought to have shifted back to its pre-2008 policy, namely to pursue a foreign policy based on preventing Armenia’s efforts to make the recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide. In time, this perception has the tendency to be entrenched in the Armenian leadership and will be difficult to eradicate. Consequently, any future attempt by Turkey to revisit the normalization process will risk to be taken genuinely by the Armenian side because of this skepticism. The longer the current situation persists, the more structural that skepticism is likely to become.

Second, the current situation will never give Turkey the opportunity to develop a comprehensive, lasting and stable foreign policy vis-a-vis the South Caucasus region. In 2008, immediately after the Russia-Georgia war,

⁷ “Trabzon Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey”, 08 June 2012, Trabzon.

Turkey had come forward with an initiative for enhancing peace and stability in the South Caucasus region, namely the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). With this initiative, Turkey had been able to bring Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia around the same table for three consecutive meetings at Deputy Foreign Ministers level. This had been possible simply because Turkey at the time had increased its image as an impartial regional actor because of the continuation of its normalization process with Armenia. Today, Turkey has lost this moral high ground.

Third, it is also important to underline that Turkey can contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem constructively only if it maintains an image of impartiality in the region. Although Armenia insists on the differentiation of the two processes, namely the normalization with Turkey and the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem, it is also a fact that this stance mainly emanates from the perception of Turkey in Armenia. Turkey's lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia does not give Turkey the perception of a reliable honest-broker in the facilitation of this protracted conflict.

It is important to recall that during the continuation of normalization talks between Turkey and Armenia, talks between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh problem also gained momentum. This, in a way, shows that any positive development in the Turkish-Armenian relations is also likely to have positive impact on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; no matter how unrelated these two issues seem to be.

A fourth reason is related to obligations of both countries to protect the rights of their citizens in their respective territories. Lack of diplomatic relations and having a closed border cannot and does not prevent people to people contacts between Turkey and Armenia. On the one hand, indirect trade relations continue. This requires frequent travels of Turkish businessmen to Armenia and vice versa. On the other hand, there are many Armenian citizens who travel to Turkey for tourism or for seasonal labor opportunities. Such social contacts increase the likelihood of need for consular services in the respective countries. Unless the two countries come to terms with an understanding to address these issues, unexpected

incidents may result with undesired consequences and cause each country to fail to protect the rights of their citizens in the other's territory.

Today, Armenia has a diplomat as its permanent representative to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization at its headquarters in Istanbul, but this Armenian diplomat's tasks are limited to the jurisdiction he has only under the parameters of the regional organization he is assigned to. He cannot perform consular services and cannot act as if he represents a bilateral diplomatic, or for that matter consular, service in Turkey.

Finally, the anomaly of non-normalized relations between Turkey and Armenia remain as one of the last vestiges of the long forgotten Cold War era. As the bipolar system of the Cold War collapsed, the iron curtain disappeared and countries in Europe all agreed that they would never allow the reappearance of new dividing lines between the peoples of the common European home. At a time when the United States and Cuba have also embarked upon a process of establishing diplomatic relations-although Donald Trump is now trying to reverse this process-it is incomprehensible to have a closed border between Turkey and Armenia in the heart of Caucasus at the center of Eurasia.

Normalization between Turkey and Armenia will be beneficial not only for the two countries but will also become an inspiration for the facilitation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Consequently, the region will enjoy a new dynamism for the enhancement of east-west and north-south relations.

Is Turkey-Armenia normalization likely to happen soon?

Although South Caucasus and its problems appeared to gain importance in Turkey's foreign policy between 2008 and 2009, it is also true that the region's importance has been relatively reduced in the last couple of years due to developments in the Middle East and North Africa. However, when one considers the effect of Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision on Turkey's recent foreign policy conduct, one can even question whether the previous importance attributed to the South Caucasus was circumstantial at best.

Middle East has always figured prominently in Turkey's foreign affairs and AKP's foreign policy has not been an exception. However, theirs had a fundamental difference from the previous governments' prioritization of the Middle Eastern matters in Turkey's foreign policy. During the first half of 1990's Turgut Özal also tried to reach out to the post-Soviet space and other neighboring geographical regions around Turkey but he was prudent to sustain the basic principles of Turkey's commitments to its western allies. Özal's policies sought to work together with the United States, for example, during and after the Gulf War. AKP's foreign policy, however, was developed with pursuit of a broader anti-status quo approach, dissociating itself from the U.S. policies. This interpretation is justified with the example of the Turkish Parliament's 1st of March 2003 vote against the use of Turkish territory by the U.S. troops for intervention in Iraq. This approach characterized as "non-first world axis" and "anti-Özal" vision has become one of the main elements of Turkey's foreign policy conduct under AKP, particularly in the Middle East.⁸ (Barkey, in defining AKP's foreign policy argues that AKP government "has little attachment to NATO and the other institutions and remnants of the Cold War and, therefore, feels no particular closeness to the US.")

AKP's direction toward the Middle East, particularly under the influence of Davutoğlu, therefore became a matter of identity and assertiveness. Davutoğlu has been frequently quoted to have mentioned Turkey as "regional protector to bring order to the Middle East". This, in time, has developed into a more ambitious commitment to and engagement with the region.

In the aftermath of the Arab upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey's engagement in the region did not only become more intense but also lost its impartiality. With the emergence of civil war in Syria, Middle East has become the most important focus in Turkey's

⁸ See: Barkey, Henry J., "Turkey and the Great Powers", in Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins, ed., *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, p.254.

foreign policy. Today, Turkey is perceived as a regional actor which is trying to define, pursue and implement its own hidden agenda in the region.

Another feature of AKP's foreign policy is its instrumentalization for domestic political purposes. Foreign policy matters related to the Middle East have direct relationship with Islam and this becomes an efficient instrument to manipulate the religious sentiments, emotions and nationalism based on all these primordial feelings. Under the circumstances, Middle East's priority in Turkey's foreign policy is unlikely to be reduced. The situation in Syria, Turkey's preparation to become a contributor to the de-escalation zone in Idlib, the referendum organized by the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the complications it may produce are all important factors to affect Turkey's focus toward the region.

Currently, Armenia can become a matter of attention only if there is an escalation of conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is unlikely to see a new momentum in the attempts for normalization of Turkey's relations with Armenia in the near future. Instrumentalization of foreign policy, nationalist and populist policies pursued for domestic purposes would create a reaction if Turkey tried to revisit the process of normalization unilaterally and this would very easily be exploited by the nationalist political parties in the opposition as well as by the similar ranks of AKP parliamentary group itself.

Moreover, the current in Turkey in the first decade of the twenty-first century was very much in line with the enhancement of fundamental rights for freedom and deepening and widening of democratization of the society in Turkey. As there was an attempt for rapprochement with Armenia, Turkey was also trying to reach out to its citizens of Kurdish origin with a view to launching a dialogue process in order to achieve historic reconciliation for the resolution of the so-called "Kurdish issue". These two processes, in essence, were the two complementary elements of a more comprehensive policy of democratization in Turkey.

Today, the dialogue process with Kurds in Turkey is practically terminated. There is also a risk of rising tension in Turkey against the Kurds due to the potential developments in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, it

would be unlikely for the government to return to the so-called “Armenian issue” which would immediately provoke nationalistic reactions. Azerbaijan’s influence on the Turkish street in that respect should not be underestimated as well.

What could be the way forward?

Taking into consideration the peculiarities of the process of normalization between Turkey and Armenia, the following scenarios could be envisaged:

1. Turkey changes its policy and suddenly makes an opening towards Armenia, such as opening the border or establishing diplomatic relations:

Such a development can only take place when the decision comes from a self-confident and authoritative executive leader. Under the circumstances, President Erdoğan will not be in favor of taking such a bold step forward. If he does, it will be open to exploitation by the opposition and he will easily be depreciated of his overwhelming authority. He would not risk losing authority and being exposed to criticism before the presidential elections. President Erdoğan can only take such a step forward if he wins the presidential elections, currently scheduled for 2019, and ensures an uninterrupted period of five years term of Presidency. Even in such a confident political setting, however, he will have to assure that Azerbaijan’s reaction will be moderate. Given the continuation of TANAP project and many other infrastructural projects currently underway, and financed by SOCAR in Turkey, it would be hard to figure out how Azerbaijan would respond. Similarly, Armenia may also show reluctance and may not find such an opening sufficient enough to restart the normalization process with Turkey because of domestic concerns. The Armenian leadership may be forced to ask for more from Turkey if and when such an opening takes place.

2. Armenia takes a bold step forward and declares willingness for establishment of diplomatic relations, ratifies the protocols:

This is less unlikely to happen as compared to the first scenario but if it happens, it can also happen only when a strong, authoritative, self-confident Armenian leader, with a relatively safe term of leadership in front

of him goes forward and takes the decision. Such a decision would certainly require effective advance coordination, not directly with Turkey, but either through a third party or a second track mechanism, to ensure that Turkey will not exploit the situation and ask for concessions in Nagorno-Karabakh. In return, Turkey may find this kind of an initiative easier to accept in spite of Azerbaijan, because the offer comes from Armenia. Turkey may also convince Azerbaijan that such a first step could give Turkey the opportunity to negotiate, not directly at the outset but perhaps at a later stage in the process, on small and incremental openings in Nagorno-Karabakh, too. Nevertheless, current political setting in Armenia, as well as the in the diaspora will hardly allow this scenario to happen.

3. Nothing happens, both sides wait for an opening from the opponent and the status-quo continues:

This is not to the benefit of either side. The only winner in that kind of a scenario will be Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan will successfully sustain the blockade on Armenia by exploiting the inability of Turkey to take an initiative and will continue to enlarge its military potential. Azerbaijan's long-term policy calculation will continue to be based on the military option. Therefore, this scenario should not be allowed to take a chance.

4. A third party takes the initiative to bring the two sides together with a view to breaking the ice:

World politics suffers from lack of pragmatic, effective and respectable leadership. Under the circumstances, neither the U.S. nor the Russian leaders would be considered as potential honest-brokers in the international community and they would be unwilling to take the risk of being unsuccessful, too. The only likely candidate seems to be President Emmanuel Macron of France, but he will have to see the real benefit of taking such an initiative, both internationally and domestically. Armenian diaspora in France is as sensitive as the one in the United States and they will also be demanding. Macron, if he sees a real benefit in making this issue as a major asset for enhancing his international image, may consider presuming such a role.

5. Slowly and gradually, confidence building measures continue with a view to creating the fertile environment for political leaderships to take decisions more easily:

The main problem between Turkey and Armenia is the lack of trust and confidence. This becomes the main handicap for both leaderships because they are not certain about the reaction of their counterparts. They hesitate to take bold steps forward because they cannot be sure that it will not be exploited by the other side. It is therefore necessary to prepare the necessary infrastructure by means of slow steps and gradual confidence building measures and create an environment of mutual trust and confidence. This can become a functional approach to problem solving, addressing less important issues which will not be politically contested and which will be more easily understood by the political elite. Increased people to people contacts, focusing on joint cultural and social projects, as well as small economic or other sectorial platforms to enhance bilateral cooperation should be considered. Such small steps would not necessarily draw the attention of public and should not necessarily be publicized but create an undercurrent which will come to fruition with strong and solid background. Projects along the common border such as restoration at Ani, or rehabilitation of cultural monuments, such as development of Akhtamar, could also be considered. Joint sport activities could also help. A joint Turkish-Armenian expedition to the summit of Mount Ararat, for example, could be a good start.

Conclusion:

Normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia is one of the essentials for the future stability and security in the South Caucasus. Currently, both countries hesitate to take the leading action mainly because of domestic concerns. Gradual and incremental steps of confidence building will help the political elite in both countries to overcome their hesitations through increased contacts between the two peoples. Failure to overcome the impasse between the two countries carries the risk of new tensions and escalation in the South Caucasus.

Furthermore, Turkish-Armenian normalization will also create a new positive spirit in the region which in turn will have a positive impact on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, too. Resolution of this conflict will enhance the environment of security and stability in the region.

Finally, overcoming these two pending issues in the South Caucasus will create a more favorable environment in the region for expanding the opportunities of multilateral cooperation.

**ՀԱՐԱՎԱՅԻՆ ԿՈՎԿԱՍԻ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ
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Քանալի քառեր՝ Հարավային Կովկաս, Թուրքիայի արտաքին քաղաքականություն, նորմալացում, ՀՀ-Թուրքիա հարաբերություններ, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն

Հոդվածում քննարկվում է Խորհրդային Միության փլուզումից հետո ստեղծված տարածաշրջանային նոր խորապատկերը և դրա առանձնահատկությունները՝ հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների համատեքստում: Մասնավորապես, վերլուծվում են այն գործոնները, որոնք պայմանավորում են Թուրքիայի՝ Հարավային Կովկասի հանդեպ վարած քաղաքականությունը: Թեև Հարավային Կովկասում Թուրքիայի վարած քաղաքականությունը մեծամասամբ առաջնորդվում է այդ երկրի որդեգրած նոր արտաքին քաղաքական ուղենիշներով, բայց և այդ քաղաքականության վրա իր ազդեցությունն ունի Թուրքիայի հիասթափությունը՝ կապված նրա՝ Միջին Արևելքում ունեցած փորձառության հետ: Թուրքիայի՝ «գրո խնդիր հարևանների հետ» քաղաքականության ամենաթույլ օղակը, անկասկած, ՀՀ-ի հետ հարաբերություններն են:

Հարաբերությունների նորմալացման ջանքերը, որ ստացել են «Ֆուտբոլային դիվանագիտություն» անվանումը, կարող էին նոր էջ բացել Հարավային Կովկասի համար: Այդ ջանքերը, սակայն, հաջողության չհասան: Ութ տարի առաջ կնքված Յուրիխյան արձանագրությունները այդպես էլ չեն վավերացվել երկու երկրներում, իսկ հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների ներկա վիճակը լուրջ խոչընդոտ է տարածաշրջանի անվտանգության ու կայունության տեսանկյունից:

Ի տարբերություն 2008-2009 թթ.-ի՝ այսօր Թուրքիայի արտաքին քաղաքականության առաջնահերթություններից չէ Հարավային Կովկասն ու նրա խնդիրները:

Հաշվի առնելով Հայ-Թուրքական հարաբերությունների առանձնահատկությունները՝ հողվածում քննարկվում են նաև հնարավոր փոփոխությունների սցենարներ: Ներկայացված սցենարների՝ իրականություն դառնալու հավանականությունը, սակայն, նվազում է, երբ հաշվի ենք առնում անվտանգության այն մակարդակը, որ կա երկու երկրների միջև: Երկու երկրների հասարակությունների միջև վստահության մակարդակի բարձրացումը աներկբա առաջնահերթություն պիտի լինի այդ երկրների հարաբերությունների նորմալացման ճանապարհին:

**NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS OF GEORGIA
(2005¹ AND 2011²): REGIONAL, SUB-REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
SETTINGS**

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Keyword: *Georgia's National Security Concept, Regional Security, South Caucasus.*

“Georgia regained its independence after seven decades of occupation.... The Rose Revolution of November 2003 once again demonstrated that democracy and liberty are part of the Georgian traditional values that are of vital necessity to the people of Georgia. Georgia, as an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and traditions, aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe's political, economic and security systems. Georgia aspires to return to its European tradition and remain an integral part of Europe”. (Georgia, National Security Concept 2005).

Abstract

On December 23, 2011, the Georgian Parliament approved Georgia's National Security Concept (NSC) for a second time, replacing the one adopted in 2005. The document reflects the changes that have taken place in the security environment of Georgia (predominantly events related to Russia), as well as their influence on the threats and challenges to its national security. It provides a solid opportunity to examine the country's official perceptions (and orientation) on security, its internal and external

¹ National Security Concept of Georgia 2005,
http://www.parliament.ge/files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf

² National Security Concept of Georgia
2011 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0ByCs3veKblaXU31FNzNRR0pwWEE>

security environments, and its contours of foreign relations. The key purpose of this paper is to analyze how and in what regional, sub-regional, or global settings is the country's foreign policy elaborated, as well as what are the dynamics for the period between the first and the second documents.

Return to European Track and Changes in Security Situation

The introduction of the 2005 NSC describes the "return to European track," and it highlights that "Georgia is integral part of European political, economic and cultural area." Thus, Europe is viewed as a wider "region" that Georgia is a part of, and Georgia's aspiration to become fully integrated into Europe's political, economic, and security system. Particularly, Georgia's Euro-Atlantic orientation of its foreign policy is directly shown through the following statement of the NSC:

"The Concept underlines the aspiration of the people of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system."

As clearly seen throughout the rest of the text, Georgia aims to join the Euro-Atlantic security system altogether with its attachment to (location in) the Black Sea Region.

The NSC 2011 Introduction highlights two clear components in describing the "changes in security situation:" one of them is connected to the Russian Federation, which is now a "key threat" to Georgia's security (as it "does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia.") The second aspect is more straightforwardly defined by EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, adding that eastward expansions have key importance. In the previous document, NSC 2005, however, the Russian Federation was mentioned through the perspective of possibly normalizing relations, stating Georgia's willingness "to establish (a) partnership based on the principles of good neighborly relations, equality, and mutual respect." However, a prerequisite for improvement of relations was announced, stating that the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit regarding

the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgian territory within the agreed timeframe. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.6)

In NSC 2011, it is specifically mentioned that: *“The military aggression by the Russian Federation in 2008, the occupation of Georgian territories, and the deployment of occupation forces in Georgian territories significantly worsened Georgia’s security environment. The 2008 war demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia’s choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy.”*

In NSC 2011, the Russian Federation is portrayed as a military aggressor in the Caucasus: a key region (“as a whole”) that Georgia is part of. For example, the document highlights this as: *“Security environment in the Caucasus is worsened by the military aggression by the Russian Federation together the instability in the North Caucasus and the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh”.*

Within NSC 2005, it is the development of friendly relations with neighboring states that receive special mention, without any specific reference to the Russian Federation in a wider context of stating Georgia’s will to “peaceful solution of all disputes based on norms of international law.”

European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union is expressed as a key foreign policy priority. European and Euro-Atlantic integration is clearly stated among Georgia’s national interests. In NSC 2011, it claims Georgia’s “aspirations to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures” as a free implementation of the right to “choose own strategic path for future development and the alliances to join”.

One of the main directions of Georgia’s NSC 2005 and “top priority of the Georgian foreign and security policy” is mentioned in the Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union as a realization of the “firm will of Georgian people.” In regard to NATO and EU integration, Georgia is seen as inseparably connected to the Black Sea

region. Particularly, Georgia's integration is seen as part of the Black Sea states as a means to reinforce the Black Sea region, which in turn is valued as the "South-Eastern border of Europe. "Once again, one can observe the role of Georgia as being geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.2; 5, 4)

The 2005 document mentions two key vectors of this integration: the NATO and EU structures. The document says, "Membership of NATO would not only endow Georgia with an unprecedented degree of military and political security, but would allow it to contribute to strengthening the security of Europe, particularly the Black Sea region". (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.4.1)

EU membership is seen as an important guarantee for Georgia's economic and political development, where Georgia's accession to the EU will strengthen Europe by restoring the Black Sea region as a European trade and stability zone. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.4.2)

NSC 2011 also includes the Integration into NATO and the EU as Georgia's sovereign choice, a priority which will strengthen Georgia's security and ensure its stable development stressing Georgia's enduring time as a part of Europe geographically, politically, and culturally, despite its limited time in the Euro Atlantic community due to historical cataclysms.

Georgia's membership in NATO is seen as twofold security guarantee as it provides domestic stability and security, *and* it in turn strengthens stability in the entire region. NSC 2011 explains the idea of Georgia being not only a "consumer" of security but also as an "investor" in collective security particularly through its participation in international missions. Integration into the European Union is seen as one of the most important directions of the nation's political and economic development and its process is being highlighted at every stage.

One of the main directions in both documents is seen in the Strengthening State Defense/Development of the defense and security system through "carrying out large-scale defense reforms" (2005) and through cooperation and learning from partner countries (2011.) Here, there is a clear and direct connection between strengthening state defense to

Georgia's Euro-Atlantic direction or continued integration into the Euro-Atlantic space.

Georgia: an energy corridor and transit potential

Georgia's transit and energy corridor functions are of "special importance," and its strengthening is seen as a national interest priority for Georgia in both documents. Among the directions, the 2005 Document mentions Georgia's active participation in international energy, transportation, and communications projects, in ensuring alternative energy and strategic resource supplies, and in developing strategically important regional infrastructure. (NSC 2005, paragraph 3.5) NSC 2011 highlights Georgia's readiness to "participate even more active in international energy, transport, and communications projects."

Energy Security Policy for both documents is based on the recognition of Georgia's role as an "energy corridor." In NSC 2005, it is "the key role Georgia has as a part of the East-West and North-South energy corridors (part of the corridor of energy resources from Caspian and Central Asian regions to the rest of the world) (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.9) For the 2011 document, it is "the role in supplying the rest of the world with energy resources from the Caspian Sea and Central Asian regions via alternative routes." Georgia welcomes the implementation of new projects in the framework of the South Energy Corridor, including those projects that will supply oil and natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions through Georgia to Europe. The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are listed as such projects.

In the 2011 document, the need for the diversification of energy resources and supplies is mentioned through ensuring participation in joint projects. Furthermore, it stresses the aim to develop the prospective projects that also include hydropower, clean energy, renewable energy, and electricity (with the goal to become an important regional exporter of electricity.)

“Region(s)”

Under the ‘Regional Stability’ section, Europe is discussed as the “foremost determinants of Georgia’s security environment” with parallel influences from the processes in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is said: “Particular importance” is attached to developments in the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus, and Russia as regional security system components. (NSC 2005, paragraph 3.2). In the NSC 2011, developments in Europe, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus are mentioned as “direct” determinants for Georgia’s national security, while Middle Eastern and Central Asian developments are written as auxiliary ones. In the 2011 document, Russia is removed from this section.

Region, Neighboring States: Russia and Territorial Integrity

“Infringement of Georgia’s Territorial Integrity” is mentioned as the “major national security threat” in the NSC 2005. Particularly, the document provides the logical chain of how if the infringement of territorial integrity is not addressed in a timely and efficient manner, it may endanger the existence of Georgia as a viable state. (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.1). The infringement is caused by “Aggressive separatist movements, inspired and supported from outside of Georgia,” which then led to armed conflict in the country. As a result, the following occurred: the de facto separation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia from Georgia, and the loss of control over these territories by the Georgian authorities. It should be noted that the formulation “outside Georgia” is used instead of naming the threats or pointing at a specific country, i.e. at Russia.

‘Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States’ is mentioned as one of the threats to National Security in different ways, mostly indirectly. It is possible that such a phenomenon causes destabilization in the country as it may elicit provocations from other state and non-state actors, and may also cause a large-scale influx of refugees into Georgia, thereby creating favorable conditions for transnational criminal activities and contraband (NSC 2005 paragraph 4.2). The role of Russia is identified indirectly through the following statement: “*Lack of control over the state border of*

Georgia with the Russian Federation along the perimeters of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia,” which in turn has the potential to increase the risks. The conflicts in the neighboring states including Northern Caucasus-related conflicts in Russia may also indirectly pose challenges, as a result of which Georgia may be involved in the conflicts.

As a source of danger, Russia is mentioned once as a “risk factor to the stability of the country in certain circumstances” created by the Russian Federation’s military presence (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.2). The document addresses the issue of withdrawal of the Russian military base, however defining it as “no longer a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, but rather as a “risk to national security” damaging the security environment in Georgia until their final withdrawal. (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.3) Moreover, it is mentioned that the normalization of Georgian-Russian relations is supposed to take place as a prerequisite for any potential withdrawal of military bases. Particularly, the text reads: “*Georgia welcomes the transition of the Russian Federation’s military bases to the “withdrawal regime” and believes that irreversible realization of the Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Russian Federation of May 30, 2005 will facilitate normalization of bilateral relations and strengthening of mutual confidence.*” (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.6)

In light of possible military intervention (s) as a threat, it is the state and non-state actors that are mentioned as potential source of danger. Granting passports by the Russian Federation to the citizens of Georgia “in certain circumstances, could be used as a pretext for intervention in Georgia’s internal affairs.” (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.3)

The discourse is changed in NSC 2011. Particularly, among the twelve threats, risks, and challenges to National security, three of them are directly connected to Russia: (a) Occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation and terrorist acts organized by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories; b) The risk of renewed military aggression from Russia, and c) Violation of the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees from the occupied territories). Part of the conflicts in the Caucasus as threats and challenges are also Russia-tied (“possible spillover

of conflicts from neighboring countries. RF's attempts to demonize Georgia among the population of North Caucasus, continuous conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with its possible risk of Russia's continuous influence over the entire region, etc.") Russia-tied risks are also described as Cyber-threats, Environmental challenges, and a significant terrorist threat, which is said to be "coming from the territories occupied by the Russian Federation."

NSC 2011 has a number one priority in its National Security Policy, and it is "Ending the occupation of Georgia's territories; relations with the Russian Federation."

In NSC 2011, key concepts include "Peaceful," "non-use of force," and "through international community involvement." The adoption of the term "occupation" in international political and legal documents is also an important component of the de-occupation policy. The documents states: *"In this regard, the documents adopted by the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the US Senate, and legislative bodies of other partner nations of Georgia carry great importance."* The aforementioned entities are seen as "partners" in the de-occupation process, as opposed to the Russian Federation grouping them under the concept "partner nations."

In NSC 2011, two concepts - "Good neighborly relations" and "preparedness to a dialogue" - are used as a possible vision for normalization of relations with the Russian Federation. This vision was referenced in NSC 2005 in a different frame. Prerequisites for the normalization process here is the beginning of de-occupation (2011), whereas for the 2005 document, it was the withdrawal of military bases from Georgia as according to the agreed plan. According to NSC 2011: *"Georgia is willing to have good-neighborly relations with the Russian Federation, based on the principle of equality—which is impossible without respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and the beginning of de-occupation. Georgia is willing to start a dialogue with the Russian Federation on these fundamental issues."*

The integration of Georgia into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is mentioned as not contradicting the Russian Federation's

interests. They are not viewed as part of a “competition” between two security systems that Russia is part of, but on the contrary, as something that would be beneficial. Particularly, the document states, “...it will foster peace and stability in the Caucasus, ensuring Russian security on its southern borders.”

Region: Caucasus and Neighbors

In the NSC 2011, relations with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan are framed within the Cooperation in the South Caucasus as one of Georgia’s National Interests. Although the framing of the Caucasus as a region was previously discussed, the South Caucasus as a region is revisited. Also from the document, Georgia’s view of the Caucasus as a whole and belief in the viability of the South Caucasus as a region is noted, as well as the hope in its possible transformation into “an economically attractive, peaceful, and safe region.” In the section devoted to natural protection, there is an attempt to view the Caucasus as a whole region, particularly bringing the people of the North Caucasus into the same agenda. The document states: “*The preservation of the unique nature of the Caucasus and of the region’s environmental security, along with the related issues, should become the subject of joint efforts by Georgia and the peoples of the North Caucasus.*” Furthermore, the document elaborates on the Caucasus as a whole region bringing forth the concept of “the Caucasus - common home for all individuals and groups living here” (NSC 2011). Meanwhile, Georgia’s supporting role for the development of multilateral cooperation is mentioned as a Black Sea littoral state. However, Nagorno-Karabakh as an unresolved conflict zone is a factor undermining the stability of the countries in the region. The 2011 document is consistent in viewing the possibility for joint regional activities that would include Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey simultaneously. Namely, it is stated as part of the environmental security policy. Particularly: “*Successful cooperation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Georgia will contribute to the protection of the natural environment and the improvement of environmental security.*” (NSC 2011)

In NSC 2005, there is a milder version of the belief in a viability of the South Caucasus as a whole “united region” to take form; the document expresses Georgia’s belief in the importance of elaboration of “joint approaches about the future of the region.” Regional stability is endangered by the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Georgia states its position regarding the conflict by situating it in the frame of “peaceful solution,” and advocates for “more active international involvement.” (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.4)

Relations of Georgia with Armenia and Azerbaijan

Relations of Georgia and Azerbaijan is mentioned as a “strategic partnership,” and appreciated with its regional energy (transportation) project component as not only economically important but also for its potential for stabilizing the region. In NSC 2011, the close cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan on political and security issues is mentioned separately, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration. The GUAM framework cooperation, Azerbaijan’s participation in the EU Eastern Partnership, and the NATO Partnership for Peace program are also mentioned as common formats

Georgian-Armenian relations are seen in the frames of the “traditional friendship between them” and defined as “close cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.” The relationship should focus on “deepening good neighborly relations.” Though the document states Georgia’s aspirations to strengthen trade, economic, and transportation ties with Armenia, it does not name any specific and/or current projects and initiatives. Multilateral formats are not mentioned with regard to Armenia-Georgia joint efforts or participation. EU Eastern Partnership participation and more active cooperation with NATO are mentioned as initiatives that Georgia welcomes. Armenia-Turkish relations are added to the lists that Georgia is supportive of in the 2011 Document.

The 2011 document is different from the 2005 one in its placement of Relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan among the Priorities of National Security Policy (2011), and is not in the Section where strengthening foreign relations are specified (2005).

It is worth noting the vision of the relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan comparatively. Particularly, in the NSC 2005, Armenia and Azerbaijan are mentioned as being on the same level in their titles (“partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan,” “historically established traditional good neighborly relations.”) However, the text further indicates a certain differentiation. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is “strategic partnership,” and for Armenia, it is “close partnership in the areas of mutual interest.” Azerbaijan is valued not only as a good neighboring state, but also for its potential to increase Georgia’s transit opportunities and energy diversification efforts. For Armenia, the benefit is rather seen as one-sided; focusing on Armenia’s benefit (“*Georgia believes that Armenia should benefit from Georgia's transit location by transporting Armenian goods through its territory.*”)

Azerbaijan is also mentioned also in the multilateral cooperation framework such as GUAM, EU ENP, and NATO PfP, contributing to the “harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common positions on various strategic issues.” Multilateral cooperation between Georgia and Armenia is mentioned as “active cooperation in BSEC,” and Armenia’s stronger connection with EU and NATO is welcomed.

Strengthening of foreign relations with international community both in bilateral and multilateral formats

In NSC 2005, the National security goal is seen as its strengthening of foreign relations with the international community both in bilateral and multilateral formats, which includes countries and organizations such as the United States (“strategic partnership”, paragraph 5.5.1,) Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region (GUAM, BSEC), OSCE, UN, CoE, as well as through Inter-regional cooperation (Baltic states, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia). (Paragraph 5.5)

Bilateral: United States of America

In NSC 2005, it is stated that Georgia continues to develop its strategic partnership with the United States of America. The support from USA to Georgia is valued in diverse areas including defense capabilities as

well as Georgia's participation in the anti-terrorist coalition led by the U.S. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.1)

NSP 2011 has the same statement about the continuation of the deepening of its strategic partnership with the U.S. Additionally, Georgian appreciation for U.S. support in de-occupation, financial support, deepening economic and trade relations, and strengthening Georgia's defense capabilities through US assistance programs is expressed.

Bilateral: Ukraine

With regard to Ukraine, both documents state the same framework for cooperation and fields of mutual interest. Georgia's relationship with Ukraine is situated under the title "strategic partnership" and introduced in the context of the Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as "confirmations of the belief in common values of democracy and freedom."

Bilaterally, the partnership in the fields of free trade, industrial cooperation, and military education and assistance is stressed. In foreign and national security policy terms, Georgia cooperates with Ukraine not only bilaterally but also multilaterally in forums such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE,) Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR,) and others. Georgia would welcome Ukraine's possible participation in the Secretary General's Group of Friends. The Euro-Atlantic integration process is seen as an area of Joint interest and cooperation.

Bilateral: Turkey – "a leading regional partner", "largest trade and economic partner"

Both documents discuss the "strategic partnership" with Turkey as an "a leading regional partner of Georgia," a "valuable military partner" (training, education and assistance in modernizing military infrastructure) by mentioning Turkish support to Georgia's efforts to develop stable economic, political, and military institutions.

In NSC 2005, Turkey is also valued for the partnership in trade and economy due to joint regional transportation and strategically important energy projects (i.e. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines). (NSC 2005 paragraph 5.5.3)

However, NSC 2011 has a slightly wider circle of joint interest and spheres for Georgian-Turkish cooperation. It again underlines the trade and economic partnership, stating that Turkey is Georgia's "largest trade and economic partner;" this is evident due to operating free trade and visa-free regimes between Georgia and Turkey. It is strategically important for both countries to continue "deepening economic, energy, and transport relationships, and the successful implementation of other projects" (i.e. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines, Nabucco, the Eurasian Oil Transport Corridor, White Stream, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway.) It is crucial to note the two countries military partnership. Turkey is "an important military partner", in addition to being a "regional leader" as a valued "NATO member-state."

Cultural heritage monuments are also mentioned as a sphere of cooperation.

Silencing Iran:

It is worth mentioning that Iran is absent from both documents; Iran is not stated as a regional power within bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Particularly, Iran is mentioned once among the countries of economic cooperation. It states: "*Georgia will continue economic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and other states of the Black Sea region, the Middle East, and Central Asia.*"

Multilateral: Black Sea Region and Others

Multilaterally, Georgia is perceived as a Black Sea country and is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic and European security.

Georgia's security policy is based on the principle that security in the Euro-Atlantic area is indivisible, and that Georgia, as a Black Sea country, is an integral part of it. Georgia welcomes ongoing integration of the Black Sea countries into NATO and the EU, and firmly believes that Georgia's

future lies with the more secure and stable Black Sea region and, consequently, with NATO and the EU. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.6)

Strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for Georgia. In this respect, Georgia attributes special importance to the cooperation in the following regional initiatives: GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) with a focus on U.S.-GUAM framework, BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) given the appreciating value of its serious economic potential and geopolitical importance, BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group,) and cooperating within the CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures) on the Black Sea (also known as the “Ukraine Initiative.”)

In NSC 2005, the inter-regional cooperation activities with Baltic Sea states is seen as important in terms of sharing the “Baltic experience of European and Euro-Atlantic integration,” and the support they get from these states for Georgia’s aspiration to integrate into NATO and the EU. The states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are also valued in terms of the support in Georgia’s European aspirations (“New Friends of Georgia group.”)

In its relations with Central Asian states, the key role of Georgia is to be a “natural link between West and East,” to attain a “close relationship,” and in promoting the free flow and exchange of energy resources, goods and information between the West and East. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.7)

NSC 2011 elaborates on the following inter-regional cooperation formats: Baltic states (sharing the experience of the Baltic States in European and Euro-Atlantic integration as well as the support from these countries to Georgia on its path to NATO and EU integration is important); Central and Southeast European and Scandinavian states; Moldova and Belarus (“great importance, welcoming their EU Eastern Partnership participation”); Cooperation with Central Asia regional states is based on accepting Georgia being “a natural bridge between Europe and Asia.” The main goal of this cooperation with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan is to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital between the West and East.

For Georgia, the following multilateral cooperation forums are listed as important for its national security environment: the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Council of Europe (NSC 2005, 2011).

Georgia places great importance on deepening political dialogue and economic relations with China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, the Persian Gulf states, Canada, India, Brazil, Australia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia in order to foster trade and investment, and to generate international support for Georgia.

It is seen as important to continue establishing diplomatic relations with Latin American and Caribbean states in order to provide for Georgia's economic growth, attract investments, and raise awareness of Georgia in these countries. Special attention should be paid to gaining further support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and to mutually beneficial cooperation within the UN and other international organizations.

Conclusion

In Georgia's Return to European Track, Europe is viewed as a wider "region" that Georgia is a part of, and Georgia's aspiration to become fully integrated in Europe's political, economic and security system.

The introduction of NSC 2011 clearly has two key features in describing the "changes in security situation:" one of them is connected to the Russian Federation, which is now a "key threat" to Georgia's security (as it "does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia,") and the other feature is more straightforwardly defined by adding the Eastward expansions as key importance in Euro-Atlantic and EU integration. Thus, inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union is recognized as a "Key Priority" as stated in both documents. With regard to NATO and EU integration, Georgia is seen as inseparable to the Black Sea region. Georgia's membership in NATO is seen as a twofold security guarantee; it's both Georgia's guarantee for stability and security, and for strengthening stability in the entire region.

Georgia puts its transit and energy corridor functions under the frame described as "especially important", and strengthening of which is seen as a

national interest priority in both documents. Georgia welcomes the implementation of new projects in the framework of the South Energy Corridor, including those projects that will supply oil and natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions through Georgia to Europe.

Europe is the wider “region” that Georgia puts itself in; it is the “foremost determinants of Georgia’s security environment” with parallel influences from the processes in the Middle East and Central Asia. “Particular importance” is attached to developments in the Black Sea basin, and the Caucasus as inclusive of regional security system components. In the 2005 document, Russia, though not in a supporting list, is part of the security system, while in 2011; it is removed from the listing.

“Infringement of Georgia’s Territorial Integrity” is mentioned as a “major national security threat” in NSC 2005. Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States is mentioned as one of the threats to National Security in different ways, mostly indirectly. The discourse changes in NSC 2011. Particularly, among the twelve threats, risks, and challenges to National security, three of them are directly connected to Russia. “Good neighborly relations” and “preparedness to have a dialogue” are the concepts used in NSC 2011 in relation towards the Russian Federation as a possible vision for the normalization of relations. This vision could be noted in the previous NSC 2005, but in a different frame. The beginning of de-occupation (2011) is a prerequisite for normalization, whereas in the 2005 document, it was withdrawal of military bases from Georgia as according to the agreed plan.

In NSP 2011, relations with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan are framed within the Cooperation in the South Caucasus as one of the National Interests. In both documents, the Caucasus *and* the South Caucasus are viewed as a region. Moreover, based on the document, Georgia’s view of the Caucasus as a whole and its belief in the viability of the South Caucasus as a region can be noted. It also includes the hope in its possible transformation into “an economically attractive, peaceful, and safe region.” Armenia and Azerbaijan are mentioned as being on the same level in their titles (“partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan,” and “historically established traditional good neighborly relations.”) However, the text later

reveals a noticeable differentiation. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is a “strategic partnership,” whereas for Armenia, it is a “close partnership in the areas of mutual interest.”

It is a goal for the national security to strengthen foreign relations with the international community bilaterally and multilaterally, which includes countries and organizations such as the U.S., (“strategic partnership,” paragraph 5.5.1), Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region (GUAM, BSEC), OSCE, UN, CoE, as well as through Inter-regional cooperation (Baltic states, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.)

Bilaterally, Turkey is a leading regional partner and is Georgia’s “largest trade and economic partner;” a slightly wider circle of joint interest and spheres for cooperation is evident in NSC 2011 in comparison to the 2005 document.

It is worth mentioning that Iran is absent from both documents; there is no mention regarding the country as a regional power or within bilateral and multilateral dimensions.

Multilaterally, Georgia is a Black Sea country that is vital in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Europe strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for Georgia.

**ՎՐԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ 2005Թ. ԵՎ 2011Թ.
ՀԱՅԵՑԱԿԱՐԳԵՐԸ. ՏԱՐԱԾԱՇՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ,
ԵՆԹԱՏԱՐԱԾԱՇՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԵՎ ԳՒՈՒՄԱԿ
ԿԱՐԳԱՎՈՐՈՒՄՆԵՐ**

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տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, Հարավային Կովկաս*

2011 թ. դեկտեմբերի 23-ին Վրաստանի Ազգային ժողովը հավանության արժանացրեց Վրաստանի Ազգային անվտանգության երկրորդ հայեցակարգը՝ փոխարինելով նախորդ 2005 թ. ընդունված

հայեցակարգը: Ընդունված փաստաթղթում արտացոլված են անվտանգության միջավայրում տեղի ունեցած փոփոխությունները (մասնավորապես Ռուսաստանին առնչվող միջադեպերը), ինչպես նաև ազգային անվտանգության վտանգների և մարտահրավերների վրա վերջիններիս ունեցած ազդեցությունները: Փաստաթղթերի փոփոխությունների ուսումնասիրությունը լայն հնարավորություն է ընձեռում քննելու երկրի պաշտոնական մոտեցումները (և կողմնորոշումները) անվտանգության, ներքին և արտաքին անվտանգային միջավայրերի և արտաքին հարաբերությունների ուրվագիծը: Այս հոդվածի հիմնական նպատակն է վերլուծել, թե երկրի արտաքին քաղաքականության հիմքում ինչպիսի ենթատարածաշրջանային, տարածաշրջանային և գլոբալ կարգավորումներ են ընկած՝ դիտարկելով այն Ազգային անվտանգության երկու հայեցակարգերում նկատված փոփոխությունների տեսանկյունից:

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: AZERBAIJAN

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Keywords: *National Security Concept, Regional Security, Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Caucasus, Azerbaijan Security Policy.*

This research discusses Azerbaijan's security and military dynamics, the influence of recent political and military development and processes in the Middle East and South Caucasus regions on Azerbaijan's security environment by analyzing Azerbaijan's National Security Concept documents (hereinafter referred to as Concept/NSC,) and Military Doctrine (hereinafter referred to as Doctrine/MD,) and President Ilham Aliiev's speeches.

The main issues discussed in this paper are as follows:

- Understanding the challenges and the threats defined in Azerbaijan's NSC and MD,
- Clarifying Azerbaijan's priorities in its security policy and implementation,
- Indicating how recent political and military developments in the Middle East and South Caucasus regions influence Azerbaijan's security environment.

Azerbaijan's perception of security policy is set out in two documents: "the National Security Concept" adopted in 2007, and "the Military Doctrine" of 2010.

The Concept is a set of goals, principles, and approaches to the policies and measures, all of which underline the independence, territorial

integrity and democratic development of the country, and integration into the Euro-Atlantic area as a strategic choice.¹ The main goal of the document is to protect the society and the state of Azerbaijan against internal and external threats.

1. THE CHALLENGES AND THREATS

The Azerbaijani National Security Concept, consists of four main components: political, economic, military, and ecological. Each of the aforementioned components have challenges and threats: both internal and external.

The documents' position debating the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict will be discussed later.

Political

According to a general definition typically found in the document's language, the disruption of the democratic system, hindering the implementation of state functions (NSC art. 3.2) as well as separatism and ethnic, political, regional extremism (NSC art. 3.3) are characterized as **internal** threats. The following issues are considered as real challenges to internal political stability:

- The fight against corruption, the maintenance of democratic rule, protection of human rights, and issues related to freedom of speech and press (NSC art. 4.3.1),
- The creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of religious and ethnic tolerance in the state (NSC art. 4.3.2),
- Preservation of the Azerbaijani cultural-historical heritage and increasing the scientific-educational level (NSC art. 4.3.3),

¹ Azərbaycan Respublikasının milli təhlükəsizlik konsepsiyası, Yekun müddəalar, 23 may, 2007 (National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan). http://www.mdi.gov.az/files/uploader/Milli_tahlukasizlik_konsepsiyasi.doc (19.06.2017)
Here in after the references to the document of the National Security Concept will be made in the text as in (NSC art.)

- Providing internal security, which can only be reached through a respect towards human rights and basic freedoms, in terms of developing civil society and social welfare (NSC art. 4.3.5),
- Migration processes and the measures taken against them by the state; developing mechanisms that regulate migration processes needs to make an effective immigration policy, strengthening international cooperation, and tighter control over migration processes (NSC art. 4.3.7),
- The creation of a professional workforce, and establishing a modern educational and training system (NSC art. 3.9).

This image of what defines Azerbaijan's internal political threats and challenges is also portrayed in the analysis of Ilham Aliyev's annual speeches made at the incumbent party conventions. There are two additional points that are found in the speeches: one refers to Heydar Aliyev and to the role and significance of the "New Azerbaijan" party in maintaining stability in the country, and the other is the absence of the opposition in the country.² However, the reports produced by international authoritative structures defending human rights show that these challenges are often not overcome. For instance, the Freedom House 2017 Country report on Azerbaijan shows that the press is not free,³ but Internet Freedom is considered partly free. (2017)⁴

In terms of international cooperation, the Concept considers the political, economic, and military overdependence on other countries as an **external** challenge and threat. (NSC art. 3.7)

The fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (NSC art. 3.4) the banning of unlawful drug trafficking and prevention of illegal arms trade, and the fight against organized crime are considered the external challenge. (NSC art. 3.5)

² See Ilham Aliyev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2005, <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/28>; Aliyev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2008 <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/40>; Aliyev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2013 <http://az.president.az/articles/8393>. (16.06.2017)

³ Freedom of Press 2017: Azerbaijan, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/azerbaijan> (19.06.2017)

⁴ Freedom of Net 2017: Azerbaijan, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/azerbaijan> (19.06.2017)

Although such issues are formulated in the Security Concept, Ilham Aliiev defines these elements a topical external political threat and challenge the fact that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not regulated, as seen in his platform speeches at “New Azerbaijan” party conventions.

In his speeches, the analysis shows how the rhetoric changes from peacefully resolving the issue⁵ to defining the talks as being unfruitful, and that the emergence of a more aggressive rhetoric and the recognition of territorial integrity principle as a single principle⁶.

Economic

The Azerbaijani dependence on oil and gas sectors is viewed as an internal threat: it can distort the macroeconomic stability and make the country vulnerable in case of global or regional economic crises. (NSC art. 3.8)

Diversification of the economy, the development of the non-oil sector, and liberalization of the economy are formulated as internal challenges. (NSC art. 4.3.4)

An **external** economic threat are considered as any attempt of distorting energy power projects by political means or the attempts of doing physical harm to the relevant infrastructures. (NSC art. 3.6)

The construction and launching of modern oil-gas platforms is considered as an **external** economic challenge (NSC art. 4.3.8.) In other words, the challenge is the detection and evaluation of threats to major oil and gas pipelines and terminals, taking preventive measures (NSC art. 4.3.8), and making the country a transit hub from north-south and west-east axis. (NSC art. 4.3.4) An external challenge is also considered to be modernizing the economy through the investing in modern technologies and developing the information technologies system, and developing alternative energy sources. (NSC art. 4.3.8)

Though the Concept discusses the necessity to diversify the

⁵ Ilham Aliiev Speech at “New Azerbaijan” Party conventions, 2005, <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/28> (18.06.2017)

⁶ See Aliiev Speech at “New Azerbaijan” Party conventions, 2008 <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/40>; Aliiev Speech at “New Azerbaijan” Party conventions, 2013 <http://az.president.az/articles/8393>. (16.06.2017)

economy, it should be noted that in his speech in 2008, I. Aliyev identified the importance of energy carriers from the intention of increasing Azerbaijan's political weight (influence).⁷ The 2013 speech, however, already discussed the necessity to reduce dependence on oil and energy infrastructures and the importance of providing security for the cargo transportation routes.⁸ Therefore, it can be stated that these challenges have not been overcome yet.

Ecological

The internal issues associated with nature protection according to the Concept are connected to the nature protection issues that stem from the continual use of outdated oil extraction methods in the Caspian Sea and in the Absheron peninsula. (NSC art. 3.11)

Another important issue for Azerbaijan is the springs reservoir for its drinking water, which is mainly located in neighboring countries. There are also significant traces of dangerous i.e. radioactive, chemical, and other harmful substances that impact Azerbaijan's environment. (NSC art. 3.11)

The PACE Resolution N2085 "Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived of water"⁹ includes the aforementioned phenomenon.

The NSC also claims that one of the "threats for Azerbaijan and for the whole region" is the Metsamor nuclear energy station located in the seismic zone in Armenia. (NSC art. 3.11)

Military doctrine

The military component of the Concept is formulated within the frame of the Military Doctrine.

The main goals of the MD are reviewing conditions, processes, and factors that create threats and prevent the implementation of a sound

⁷ Aliyev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2008
<http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/40> (19.06.2017)

⁸ Aliyev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2013
<http://az.president.az/articles/8393> (19.06.2017)

⁹ The PACE Resolution N2085 <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22429&lang=en> (19.06.2017)

security environment and Azerbaijan's national interests.¹⁰ MD is based on the principle of necessary and efficient defense. (MD art. 1.7)

The Doctrine's provisions, which are aimed at ensuring that the military should operate under security, military, political, economic, social, informational, legal and other measures through the coordination with state and local self-government bodies, Armed Forces, and other military units of Azerbaijan. (MD art. 1.9)

The NSC states that separatism, ethnic and religious extremism are all their manifestations, and that the existence of major terrorist groups in the region are potential sources of threat to Azerbaijan's national security. According to the article 2.17 of MD, different forces continue to fuel the separatist tendencies in different regions of Azerbaijan by separate forces. (MD art. 2.17)

According to the NSC, the unresolved conflicts in neighboring countries provide fertile ground for transnational organized crime and other illegal activities, as well as the outbreak of conflicts in the regional countries also threaten Azerbaijan. (NSC art.3.5)

According to MD, in cases of (1) violation of regional military balance, (2) the deployment of troops close to Azerbaijan's state borders or territorial waters, (3) participation of neighboring states in interstate conflicts, and (4) the existence of domestic conflicts or armed riots, Azerbaijani Armed forces and other armed units could be involved in security protection. (MD art. 3.24) Although it is not mentioned in the document, this provision is accredited to the Georgia-Russian war in August 2008, and the possibility of another outbreak of this war is considered to be an additional threat to Azerbaijan's security. Also, this can explain the reason for a hasty adaptation of the Military doctrine by the government of Azerbaijan without any public and parliament discussions.

The article 4.29 of MD states that the Azerbaijani Republic does not allow the placement of foreign military bases within its territory, except the

¹⁰ Azərbaycan Respublikasının Hərbi doktrinası, 17 iyun 2010, 1.5 müddəa (Military Doctrine of the Republic of Azerbaijan)

http://www.mdi.gov.az/files/uploader/harbi_doktrina.doc (23.06.2017)

Here in after the references to the document of the Military Doctrine will be made in the text as in (MD art.)

cases stipulated in the international treaties that it supports. However, the article also states that in case of fundamental changes in military-political conditions, Azerbaijan has the right to place foreign military bases in its territory or temporarily to allow foreign military participation in other forms. (MD art. 4.29)

In this context, the signing of a protocol¹¹ for placing a Turkish manpower of the Armed Forces in Azerbaijan is important. According to that protocol, there is an area allocated to the Turkish armed forces near the military airport that is situated near Baku's "Gzl sherkh" base and Sumgaiti Haji Zeinalabdin airbase. On July 20, 2016, the protocol allocating an area in Azerbaijan to the Turkish armed forces was signed by the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev. In September 2016, the aforementioned protocol was ratified by the Turkish Council of Ministers.¹² Interestingly, this accord between the two countries was reached after the Karabakh escalation in April 2016. This, in essence, is a powerful tool in the hands of Azerbaijan for making policy with regional actors.

It is worth mentioning that the protocol about the allocation of Turkish armed forces in Azerbaijan, signed in June 2016, is part of the Contract of cooperation in military education, technical, and scientific spheres, and is part of the Contract of Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance signed in 1996 and 2010 respectively between Turkish and Azerbaijani governments. Nevertheless, the text of the Protocol, signed in 2016, states that after the implementation of the latter, the documents signed in 1997 and 1999 are invalid. Despite that the Protocol is a revised version of the previous documents, the fact that the Turkish parliament has ratified the protocol as recently as June 2016, it is reasonable to state that the situation and processes have changed in the region, which have led to the revision of the previous agreements.

According to the Military Doctrine, the sole threat for Azerbaijan is the Republic of Armenia, while threats from other countries are less

¹¹ Signed in Baku, between the governments of two countries, on June 3, 2016

¹² The decision of Turkish Council of Ministers on Protocols:

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161006M2-1.pdf> (19.06.2017)

probable and pertinent. However, local clashes and confrontations are not excluded. (MD art. 5.42)

Terrorist acts, and the targeting of state-owned infrastructures (including energy) are also considered to be a source of instability and security threat. (MD art. 5.42)

The 4.28 article of the Doctrine affirms that Azerbaijan has no intention of beginning military operations against any other state unless it becomes "**the victim of aggression.**" Article 4.26, of that document claims that Azerbaijan is interested in establishment, development, and the strengthening of friendship, partnership, or allied relations with its neighbors and other countries without taking military action.

In addition, article 4.1.3 of NSC states, that The Republic of Azerbaijan has made its airspace and airfields available in support of the international fight against international terrorist organizations. (NSC art. 4.1.3)

Nagorno-Karabakh

In both the NSC and MD, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is characterized as a main challenge against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. According to the NSC, "the aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan" is a major determinant of the country's security environment and is a key factor in the formulation of its national security policy. (NSC: chapter 1)

According to article 2.14 of MD, "Armenia's continual occupation of Azerbaijan's territories" is the chief threat for Azerbaijan (MD art. 2.14.) The NSC states that restoration of its territorial integrity by making **use of all means laid down in international law** is a key objective of the National Security Policy of Azerbaijan. It should be noted, that two articles of MD (4.28 & 5.43) unanimously state that Azerbaijan has the right (by using all necessary means, **including force**) to liberate the territories "that have been seized and re-establish the territorial integrity" of the country.

It should be noted that the National Security Concept does not directly mention the use of military force.

The Articles found in the MD concerning the use of military force is

directly connected with tabling “the Madrid principles.”

The fact that Azerbaijan defines Articles about using military force can be viewed as a bid to strengthen its stance in the negotiation process. This means that in case of not accepting “the Madrid principles,” it has the right to use military force: the escalation of April 2016 is a clear example.

The annual growth of Azerbaijan’s armament should be viewed from this perspective.¹³

Furthermore, according to Article 4.28 of MD, any political, military, economic, or other support provided to the Republic of Armenia and “to the separatist regime created with Armenia's support on Azerbaijani territory with the aim of official recognition of the results of occupation” will be interpreted as an act directed against the Republic of Azerbaijan. (MD art. 4.28)

Article 3.10 of NSC claims that the excessive accumulation of armaments and weapon systems in the region undermines regional stability and may distort the military balance between the countries in the region. A military build-up exceeding reasonable national security purposes, including the foreign military bases lacking effective control mechanisms, may create concerns about each player’s intentions and can result in a regional arms race.

With regard to practical approaches to the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict, it can be inferred from Ilham Aliyev’s speeches at Munich Security Conference that there are two main problems that should be addressed:

- Humanitarian (refugees, displaced); connected with the security of spring water resources (in the speech of 2016 it acquires an element of nature protection),
- Political; that is, the precondition of de-occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s environmental territories for the improvement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

Regarding to the question of the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ilham Aliyev has announced that “Azerbaijan does not interfere in relations between two sovereign countries, and both Turkey and Armenia are sovereign countries and the relations between the two countries should be considered only by two

¹³ Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, Pivot table of World Arms Import 2008-2019. pp 604-607, <http://www.armstrade.org/files/obrazecglava4.pdf> (21.06.2017)

countries." According to Aliyev, the opportunity should be granted to Armenia and Turkey to find a solution amongst them. However, simultaneously, Aliyev has noticed that if the normalization processes in Turkish-Armenian relations and the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are carried out in one package, peace can be achieved in the region.¹⁴ Unlike these formulations, İlham Aliyev's rhetoric is rather aggressive and militant when he makes speeches at "New Azerbaijan" incumbent party conventions: this may be due to his speech being addressed to the home auditory.¹⁵

In reality, "the Madrid principles," around which the two sides negotiate, continue to be the main map of regulating the conflict, even though, Azerbaijan continues to acquire more armor simultaneously.

2. AZERBAIJAN'S SECURITY POLICY PRIORITIES

For understanding Azerbaijan's security policy priorities, it is important to analyze the speeches of different high-ranking officials of Azerbaijan, particularly, the speeches of president of Azerbaijan İlham Aliyev and the Foreign Secretary Elmar Mammadyarov made during international security meetings such as Munich Security Conference.

The main issues discussed by the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are as follows:

- The issue of Economic security,
- The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. (see above)

Economic Security Issue

In all of his speeches delivered at the Munich Security Conference used in this research, Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev has always announced that energy security cannot be separated from national security.

According to Aliyev's speeches, investments in oil reserve were the only way for the Azerbaijani Republic to strengthen its independence and

¹⁴ Prezident İlham Əliyev Münxen Təhlükəsizlik Konfransının "Təbii sərvətlərin təhlükəsizliyi və dəyişən qlobal güc" mövzusunda müzakirələrində iştirak etmişdir, 05 fevral 2010, <http://files.preslib.az/site/ialiyev/2010.pdf> (22.06.2017)

¹⁵ İlham Aliev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2005, <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/28>; Aliev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2008 <http://yap.org.az/az/view/pages/40>; Aliev Speech at "New Azerbaijan" Party conventions, 2013 <http://az.president.az/articles/8393> (19.06.2017)

overcome difficulties in the 1990s. In one of his speeches made in 2017, Aliyev especially emphasized the importance of the pipeline system of three different pipelines connecting Azerbaijan with European markets, and connecting Azerbaijan with the countries on route to European markets.¹⁶ According to Aliyev, the pipeline system opens new prospects for a regional cooperation format where there are some Caucasian countries – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, and then countries of the European Union i.e. Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Albania.¹⁷

During the Munich Security Conferences in 2017 and 2016, Aliyev also highlighted the importance of diversifying Azerbaijan's export potential and reducing its economic dependence on oil and gas.¹⁸

Aliyev also mentioned in his speech that for the government of Azerbaijan, energy security and energy policy was a way to modernize, to diversify, and to invest in the infrastructure because the money accumulated from oil sales was invested in infrastructure in order to reduce oil dependence. According to Aliyev, that diversification policy resulted in today's non-oil sector, which accounts for more than 70% of Azerbaijan's GDP.¹⁹ Aliyev also announced that Azerbaijan depends on oil prices with respect to the country export as oil and gas account for 90% of Azerbaijan's total export.²⁰ In spite of this, the CIA World Factbook's Azerbaijan report states the portion of non-oil sector in GDP of Azerbaijan in 2016 was around 50%.²¹

Aliyev underlined the importance of implementing large-scale reforms including privatization, diversification of the economy, improvement of business climate in order to reduce the dependence on oil

¹⁶ Ilham Aliyev attended roundtable of Munich Security Conference 17 february 2017, <http://en.president.az/articles/22869> (19.06.2017)

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ President Ilham Aliyev attended Energy Security Roundtable as part of Munich Security Conference, 12 february 2016 , World of diplomacy journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Azerbaijan, http://www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/Diplomatiya_Alemi_41.pdf (19.06.2017)

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ CIA World factbook: Azerbaijan, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html> (18.06.2017)

and gas, and the importance of investments in technology, non-oil economy, agriculture, and ICT.²²

In the 2015 Speech, Aliyev announced that issues related to energy policy are strongly linked to national interests and to the global political map of Europe in the South Caucasus region.²³ He mentioned the importance of the agreement with Turkey on the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline – TANAP. He also highlighted the importance of the cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and the other EU countries involved in the Southern Gas Corridor project, among others. According to Aliyev, the Southern Gas Corridor is an energy security project, and therefore, it should be treated as a project of national security of the countries involved²⁴.

During the Munich Security Conferences in past three years (2017, 2016, 2015,) Aliyev mainly discussed the importance of decreasing the dependence of Azerbaijan's economy on oil and gas and developing the other non-oil economic fields. This is likely connected to the global drop in oil prices. In the earlier speeches, Aliyev especially concentrated on the issue of diversification and finding the right balance between the producer, Azerbaijan, and consumers.²⁵

It should be noted that during one of the 2012 speeches, Aliyev also spoke about environmental problems. According to Aliyev, for many years, Azerbaijan's oil reserves have been developed without any attention being paid to the environment. He has also mentioned that it is Azerbaijan's obligation to clean up the “legacy” left over from the previous decades of oil production off- and onshore, and to contribute to the global environmental cause.

²² President Ilham Aliyev attended Energy Security Roundtable as part of Munich Security Conference, 12 february 2016 , World of diplomacy journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Azerbaijan, http://www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/Diplomatiya_Alemi_41.pdf (19.06.2017)

²³ Ilham Aliyev attended “Diversification strategies” roundtable of the Munich Security Conference 06 february 2015, <http://en.president.az/articles/14264> (19.06.2017)

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Munich Security Conference, 4 february 2012 , <http://en.president.az/articles/4209> (20.06.2017)

In his Speech in 2010, Aliyev particularly concentrated on the issue of conducting oil and gas exports from Azerbaijan to European countries.²⁶ He also underlined the importance of investments in creating infrastructure and pipeline projects for exporting gas and oil from Azerbaijan to European markets²⁷.

Another noteworthy security formula is the so called “3G concept” announced by Foreign Secretary of the Republic of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov in 2013 during the Munich Security Conference:

- Geology - oil and energy resources of Azerbaijan,
- Geography - Azerbaijan under connection between east and west, and south and north,
- Geo-strategy - both geology and geography move Azerbaijan to geostrategic position.²⁸

The analysis of the reflection of Economic Security issues at the Munich Conference platform shows that Azerbaijan is attempting to present itself as a stable (longstanding) partner to the international community and potential investors. That is, a country with diversified, modernized, and is a non-oil dependent economy, yet is also as a reliable energy supplier and carrier on the other hand.

3. REGIONAL AND EXTRA REGIONAL/GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEMS

Although it is mentioned in the NSC that integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other institutions, cooperation with NATO and NATO member-states constitutes the strategic goal of the Republic of Azerbaijan (NSC art. 4.1.2.,) the MD

²⁶ Prezident İlham Əliyev Münxen Təhlükəsizlik Konfransının “Təbii sərvətlərin təhlükəsizliyi və dəyişən qlobal güc” mövzusunda müzakirələrində iştirak etmişdir, 05 fevral 2010, <http://files.preslib.az/site/ialiyev/2010.pdf> (24.06.2017)

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Security and Stability in Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus, Elmar Maharram oğlu Mammadyarov (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan), 2 February 2013, https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-search/s_video/breakout-session-security-and-stability-in-southeastern-europe-and-the-caucasus/s_term/Elmar/38:40—48:35minutes

Document does not mention the integration of Azerbaijan with Euro-Atlantic structures as a strategic goal. At the same time, the MD document only affirms Azerbaijan's continued willingness to cooperate with NATO, particularly in its peacekeeping missions. (MD art 7.61)

On the topic of cooperation with international organizations, the NSC identifies the UN, OSCE, the Council of Europe, Organization of Islamic Conference, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, and GUAM as organizations “of great importance for the security and foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” (NSC art.4.1.4)

Since the adoption of the Document, it is clear that the cooperation level with OSCE is the lowest. The Baku Office of the Organization is closed. Despite that, the OSCE Minsk Group remains as the only political tool for resolving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

On the level of regional cooperation, the NSC gives priority to the “trilateral strategic partnership and deepening cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey” as a stabilizing factor in the region, mainly because of its importance as a hydrocarbon infrastructure corridor. The NSC sees Armenia as the main destabilizer in the region and views the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement as a precondition of normalizing bilateral relations. (NSC 4.1., 5.1)

The NSC identifies the relations between **Azerbaijan and Russia** as one of “strategic partnership and cooperation.”

The other aspect of regional cooperation is the establishment of “peaceful and good neighborly relations **with Caspian littoral countries** and joint participation in regional projects.” The document mentions Russia and Kazakhstan as key partners among the Caspian littoral countries. In spite of this, the Concept mentions that Azerbaijan shares “a common rich, historical and cultural heritage” with Iran and “is interested in promoting mutually beneficial relations with Iran in political, economic, cultural and other spheres.” (NSC art. 4.1. 5.1)

According to the NSC’s main vectors of non-regional cooperation, Azerbaijan sees the expansion of economic and political relations with the Baltic, East, and South-East European States, the **Far East and South-**

East Asia (China, Republic of Korea, and Japan), and the Central Asian countries, Middle Eastern countries (NSC art. 4.1., 5.2,) and also defining Azerbaijan's relations with the U.S. as a strategic partnership.

Though the NSC mentions the significance of cooperation with Turkey, Georgia, USA, Russia, NATO, and with GUAM member states (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova,) and refers to some of them as strategic partners, the MD perhaps significantly does not identify any other country as an ally.

According to the NSC, bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey (which are sharing ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinity) are further expanding and deepening on the level of **strategic partnership**. (NSC 4.1.5.1) However, the final version of the MD does not name Turkey (or any other state) **as an ally**. This can be connected with Baku's indignation because of the Zurich Protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009. The protocols were aimed at opening the borders and establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, this process was stopped.

In Azerbaijan's security sphere, regional and non-regional cooperation can be described as balanced, based on the creation of a checks system.

On the regional level, Azerbaijan has been able to play on the contradictory interests of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. Thus, the signing of the 2016 Protocol for deploying Turkish Armed Forces in Azerbaijan should be viewed in this context (see above.)

The European region sees Azerbaijan mainly as a potential market for energy resources and consumption, or as a transport hub for goods.

4. MIDDLE EAST TRANSFORMATIONS AND AZERBAIJAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

As a corollary of transformation processes going on in the Middle East, there is a high level of terrorist threat, which in turn, is a threat to Azerbaijan's security. Particularly, the activities of the DAESH and the membership of Azerbaijani residents to that group and, generally, the Azeri participation in the Syrian conflict make the aforementioned threats

feasible.

The number of Azerbaijani fighters in Syria started to increase with the growing international prominence of DAESH. They mainly formed a separate Azerbaijani Jamaat in “Jaish al-muhajirin wa-l-ansar” group. According to a “Combating Terrorism Centre” report published in April 2016, more than 4,000 foreign fighters from 71 countries joined ISIS in 2013-2014, and 122 of those fighters are Azerbaijani residents.²⁹ According to other sources, 1,500 people from Azerbaijan went to Syria to fight with DAESH, but now, given the deteriorating security situation, many of them are returning home where they pose an increasingly serious problem for Baku.³⁰ On the other hand, in March 2017, Lieutenant General Madat Guliyev of The State Security Service of Azerbaijan reported that upwards of 900 Azerbaijani citizens have joined the ranks of ISIS terrorists in Syria and Iraq.³¹

SINIR DIŐI EDİLEN / DEPORTATION INFORMATION

AB ÜYESİ İLK 10 ÜLKE / TOP 10 EU COUNTRIES

İLK 10 ÜLKE / TOP 10 COUNTRIES

UYRUĐU / NATIONALITY	TOPLAM TOTAL
FRANSA / FRANCE	252
ALMANYA / GERMANY	133
BİRLEŐİK KRALLIK / UNITED KINGDOM	106
İSVEÇ / SWEDEN	55
BELÇİKA / BELGIUM	37
AVUSTURYA / AUSTRIA	31
DANİMARKA / DENMARK	23
HOLLANDA / HOLLAND	22
BULGARİSTAN / BULGARIA	21
İSPANYA / SPAIN	21
DİĐER / OTHER	71
TOPLAM / TOTAL	772

UYRUĐU / NATIONALITY	TOPLAM TOTAL
RUSYA / RUSSIA	804
ENDONEZYA / INDONESIA	435
TACİKİSTAN / TAJIKISTAN	308
İRAK / IRAQ	278
FRANSA / FRANCE	254
AZERBAYCAN / AZERBAIJAN	252
FAS / FAS	183
MISIR / EGYPT	150
SUUDİ ARABİSTAN / SAUDI ARABIA	141
ALMANYA / GERMANY	133
DİĐER / OTHER	2.019
TOPLAM / TOTAL	4.957

²⁹ Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, Don Rassler, The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016, p. 11, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CTC_Caliphates-Global-Workforce-Report1.pdf (19.06.2017)

³⁰ “ISIS Fighters Returning to Azerbaijan Seen Creating Serious Problems for Baku,” Goble, P., Windows on Eurasia, 7 november 2015, <http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.nl/2015/11/isis-fighters-returning-to-azerbaijan.html> (19.06.2017)

³¹ State Security Officer: More Than 900 Azerbaijanis in the Ranks of ISIS, p. 57, 7 March 2017, <https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/21656/> (28.06.2017)

Azerbaijani citizens usually try to cross the conflict zones from Turkey. According to the General Directorate of Migration Management, from 2011 – July 2017, 4,957 foreign individuals were listed as foreigners who were arrested and/or deported at the border cities while trying to cross the conflict zones. 252 of these individuals were citizens of Azerbaijan.³²

It should be noted that the Azerbaijani residents are engaged in the Syrian conflict both in Sunni radical groups and in pro-governmental Shia/Iranian groups.³³

The engagement of the Azerbaijani residents in the Middle East conflict and their affiliation to either terrorist groups, or “non-legitimate military” groups distort the Azerbaijani Security environment. On one hand, they promote the spread of Sunni extremist ideology in the country, which results in the increase of risk of terrorism. Yet on the other hand, it promotes the deepening of the Sunni-Shia division inside the country.

CONCLUSION

1. Nearly 10 years have passed since the adoption of the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, and a lot of changes have occurred. With that, new problems and challenges in the South Caucasus and Middle East regions have also taken place, so these documents should be updated to address security concerns, and to allocate responsibilities among different national security institutions.

According to the NSC and MD, the main threats and challenges for Azerbaijan’s security are:

- Separatism, ethnic, political, and religious extremism,
- Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
- External political, military, or economic dependence,
- Violation of The Republic of Azerbaijan’s state borders by military

³² Turkey’s Fight Against DEASH, Ministry of interior of Turkey, July 2017, <http://www.mia.gov.tr/kurumlar/mia.gov.tr/Genel/deas%CC%A7%207%20temmuz.pdf> (23.07.2017)

³³ Konfliktoloq, siyasi İslamın araşdırmaçılarından olan Arif Yunusun Publika.Az –a müsahibəsi, 3 Fevral 2014, <http://publika.az/news/nida/3970.html> (21.06.2017)

units and armed groups,

- Diversification of the economy and development of the non-oil sectors,
- The safeness of drinking water sources and the existence of the Metsamor atomic station,
- Regional militarization, creation of military bases in the region or directly near the state borders and water territories of the Azerbaijani Republic.

The main objectives that Aliyev points out in his speeches at the “New Azerbaijan” Party Conventions concern strengthening the country's internal stability, where the consumer is mainly the inner auditorium. For the inner audience, Aliyev uses more military rhetoric concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and he promotes Heidar Aliev's cult of personality. By the logic of ruling elites in Baku, this can strengthen the country's internal stability.

Though it is not directly mentioned in the MD and NSC texts, the increase of Iran's influence on the Shia Muslim population of Azerbaijan is also considered as an external threat. One of the most interesting cases referring to Iran's influence is the Shiite village of Nardaran on the Absheron Peninsula. In Nardaran, Iran's influence facilitated the emergence of a higher degree of religiosity amongst the population with a more profound degree of respect for Islamic traditions. The authorities of Azerbaijan occasionally carry out operations against the population of Nardaran. One of the most recent examples of this is the armed clashes between the population of Nardaran and police in 2015.³⁴

2. The priorities of the Azerbaijani Security Policy outline two directions: settlement of the Karabakh Conflict, and Energy Security issues.

The unresolved Nagorno Karabakh Conflict is a main challenge against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The resolution format of the Karabakh conflict is within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group Mandate. The so-called “Madrid Principles” that are

³⁴ Azerbaijan Deepens Crackdown On Shi'ite Stronghold, December 01, 2015, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-nardaran-raid/27400436.html> (24.06.2017)

on the negotiating table are acceptable for Azerbaijan. For clarification purposes within that frame, Azerbaijan has prescribed its right of using arms in the Military Doctrine to restore regional integrity.

In the security sphere, Azerbaijan's policy is to provide transit by connecting the North-South and West-East axis. It is also trying to participate in various projects held by the geopolitical center with its own hydrocarbon resources, trying to maneuver in the domain of clashes of interest, and to expand its role and position.

3. On the regional and extra-regional levels, Azerbaijan is trying to balance its security issues through estimating the interests of the parties engaged; positioning itself as a provider of hydrocarbon resources and a country of North-South and East-Western transit routes.

It can be inferred that integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, security, economic and other institutions, and cooperation with NATO and NATO member-states constitutes a strategic goal. In accepting the U.S. as a sole regional actor, it also prescribes relations with the U.S. as a strategic priority.

From security perspective, Azerbaijan's approaches to its relations with regional countries are twofold. On the one hand, the importance of trilateral relations between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan for maintaining stability in the South Caucasus and providing the uninterrupted functioning of transit roads is of great interest, yet so are the possibilities of maneuvering within a clash of regional interests between Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In this regard, Turkey is Azerbaijan's main partner, with a high cooperation level, even though it is not stated as an ally in the documents.

The signing of the protocol for allocating a territory to the Turkish Armed Forces in the Azerbaijani region is a key tool for Baku to maintain security, which can be employed in extreme and/or major force situations only, as it might undermine self-government of the country.

Unlike Baku, Turkey can implement functions from the protocol, as it dramatically increases Turkey's role in the regional sphere.

In the case of ratifying the agreement, Turkey will be in the Caspian Sea basin, as according to the protocol, the site of the Turkish staff is

Sumgait. Appearing in the Caspian basin, Turkey will impose new realities on Iran and Russia. Another important fact is that Sumgait is the center of Sunnite Muslims with wahabi/ ikhwanji moods and the choice of the site is not accidental.

4. The Middle East transformation processes and, especially, the activities of Islamic extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, present certain dangers. Azerbaijani citizens are involved in the Syrian conflict both among opposition militants, and in the Syrian governmental forces. The return of these forces to Azerbaijan is a source of instability for the authorities. On the one hand, the Sunni extremist moods intensify, and on the other, the role of Iranian influenced groups on public life increases.

Turkey may be viewed as a most interested party in strengthening the Sunni extremist groups (which mainly share the ikhwanji ideology,) as it can use these factors as a tool for keeping the Azerbaijani authorities under dependence.

**ՏԱՐԱԾԱԾՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ ԱԴՐԲԵՉԱՆ**

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Քանալի քառեր՝ Ադրբեջանի ազգային անվտանգության հայեցակարգ, ռազմական հայեցակարգ, Արցախյան հակամարտություն, Հարավային Կովկաս, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն

Հետազոտությունը ներկայացնում է Ադրբեջանի ռազմական և ազգային անվտանգության հայեցակարգերը և դրանց փոփոխման դինամիկան, ինչպես նաև փորձ է արվում ցույց տալ Մերձավոր Արևելքում և Հարավային Կովկասում ընթացող քաղաքական և ռազմական գործընթացների ազդեցությունը Ադրբեջանի անվտանգային միջավայրի վրա: Հետազոտության հիմքում ընկած են Ադրբեջանի «Ազգային անվտանգության հայեցակարգ» և «Ռազմական դոկտրին» փաստաթղթերը և այդ երկրի նախագահ Իլհամ Ալիևի ելույթները:

Հետազոտության հիմնական խնդիրներն են.

- Հասկանալ «Ազգային անվտանգության հայեցակարգ» և «Ռազմական դոկտրին» փաստաթղթերում նախանշված Ադրբեջանին ուղղված մարտահրավերները և սպառնալիքները,
- Հասկանալ Ադրբեջանի՝ ազգային անվտանգության քաղաքականության առաջնահերթությունները,
- Պարզել Ադրբեջանի դիրքորոշումը տարածաշրջանային և գլոբալ անվտանգային համակարգերի հարցում,
- Սահմանել մերձավորարևելյան և հարավկովկասյան տարածաշրջաններում ընթացող ռազմական և քաղաքական գործընթացների ազդեցությունը Ադրբեջանի անվտանգային միջավայրի վրա:

NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

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Keywords: *Iran, national security, Islamic ideology, Iran-Armenia.*

*“Our national interest is not separate from our Islamic interest:
These two phenomena are inseparable.”
-Leader of IRI Ali Khamenei*

The national security strategy of a given country is based on its national interests and is defined by taking into consideration geographic, historical, political and economic aspects of its past and present. The same is true about the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, what distinguishes it from the national security strategies of other countries is the religious ideology that shapes the “nation” and as a result, its “national security.” Although IRI has never produced available documents of its National security strategy or Foreign policy doctrines, the history of the country’s political behavior and current steps by the Iranian political and military actors provide a possibility to draw the main characteristics of its national security assumptions. In other words, “Iran’s National security policy behavior must be understood in its discursive context.”¹

The national security strategy of Islamic Republic of Iran consists of different, sometimes contradictory assumptions of self-identity. Some researchers believe that Iran’s current religio-political system constructs and maintains several identities. Namely:

- Iranian identity,
- Islamic identity,

¹ManshourVarasteh, “Understanding Iran’s National security doctrine”,UK, 2013, p.21 (01.05.2017)

- Shia identity, and
- Revolutionary identity.²

Although the supreme Leader of Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that “there is no national interest without Islamic interest”, the analysis of the available documents and speeches by members of the political establishment of the country show that Iranian National interest is waved from not only Islamic, but also national, Shia’, and Revolutionary identities of Iran.³ These identities and identity-based interests are the main sources of Iran’s national security strategies dimensions and its objectives.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic as a result of Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has adopted a constitution that is based on the ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of Velayate Faghih.⁴ This concept emphasizes the need of jurists’ government in an age of big occultation of the imam Mahdi.⁵ In this kind of government, the power structure is complicated and consists of several mutual supervisory bodies. As a result, the country’s foreign and security strategies are being knitted and supervised in the different political, military, and religious structures.

Thus, for the foreign and security issues of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the responsible entities are the Office of the Leader, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Intelligent service, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s Corps with its special unit named Quds Force, the conventional military of Iran, and the Supreme Council for National Security.⁶The latter, however, is the key national security and defense assessment body according to the constitution. The members of the council are ex-officio members and include the representatives of IRGC, the

² Some researchers emphasize the “Persian” not “Iranian” identity, J .MatthewMcInnis, “The Future of Iran’s security Policy”, AEI, 2017, p.7, available at <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The-Future-of-Irans-Security-Policy.pdf> (10.07.2017)

³ The name of the country “Islamic Republic of Iran” by itself expresses markers of two identities; the origins of other two are anchored in the constitution of the country.

⁴ “Constitution of the Islamic Republic”, Encyclopedia Iranica, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic> (02.05.2017)

⁵“Islam in Iran vii. The concept of Mahdi in Twelver Shi’ism”, Encyclopedia Iranica,<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-vii-the-concept-of-mahdi-in-twelver-shiism> (02.05.2017)

⁶Kevjn Lim, “National security decision-making in Iran”, Open Briefing: The Civic Society Intelligence Agency, 2015, p.3 (06.05.2017)

Artesh, and the heads of three powers. Some members of the council join the council for the short-term for discussing certain issues. This body gathers meetings in order to discuss ongoing threats of the country and accepts resolutions.

For the conventional military of the IRI, the border of their responsibilities are the political borders of IRI, whereas the borders of IRGC are “the borders of Islamic revolution” and for the Leader of IRI protecting Iran’s borders means protecting “the heart of Islamic world.”

Although ayatollah Khomeini has said that “revolution was not about the price of watermelons,” the economy of the country and its problems and challenges have a significant impact on the foreign and security policies of Iran, and economic growth and independence have become the top priorities of the country’s leadership so far. In the 20 Year Development Plan of the country adopted in 2005, it is predicted that by the end of the implementation of the plan, “Iran would be a fully advanced country, rising to the number-one rank in economic, scientific, and technological progress among 28 nations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.”⁷

The Economy of Iran is not free from Islamic ideology, but the economy itself has a say on the Islamic Republic’s strategy when implementing that ideology. Thus, in the first years of the Revolution, the isolation of the country and the Iraq-Iran war has weakened the country and the need to stop talking about the “exportation of the revolution” emerged. Furthermore, that aspect of the Khomeini ideology is a part of the constitution of the IRI; there is less and less proclamation of it in the Iranian politicians’ public speeches. The situation became much tougher after the sanctions concerning the country’s nuclear policy, and resulted in a victory of a political person with an electoral slogan that entailed “cooperation with the west.”⁸

In order to understand the policy-making of IRI, and not to be lost in the different aspects of its identity driven interests, one must know about

متن سند نهایی چشم انداز بیست ساله جمهوری اسلامی ایران⁷

<https://vpb.um.ac.ir/images/192/stories/asnad-faradasti/sanad20.pdf> (12.06.2017)

⁸Iranian president-elect Rouhani promises better relations with west <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/iran-hassan-rouhani-promises-moderation> (10.06.2017)

the Shiite concepts adopted and widely used by Iranian political culture. Mansour Varesteh writes that “in spite of its religious-ideological nature, the decision-making process in the Islamic Republic is basically rational and pragmatic. It leans heavily on the Shiite concept of “*maslahat*” or “*darurat*” (public interest or necessities,) which allows for religious compromise according to a cost-benefit calculus. Ideological and religious constraints do exist, but they are subject to the basic pragmatism of Iranian political strategy.”⁹This concept allows the government of IRI to have more maneuvering tools in Foreign policy, and gives the possibility to interchange the places of its different identities when dealing with one or another issue, threat, or achievement.

This pragmatism is a leading factor of Iran’s foreign policy. Both in the region and globally, it constructs its relations with other states with pragmatic goals and religio-ideological tools. When dealing with US and European countries, it uses the dichotomy of “Self and Other,” stressing the differences and peculiarities of civilizations. When speaking with Muslim countries, it stresses the importance of the “Muslim Universe” and Iran’s central role at that Universe; with regard to the regional secular countries, it emphasizes the shared civilization and common past.

Iran’s security institutions are operating with Iran’s military forces as their core safeguards. The Islamic Republic has two, often competing, military forces, which maintain their separate missions in and out of the country.”¹⁰Iran’s military forces and its military doctrine have evolved, and refined itself in the process as a response to a highly inhospitable regional security environment. Just a year after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iraq invaded Iran, and by the early 2010s, the United States posed credible security threats by occupying two of Iran’s eastern and western neighbors—Afghanistan and Iraq—though eliminating its erstwhile enemies, the Taliban and the Saddam Hussein regime.¹¹Although the Iran-Iraq War is the cornerstone of the Iran security and military discourse, and

⁹ManshourVarasteh, “Understanding Iran’s National Security Doctrine”, UK, 2013

¹⁰Daniel L. Byman , “Iran’s security policy in post-revolutionary era”, RAND, 2001, p.33

¹¹ Mohammad Nuruzamman, “What comes next for Iran’s defense doctrine”, available at [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-comes-next-irans-defense-doctrine-18360_\(01.08.201](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-comes-next-irans-defense-doctrine-18360_(01.08.201)

the lessons of the war are the roots of the country's national security strategy, Iran's military doctrine is presented as a defensive doctrine via Iranian officials. The Iranian president stressed in his speech on the occasion of the Islamic Republic Army Day that "the Iranian doctrine is not the doctrine of war but a "military and defensive doctrine," and the strategy of the Islamic Iran is the strategy of "active deterrence for establishment of peace and security in Iran and the regional countries."¹²

Some analysts believe that national security strategy of IRI can be divided to six components, namely:

1. **Recognition of the Islamic Revolution and countries political structure**
2. **Security: military guarantees for Iran's territorial integrity and security**
3. **Economy: extraction of natural resources**
4. **"Regional Hegemony"**
5. **Recognition of a Leading International Status**
6. **"Exporting the Islamic Revolution" and Leading the Islamic Camp.**¹³

In his remarkable essay written shortly after the Rouhani's first win in the presidential elections, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif states:

"The post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country's constitution. These include the preservation of Iran's independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to

¹² "President Rouhani describes Iranian military doctrine as "defensive"", available at <http://english.irib.ir/programs/political/item/208122-president-rouhani-describes-iranian-military-doctrine-as-defensive> (02.07.2017)

¹³"Tension's in Iran's national security strategy", available at <http://reut-institute.org/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1769> (03.07.2017)

foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction."¹⁴

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals, Iran has adopted the multidimensional foreign policy and has specific tools and ways for dealing with other countries in the regional and global arena.

According to IRGC leaders, the experience and results of the Iran-Iraq War hold important lessons for Iran's security. Together, these lessons form a national security doctrine that combines ideological and military components.¹⁵

These "lessons" are the main topic of Iran's national security and are referred to in and out of the country at all possible stages and for domestic and international audiences. In 2017 during The Munich Security Conference, the Foreign Minister of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif when speaking about new political order and some complications for Islamic Republic of Iran, once again made some historic excurses and mentioned the Iran-Iraq war's reasons and results as proof of unfair attitudes of Western countries towards Iran.¹⁶ From his perspective, "The UN resolution of 598 that ended the Iran-Iraq war is relevant today."

Given the popularity and the importance of the "Iran-Iraq" war discourse in the frame the perceptions of Iran in the field of international relations; it is crucial to highlight the main markers of that war:

"In both the IRGC narrative and in the public discourse of the Islamic Republic, the war is given two specific appellations: the Imposed War, because it was imposed on Iran by Iraq; and the Holy or Sacred

¹⁴ Mohammad Javad Zarif, "What Iran really wants: Iran's Foreign policy during Rouhani era", Foreign Affairs magazine, May/June 2014 Issue, available at [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants\(04.07.2017\)](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants(04.07.2017))

¹⁵ Annie Tracy Samuel, "Perceptions and narratives of the security: The Iranian revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran-Iraq war", Harvard Kennedy School, 2012, p. 12, available at http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/samuel_perceptions.pdf (04.07.2017)

¹⁶Statement by Mohammad Javad Zarif, Munich Security Conference 2017, 19 February 2017, available at <https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2017/video/statement-by-mohammad-javad-zarif-1/> (02.07.2017)

Defense, because Iran was defending not just the country but the Islamic regime and even Islam itself."¹⁷

Thus, Iran's defensive military doctrine is mostly anchored in the historic lessons driven from the "Imposed and Sacred War" and all major economic and energy projects of the country are supposed to serve to those lessons. The Nuclear program of Iran is no exception. Even though the Supreme leader of Iran stresses that the nuclear program of Iran does not aim to produce nuclear arms because "it is perceived as a big sin,"¹⁸ the nuclear program of the country itself can be a major restraining factor for foreign intervention.

USA: Tehran and Washington have had no formal diplomatic relations since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration dealt with Iran by selling the regime arms in exchange for Americans held hostage in Lebanon. There has also been some low-level cooperation between Washington and Tehran on antidrug policies and antiterrorism actions in Afghanistan¹⁹, and on a certain level, there have been possibilities to have such cooperation in Syria, but Iran rejected it because of the US' "corrupt intentions."²⁰ Starting from Rouhani's victory in the 2013 presidential elections, Iran and USA have adopted a strategy of giving the other side a chance for better negotiations. This new phase resulted in signing the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action, which is known as the "Iran deal," "Iran's Nuclear Deal," and/or even "historic deal."²¹ This new stage of possible cooperation between world powers and Iran, and especially the USA and Iran, has gained some real difficulties because of the Trump administration and his rough rhetoric and policy against Iran. His

¹⁷ Annie Tracy Samuel, "Perceptions and narratives of the security: The Iranian revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran-Iraq war", Harvard Kennedy School, 2012, p. 8, available at http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/samuel_perceptions.pdf (04.07.2017)

¹⁸ <http://www.leader.ir/fa/speech/9182/>بیانات-در-حیدار-دانشمندان-هسته-ای (05.08.2017)

¹⁹ Lionel Beahner, "Iran's multifaceted Foreign Policy",

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/irans-multifaceted-foreign-policy>(05.08.2017)

²⁰ <http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930624001016> (07.08.2017)

²¹ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/328996> (03.07.2017)

statements about reviewing the Deal and keeping “Iran on notice” have evolved to real anti-Iranian actions: starting with the Travel Ban for several Muslim countries including Iran, continuing with new US sanctions and triumphing with Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia on the day of Iran’s presidential elections, and signing unprecedented rich arm agreements with the Saudis.

These US government actions are perceived as expected threats against Iran in line with Iran’s rhetoric of “otherness of US,” and give yet another piece of evidence of necessity of the most popular pillars of Iranian foreign rhetoric, namely “Death to America.”²² One of the main characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy is its sensitivity towards the lack of respect and acceptance of its rules. During the Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif once again stressed these characteristics. In his words, “Iran does not respond well to threats, to coercion, but does respond to the mutual respect.”²³

Dealing with USA, Iran feels threats towards three components of its national strategy: lack of recognition of Iran’s current political system, security issues, and economic troubles. For Iran, it is crucial to gain international recognition and feel safe about the current regime. But with the US stressing Iran’s backing of the organizations that America lists in the line of Terrorist organizations and with backing the regional foes of the IRI, Iran feels threatened towards that component of its national strategy. The economic component of the country’s national strategy suffers from different types of sanctions of US that are in place starting from Iran’s Islamic revolution and are still increasing. Additionally, direct threats for Iran’s security are perceived as the actions and policies of USA in the Persian Gulf region as well as in Syria. Syria is viewed as the main gates of Iran’s national security and the important part of Iran’s led “Shia crescent”. Iran perceives the war against Assad’s regime in Syria as a fight against its interests and against its security. It blames the US for arming and

²²In line with “death to Zionist Regime”

²³Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran really wants: Iran’s Foreign policy during Rouhani era”, Foreign Affairs magazine, May/June 2014 Issue, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants> (15.06.2017)

supporting the extremist Islamic Sunni groups responsible for the situation in Syria. Thus, the presence of Islamic Revolution Guards Corps in Syria is explained both as ideological as well as security obligation. Though “the Army of the Islamic Republic and the Guards Corps of the Revolution are responsible not only for defending the borders, but also for the ideological mission of holy war in the way of God and fighting to expand the rule of God’s law in the world,”²⁴ the Iranian special forces under leadership of Ghasem Soleimani are defending not only the “borders of Islamic revolution,” but also geographic borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After the 2017 terrorist attacks in the heart of Tehran, this explanation became uncontested throughout Iranian society.

The US is also blamed for creating and maintaining the chaos in the region and beyond it. Different extremist organizations and spread of terrorism is believed to be the result of US politics and those of other western countries. Rouhani stated in his speech at the UN assembly meeting that “the genesis of borderless violent extremism and terrorism could be attributed to the security strategies developed by major powers in the past 15 years. The main lesson to learn from the analysis of this trend is that security in one region at the cost of insecurity in others would not only be impossible but it could also lead to more insecurity everywhere.”²⁵

In public discourse, there are two incidents in the history of the countries that are the most difficult to overcome: the 1953 coup de tat of the Mosadegh government in Iran supported by the US, and the Iranian hostage Crisis of 1979.²⁶ When asking about the possibility to overcome these “unhappy memories,” the Foreign minister of IRI Mohammad Javad Zarif said: “What needs to be done is to look forward.”²⁷ According to the Minister, with the Nuclear Deal, there is a possibility to rebuild the relations between the countries and to do that on the new foundation, on the

²⁴Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html> (02.05.2017)

²⁵ Rouhani speech at the UN, September 22, 2016, available at <http://www.president.ir/en/95419wo> (17.05.2017)

²⁶ “The Iranian hostage crisis”, <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises> (03.05.2017)

²⁷ “A conversation with Mohammad Javad Zarif”, <https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-mohammad-javad-zarif> (17.08.2017)

foundation of trust. “Iran in our view and in the view of the IAEA, built trust by implementing its end of the bargain. Unfortunately, as I said in answering the previous question, the United States didn’t. So it creates the impression in Iran that the United States’ hostility towards Iran will never end. And I think that can be remedied, while history is history, and we cannot do much about history.”²⁸ As is obvious from the Minister’s approach, the Nuclear Deal is considered as a chance to overcome the “unhappy memories” between the two countries and create a more secure environment for further relations. In general, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement reached in Vienna on 14 July between Iran, the P5+1, and the European Union²⁹, is perceived and analyzed in the framework of Iran’s national security. After the signing of the agreement, the president of IRI Hassan Rouhani in a number of interviews stressed the fact that the victory of Iran’s diplomacy with that agreement is the fact that they managed to prevent the USA from trying to make Iran another Iraq. According to him, the main meaning of that agreement is defending the country’s National Security, and although “the Iranian nation is not fearing from threats, this agreement helps to abandon those threats. “In his words,

*“The security we are considering is not only in the matter of war but also [towards] the creation of a safe environment for economic, social, and political activities. This environment is more secure in comparison to previous years. Implementing the agreement and the United Nations Security Council resolution will not create any problems for our national security and defensive power.”*³⁰

RUSSIA: “No East, No west, Islam” has been the main driving motto of Iran’s foreign policy after the Islamic revolution. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the IRI relations with the “East,” and particularly with Russia have adopted different attitudes. Having mutual interests in the region and competing interests in the field of natural

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹“Joint comprehensive plan of action”, <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/> (01.05.2017)

³⁰ گفتگوی صدا و سیما با جمهوریاسلامیبا حسن روحانی در مورد تواف هسته و دیگر مسائل روز، https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j3Xu_u60v4s (14.05.2017)

resources make the relations of two countries friendly but complicated. Political analyst Mohsen Milani has named those relations the “uncomfortable alliance.”³¹ Despite the “uncomfortable” nature of their “alliance,” it successfully lasts in the framework of regional hot spots. The two countries have mutual interests in keeping Assad’s regime in power and not “giving up the Syria,” and both have interest in maintaining the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the Caspian region, both countries are interested in not allowing other countries of the region and especially Azerbaijan to give permission to the non-regional forces to use the waters of the sea. By taking into consideration the concept of “maslahat,” Iran, including its Muslim population, has avoided involvement in the internal conflicts of Russia.³² This policy can be explained by the fact that Iran’s national security strategy has had two primary objectives ever since Khamenei became Iran’s leader: to integrate the Iranian economy into the global system of finance and technology and to deter the threats from the United States and Israel.³³

Although Iran and Russia have some contradictory interests in bilateral relations taking into account especially their economic competitiveness, and despite the expression of not very high level of the trust between the two,³⁴ the countries have cooperated successfully on a regional level. According to Iranian researchers: “Iran and Russia could have come to a common definition of identities and norms governing the

³¹ Mohsen Milani, “Iran and Russia’s uncomfortable alliance”, *Foreign affairs*, 31.08.2016, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-08-31/iran-and-russias-uncomfortable-alliance> (12.06.2017)

³² His predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini has sent a special letter to late president of USSR Gorbachov condemning him in not giving special attention to the Islam and stressing that the problems of the USSR are because of the lack of special attention to the religion. For the text of the letter, see <http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8510090317> (02.06.2017)

³³ Gareth Porter, “Rouhani’s dual messages and Iran’s security strategy”, available at <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/rouhani-s-dual-messages-and-iran-s-security-strategy-1712351174> (14.06.2017)

³⁴ It’s worth mentioning the statement of Minister of Defense of IRI, Hossein Dehghan about Russia’s “betrayal of trust”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DxPA2nTAHak> (05.06.2017)

patterns of foreign relations through benefiting the capacities of regional convergence despite heterogeneity of interests in bilateral relations”.³⁵

TURKEY: Relations with Turkey deal with three components of Iran’s national security: the economic component, the security component, and its desire to be a regional hegemony.

Turkey is a Sunni Muslim country aligned with NATO and with different views on issues concerning Syria and Iraq. Turkey is Iran’s main rival in the sphere of regional influence in the South Caucasus, and is the main concurrent for the position of the leading country of the Muslim world. Former Foreign Minister and current top adviser of Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati has stated that the “two countries are capable of playing a leading role in shaping the future of the Muslim World.”³⁶ At the same time, Iran considers Turkey as one of the victims of the Western “New Middle East” program. According to Ali Khamenei, the “New Middle East” of Western powers brought war in Syria, Iraq, Libya, etc., and also brought terrorism and sectarian tensions to the regional countries, including Turkey.³⁷ Iran is interested in the stability of Turkey taking into account the 500 km length borders between the two countries and high volume of border communications.³⁸ The other reason for Iran preferring Turkey’s current government is the fact that all the opposition groups have unfriendly attitudes towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. In other words, Iran has plenty of unresolved issues with Turkey’s current government but it prefers to try to solve the problems with a stable Turkey rather than have unstable neighbor with hostile government. These attitudes explain the position of Iran towards the coup de tat of Turkey in 2016. The coup d’etat attempt was criticized by all political members, including the

³⁵Elaheh Koolaee, Mandana Tishehyar, “The new regionalism between Iran and Russia in Eurasia”, *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol. 11, Nos. 1-2, Fall 2013-Winter 2014, pp. 49-66 (12.06.2017)

³⁶<http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/31/477806/Iran-Turkey-Ali-Akbar-Velayati-Riza-Hakan-Tekin> (10.06.2017)

³⁷ Ayatollah Khamenei: “There is terrorism in Turkey”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3WmEcUEbVOI> (05.06.2017)

³⁸ Amir Hossein Yazdanpanah, “Coup de tat in Turkey and deciphering Iran’s positions”, <http://khorasannews.com/newspaper/page/19304/3/537348/0> (12.06.2017)

President, the Foreign Minister, and the members of Parliament. The secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani stated that Iran supports the Turkey's legal government and opposes any kind of coup—either initiated domestically or supported by foreigners.³⁹

Additionally, Turkey is Iran's main economic partner,⁴⁰ and a stable Turkey means a stable Iran-Turkey economic relationship. Different researchers show that Turkey is among the largest trade partners of Iran and this partnership has a potential to deepen after the lifting of Iranian sanctions.⁴¹

Although Turkey and Iran have had contradictory interests in the Syrian conflict, in August 2016, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted that Assad might remain in power in Syria through a period of political transition, and both countries are integral parts of Russia-led talks on an overall political solution for Syria.⁴² Moreover, already in August 2017 with the high level visits of Iranian government members to Turkey, a new phase of relation has started transforming the diametrically opposing positions of the countries into one with a similar approach towards the Syrian crisis.⁴³

All these make Turkey-Iran regional partners, but at the same time, they are not such strong factors to prevent them from being the main regional rivals.

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: After the independence of the South Caucasian states in 1991, Iran gained a possibility to return its influence in the region. The entire post-soviet area was perceived as a new opportunity

³⁹ “Regional rival Iran expresses for Turkey over coup attempt”, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-iran-reaction-idUSKCN0ZWOLM> (22.06.2017)

⁴⁰ “Turkey's Top Trading Partners”, <http://www.worldstopexports.com/turkeys-top-import-partners/> (18.06.2017)

⁴¹ http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/FDD_RGE_Iran_Turkey_Economic_Relations.pdf (23.06.2017)

⁴² Kenneth Katzman, “Iran's Foreign and defense policies”, Congressional research service, June 15, 2017, p.39, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf> (01.07.2017)

⁴³ Iran's armed forces Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri visited Turkey on 15 of August and had meetings with his Turkish counterpart, general Hulusi Akar, president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Defence minister Nurettin Canikli, <http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/82632837> (02.07.2017)

for dissemination of revolutionary ideas of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If in the Muslim post-soviet countries the Islamic ideology was used as a powerful tool for reaching that goal, in the countries like Armenia and Georgia Iran have been using its cultural and civilization tools for increasing its influence. Having adopted political neutrality towards the regional tensions, Iran tries to develop high level political relations with every country of the South Caucasus.

Despite the fact that the only Shia Muslim country of the region is Azerbaijan, it is perceived as the biggest potential threat to the national security of the country, given the increasing cooperation of the state with Israel and spreading ideology of “divided Azerbaijan.” According to this ideology, the Republic of Azerbaijan encompasses only a portion of what it considers to be Azerbaijan and that the second part of it is in the North-West of Iran.⁴⁴For the followers of this ideology, the Northern provinces of Iran are, in fact, the South of Azerbaijan. The other factor in the Iran-Azerbaijan relations is Iran’s growing influence on the religious population of Azerbaijan, which is perceived as a strong Soft power of Iran and is a source of antagonism between the states.⁴⁵

Though, recent developments in the field of anti-Iranian politics of the wider region, including participation of Azerbaijan,⁴⁶ and also Azerbaijan’s anti-Shia domestic policy increase the tensions between the countries, their relations in economic terms remain strong.

Iran’s relations with Armenia are frequently stressed as “relations in a very high level,” both by the Armenian and the Iranian officials and experts. This quality of relations is mutually profitable for both countries: for Iran, Armenia is the only Christian country with common borders with it, their relations, beside the political, economic and strategic value, have also some implications for the country’s international image. During the

⁴⁴NassibliNasib L., “Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects.” Harvard Kennedy School, November 30, 1999, <http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/azerbaijan-iran-relations-challenges-and-prospects-event-summary> (14.07.2017)

⁴⁵ For secular Azerbaijan the influence of Iranian Shiism is perceived as a potential threat to the state.

⁴⁶ The 2017 Riyadh summit and its consequences are labeled as anti-Iranian both in and out of Iran.

official meetings in their common past, the cultural ties and good political relations are stressed. During his visit to Armenia, the President of IRI Hassan Rouhani stressed “we are from the same Civilization and we share a common past and many cultural joint values.”⁴⁷ During that visit, Presidents Rouhani and Sargsyan discussed a Persian Gulf-Black Sea transit and transport corridor. When travelling to Armenia Rouhani described the country as a “corridor to the Europe and the Black Sea.”⁴⁸

CHINA: Relations with China are very important for the Islamic Republic of Iran given the level of their economic cooperation and their mutual political interests in the region. China and Iran have had very extensive military relations which included selling of missile systems, ballistic missile technology, and assistance with Iran WMD programs,⁴⁹ and all these relations had their special importance during Iran-Iraq war.

Energy and its secure supply is a determining factor in China’s policy for developing relations with Iran. The importance of energy in the countries’ relations has been significant for China such that sanctions on Iran could not prevent it from promoting these relations.⁵⁰ These relations have gained a new possibility for the growth after the JCPOA.⁵¹ After signing the deal, China’s president visited Iran and had several important meetings with Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader of IRI Ali Khamenei. During that meeting, the Supreme Leader stressed the importance of Iran-China strategic relations and gave special attention to the fact that “Iran will never forget the behavior of China during Iran’s sanctions.”⁵² China was Iran’s largest oil customer before the relief of the

⁴⁷ “Armenia: Iranian president Rouhani holds bilateral talks with Sargsyan in Yerevan”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIjwD4DUWkU> (19.05.2017)

⁴⁸ <http://www.president.ir/fa/97013> (08.07.2017)

⁴⁹ Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushirvan Ehteshami, Jerold D. Green, “Iran’s security policy in the post-revolutionary era”, RAND Corporation, 2001, pp. 63 (08.07.2017)

⁵⁰ Seyed Masoud Mousavi Shafae, Hossein Mohammadi, “The role of energy in Iran-China relations”, Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol.11, Nos. 1-2, Fall 2013-Winter 2014, pp.67-86. (04.08.2017)

⁵¹ Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and defense policies”, Congressional research service, June 15, 2017, p.50 (01.07.2017)

⁵² <http://www.leader.ir/fa/content/14065/همراه-هیئت-چین-و-هیت-همراه> (14.07.2017)

sanctions, and remains at the top after the sanctions were abolished.⁵³The two countries place special emphasis on their economic ties, which include the “Silk Road” project. The leaderships of the countries believe that with economic joint projects, they can resist the USA’s desire to control the economies and politics of the region.

Conclusion

- Iran’s foreign and security strategies are being knitted and supervised in the different political, military, and religious structures and are supervised by the Supreme Leader.

- The ideology of the Islamic Republic makes no distinction between national and Islamic interests, but various self-identities of the country play special roles when dealing with regional and non-regional countries and entities. Ideas of the Revolution and the worldviews of Shia Islam are the core values of identity construction for Iran along with Islamic and Iranian self-expressions.

- Iran’s security institutions are operating by having Iran’s military forces as their core safeguards. The Islamic Republic has two, often competing, military forces, which maintain their separate missions in and out of the country. For one of them, namely IRGC borders of their mission are the “borders of the revolution,” thus enabling them to operate in different countries, including Syria in the fight against ISIS. Iran presents fighting in Syria against the extremists as a national security issue, stressing that losing Syria means transferring the battle against “takfiri forces” to the borders of Iran.

- Lessons of the Iran-Iraq war and international sanctions and their relief are cornerstones of Iran’s military and foreign policy doctrines. Given the Western backing of Iraq’s intervention in Iran, Iran is cautious to not allow the foreign presence in its neighboring countries.

- Relations of Iran with global and regional powers are differentiated by the presence and lack of the trust in those relations. Thus, relations with USA are perceived as the most untrustworthy and full of threats,

⁵³IttThirarat, “Iran’s big Asian oil customers return”, Middle East Institute , August 23, 2016, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/irans-big-asian-oil-customers-return> (18.07.2017)

cooperation with Russia have different layers of trust in bilateral, regional, and international relations, and its relationship with China has a profound portion of mutual trust.

- Relations with global and regional powers also have implications for Iran's attitudes towards regional and neighbor countries: the ones with closer ties with USA and NATO are perceived as countries with certain degrees of untrustworthiness, others are anticipated as bridges between Iran and the West. Turkey's membership in NATO, its support of extremist forces in Syria, and the competition for the influence in the South Caucasus make Turkey remain the regional rival of Iran.

- Iran sees the countries of the South Caucasus as the entities with shared civilization values. It develops its economic relations with Azerbaijan and names Armenia as a corridor towards Europe. Although economic relations with Azerbaijan are far more inclusive, political relations with Armenia remain the ones with higher level of trust and without any perception of threat.

- Despite the vulnerability of the JCPOA and new sanctions imposed by the USA, by developing the political path of "better relations with the West," Iran can also have possibilities to overcome the tensions in the region.

**ԻՐԱՆԻ ԻՍԼԱՄԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ
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ԱՌԱՆՁՆԱՀԱՏԿՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ**

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*«Մեր ազգային շահը անջատ չէ իրամասկան շահից,
այս երկու երևույթների տարանջատելի չեն»
ԻԻՀ Հոգևոր Առաջնորդ Ալի Խամենեյի*

Բանալի բառեր՝ Իրան, ազգային անվտանգություն, իրամասկան գաղափարախոսություն, Իրան-Հայաստան

Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության (ԻԻՀ) ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության առանցքային առանձնահատկությունը Իսլամական գաղափարախոսությունն է, որի վրա կառուցակցված է այդ երկրի «ազգն» ու որպես արդյունք՝ նաև «ազգային շահը»: Թեև ԻԻՀ-ն երբեք հասանելի չի դարձրել որևէ փաստաթուղթ ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության կամ արտաքին քաղաքականության դոկտրինի վերաբերյալ, բայց երկրի քաղաքական վարքի պատմությունն ու ներկա ռազմաքաղաքական դերակատարների քայլերը հնարավորություն են տալիս ուրվագծելու ազգային անվտանգության հիմնական հատկանիշները: Այլ կերպ ասած՝ «Իրանի ազգային անվտանգային քաղաքականությունը պետք է վերլուծել խոսույթային համատեքստում»: Այս հետազոտության նպատակը խոսույթային համատեքստում Իրանի ազգային անվտանգության և արտաքին քաղաքականության քննարկումն ու վերլուծությունն է:

Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության ներկա կրոնաքաղաքական համակարգը կառուցակցում է մի քանի ինքնություններ: Իրանի ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարությունը խարսխված է ինքնաընկալման այդ մի քանի, հաճախ մրցակից մոտեցումներին: Այդ ինքնություններն ու դրանցից բխող կրոնաքաղաքական հարացույցները մի կողմից բարդացնում, մյուս կողմից մասնւելու լայն հնարավորություններ են ընձեռում ԻԻՀ արտաքին քաղաքական համակարգին: Հոդվածում արտացոլված են Իրանի ազգային անվտանգության ապահովման առանցքային միտումները, արտաքին քաղաքականության մեջ մասնւելու գործիքակազմն ու դրա առանձնահատկությունները գերտերությունների ու տարածաշրջանային մրցակիցների, ինչպես նաև Հարավային Կովկասի երկրների հետ հարաբերվելիս:

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Keywords: *Russian Federation, regional security, multipolar world, Russia-West antagonism, “Near Abroad”, international organizations.*

After the collapse of the USSR¹ and the end of the Cold War, Russia’s perceptions of the term “region” and regional security have changed. The Russian Federation (RF) continued to consider the former Soviet Union countries as a territory of its’ vital interests. It was quite reasonable to define the countries of the world as “near” and “far” abroad. The term “Near Abroad” does not have as much geographical, but rather it has historical-cultural and political justification, as it summarizes the countries under the former USSR (Baltic States, Transcaucasia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia,) even those with no borders with Russia: Armenia, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while some states that border directly with Russia (Finland, Poland, Mongolia, People’s Republic of China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) were not considered “close.”² The rest of the world was considered as “far” abroad, and cooperation with those countries was important in terms of international security.

¹ The parade of sovereignty started in RF in parallel with the collapse of the USSR and external threats. It was followed by North Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, Udmurtia, Yakutia, Buryatia, Bashkiria, and that worryingly Tatarstan and Chechnya, thus bothering Russia’s internal stability.

К союзу суверенных народов. Институт теории и истории социализма ЦК КПСС, Москва, 1991, pp. 250-301, available at: <http://soveticus5.narod.ru/85/sborn91.htm#p287> (10.03.2017)

²Jacob Kulkhanek, *Russia and Near Abroad, Past and Present*, 2006, available at: <https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/amocz-RP-2006-121.pdf> (03.04.2017)

Russia's national security and foreign policy towards the countries of both "near" and "far" abroad is based on its' national interests³ and priorities.⁴ According to Russian official documents which hold a view to uphold the national interests of the Russian Federation and achieving its strategic national priorities, the State's foreign policy activities shall be aimed at accomplishing the following main objectives:⁵

- to create a favorable external environment that would allow Russia's economy to grow steadily and become more competitive in order to strengthen Russia's position in global economic relations;
- to consolidate the Russian Federation's position as a center of influence in today's world;
- to pursue neighborly relations with adjacent States, assisting them in eliminating the existent conflicts and preventing the emergence of the new hotbeds of tension and conflicts on their territory;
- to promote the efforts to strengthen international peace and ensure global security and stability;
- to promote, within bilateral and multilateral frameworks, mutually beneficial and equal partnerships with foreign countries, inter-State associations, international organizations and within forums.

RF national security directly depends on the extent to which the strategic national priorities are implemented and how effectively the system for ensuring national security operates and reacts to the existent challenges

³ The long-term national strategic interests of RF are: strengthening the country's defense, ensuring the inviolability of the Russian Federation's constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, and national and territorial integrity; increasing the competitiveness of the national economy; consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world.

The Russian Federation's national Security Strategy 2015, 30, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/18iXkr8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

⁴ The national interests are ensured through the implementation of the following strategic national priorities: national defense, state and public security, economic growth, strategic stability and equal strategic partnership. Ibid, 31

⁵ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 3, Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

and threats. The basic threats in the regional and international security sphere after declaring independence in 1991 during the first stage of RF's existence (Yeltsin's presidency period-1991-1999) were caused by the strive of some states and inter-state entities to downplay the role of existing mechanisms of safeguarding international security, primarily the UN and the OSCE, the threat of weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world, the strengthening of the military-political blocks and alliances, primarily the eastward expansion of the NATO, a possibility of the occurrence of foreign military bases and large troop detachments in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and carriers thereof, the slackening of integration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the occurrence and escalation of conflicts in the vicinity of the RF's state border and the outer borders of the member states of CIS, and the encroachments on the territory of the Russian Federation.⁶

In subsequent years, the aforementioned threats to Russian national security and the approaches to their elimination did not change, but were replenished and reformed in the RF further as seen in foreign policy and national security documents. The RF foreign policy and course of actions became more assertive after the RF president Vladimir Putin's speech during the Security Conference in Munich (2007,) where he took the Russian approach into consideration in light of all of the international security threats: from the US endeavors of adapting the so-called democracy in the third world countries up to NATO's extension into Eastern-Europe and the insertion of the US anti-missile systems in Europe:⁷ *"The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either. This is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from*

⁶ National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 1997, State system of legal information, available at: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102063972> (15.04.2017)

⁷ Vladimir Putin's Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2007, Official Website of the President of Russia, available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (16.03.2017)

within. I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world."

The president expressed his disapproval of a unipolar world governed by the US, stressing that the multipolar world should be opposite, where, RF⁸ should be one of its polars.

In order to understand how Russia's main and long-term national security threats in the Unipolar World System affect its regional and international policy, they will be analyzed according to Russia's interests in the "Near" and "Far" abroad.

Russia's Foreign Policy towards "Near Abroad"

Long-term threats

Russia, the successor of the USSR, considers the further cooperation with the countries of the "near abroad" within the framework of different institutions as a guarantee of regional security and the mechanism of the deterrence of threats. The long-term threats are as following.

NATO's eastern enlargement: The Russian Federation maintains its negative perspective towards NATO's expansion, the Alliance's military infrastructure approaching Russian borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighboring Russia, viewing them as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security and leading to the deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to the emergence of new ones.⁹ NATO's eastern enlargement disturbs RF because of the inadequacy of the current global and regional architecture, oriented (particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region) towards NATO, and likewise, the imperfect nature of legal instruments and mechanisms that create an ever-increasing threat to

⁸According to American world-systems analyst Wallerstein's formulation triple-zoning system operates for the all regions of the planet: Core zone – "Rich North", "Center"; "Poor South", "Periphery"; "Semi-periphery" (China, India, Brazil, Russia), See more Wallerstein I. Geopolitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world-system. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1991.

⁹ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 70, Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6B6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

international security.¹⁰ The buildup of NATO's military potential and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries' military activity, the further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to national security.¹¹

According to Russian sources during Gorbachov's presidency period (First and Last president of USSR-March 1990, December 1991) when the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Germany he was given verbal assurances (there was no written consent) that NATO would not expand to the east.¹² Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the newly independent states, opposite developments took place. NATO has expanded into Eastern Europe, including the countries of the socialist camp during the Cold War, including Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic (1999,) Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Montenegro, and the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (2004). Georgia and Ukraine also aspire to become NATO members and are actively intensifying dialogue in that direction.

Moreover, NATO is implementing cooperation programs¹³ that involve Armenia and Georgia to take part in its' peacekeeping operations. NATO's interest towards the countries in this region is naturally disturbed by Russia, and the latter has always been protesting against it.

In 2008 at the Munich Security Conference, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the prospects of cooperation between Russia and NATO are vague and stated, "We are not interested in the violation of

¹⁰ The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy to 2020, 8, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424> (23.04.2017)

¹¹ The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy 2015, 15, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/18iXkr8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

¹² NATO refuses the existence of such agreement. http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/04/140418_nato_putin_reaction.shtml (06.05.2017)

¹³ NATO and South Caucasian States have developed practical cooperation in many areas, including peacekeeping operations. Available at official website of NATO, available at: <http://www.natoinfo.am/en/armenia-nato-relations/>, http://www.nato.int/cps/es/natohq/topics_38988.htm# (06.05.2017)

NATO's unity.”¹⁴ However, The Russian Federation is prepared for the development of relations with NATO based on equality for the purpose of strengthening general security in the Euro-Atlantic region. The depth and content of such relations will be determined by the readiness of the alliance to take account of the interests of the Russian Federation when conducting military-political planning, and to respect the provisions of international law.¹⁵

Militarization of the regions adjacent to Russia: *“The principles of equal and indivisible security are not being observed in the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia-Pacific regions. Militarization and arms-race processes are developing in regions adjacent to Russia.”*¹⁶

By saying adjacent regions, the regions that are considered as vital zones for Russia are taken into account. Russia is worried about the militarization attempts by another force in the region. The Russian authorities are particularly concerned about the military-political and military-technical cooperation of the South Caucasus countries, particularly Georgia, with the US and NATO. This process began during the reign of Saakashvili (from 2004) and has still continued until the armed conflict with Russia and the almost complete defeat of Georgia's military potential. The United States was implementing a “Train and Equip” program in Georgia, which equipped Georgian officer staff with NATO-standard arms. Georgia's foreign policy, the main object of which was to join NATO and the EU, was opposed by the Russian security and foreign policy doctrines, and was a direct threat to it, causing war between the two countries to be inevitable, which resulted in the Georgian army Defense mechanism suffering huge losses.¹⁷ On February 1st, 2009, Russia established the 4th

¹⁴The stenography of S. Ivanov's speech at Munich Conference on Security Policy 2008, available at: <http://svpressa.ru/society/article/4036/> (13.04.2017)

¹⁵The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy 2015, 107, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/18iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

¹⁶Ibid, 14.

¹⁷“As a result of the Russian military aggression, the Georgian Army suffered material losses worth \$250 million,” Georgian Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili stated. As to the men in uniform, 270 perished in the five days and more than 1,000 were wounded. In addition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia occupation, Russian military forces entered Gori,

Guard Military Base in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali), and the 7th in Abkhazia, recognizing the independence of those quasi-states. In other words, the complete absorption of these quasi-states was replaced by RF.

Meanwhile, after the Four Day War,¹⁸ Russian Prime Minister D. Medvedev confirmed and defended Russia's policy of selling arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, stating: "They would buy weapons in other countries, and the degree of their deadliness wouldn't change"¹⁹ on Russian state television following visits to Yerevan and Baku. In other words, RF pursues a militarization policy in the South Caucasus by selling large quantities of weapons to Azerbaijan, in response to which Armenia is enhancing its weapon supply, as well.²⁰

Therefore, under the aforementioned provision, it can be assumed that Russia does not mean the militarization of the region wholly, but rather its' militarization by other forces rather than the RF itself.

Increase of EU interest towards USSR ex-member countries:

Amongst the eastern extension of NATO, the former USSR member states caught the attention of the European Union's interests, which also began to disturb Russia.

Despite the constant tension between Russia-EU relations, they have been sharply aggravated after the crisis in Ukraine and with the sanctions on Russia. Even after the conflict in Georgia the Russian Federation was in favor of strengthening the mechanisms of cooperation with the European Union by all possible means, including the continued formation of common spaces in the economic, educational, scientific, and cultural spheres, and in terms of internal and external security. The long-term national interests of

Zugdidi, Poti, Vazian military airport. Available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/lessons-and-losses-of-georgias-five-day-war-with-russia/> (12.07.2017)

¹⁸ Four Day War or April War is a collective name of the clashes along the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact, which began on 2 April 2016.

¹⁹Russia defends selling arms to both Azerbaijan and Armenia, available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-04-09/russia-defends-selling-arms-to-both-azerbaijan-and-armenia> (24.05.2017)

²⁰Armenian MFA Eduard Nalbandyan in the conversation with "Russia Today" News Agency stated "Of course, we can not like the fact that Azerbaijan is buying weapons from our ally, which, in cooperation with Armenia, as the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair, is making great efforts to maintain peace and stability in our region". Available at the official website of MFA Armenia, http://www.mfa.am/hy/interviews/item/2017/02/20/min_ria/ (04.07.2017)

Russia are served by the creation of an open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear legal and treaty basis.²¹ Currently, the cooperation with the EU has been excluded from the RF official documents.

The West's stance aimed at countering integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region is exerting a negative influence on the realization of Russian national interests. The support of the United States and the European Union for the anti-constitutional coup d'état in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society and the emergence of an armed conflict. The strengthening of far right nationalist ideology, the deliberate shaping in the Ukrainian population of an image of Russia as an enemy, the undisguised gamble on the forcible resolution of intrastate contradictions, and the deep socioeconomic crisis are turning Ukraine into a chronic seat of instability in Europe and in the immediate vicinity of Russia's borders.²² At the Security Conference in Munich (2015) Lavrov stressed that American colleagues, and under their influence – the European Union, took steps leading to escalation: *“The CIS countries, our closest neighbors, connected with us by centuries of economic, humanitarian, historical, cultural, and even family ties, are demanded to make a choice - either with the West or against the West. It is a logic of zero sum game, which everyone wanted to leave in the past. The Ukrainian crisis cannot be resolved by military force. Despite this, in some Western countries there are more calls to strengthen support for the course of the Kiev authorities for militarization of the society and the state, to “pump” Ukraine with deadly weapons, and pull it into NATO.”*

On the other hand, by interfering in Ukraine and Crimea annexation Russia itself violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum²³ which was one of the guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

²¹The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy to 2020, 16, Official website of RF MFA, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v/content/id/589768 (09.05.2017)

²²The Russian Federation's National Security Strategy 2015, 17, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

²³The memorandum, signed by then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, along with Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and John Major, required that the signatories “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “refrain from the threat or use of

The crisis in Ukraine was not only political, but also an economic threat to Russia's security, as Russia's trade policy suffered after the sanctions were implemented. RF was restricted to take cheap loans; consequently a lot of companies were blocked with significant amount of officials imposed and assets imprisoned. After the crisis in Donbas and the imposed sanctions on Russia, the first thing to break between Ukraine and Russia were their defense ties. The Russians used their "sanctions" against Ukraine, abolishing their orders from Ukrainian factories (Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk.) The Russians stopped importing foodstuff, fruits, meat, vegetables, and dairy products from Europe. However, Russian gas still has one of the highest consumption rates in the European market, especially in the severe winter conditions.²⁴

"Old" Structures

With the aim of maintaining relations with the former Soviet Union members and ensuring its own security, Russia established a wide range of cooperation with these countries.

Commonwealth of Independent States. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, on December 8, 1991, the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the Creation Agreement of CIT,²⁵ attached to it on December 21, 2007, the heads of 11 sovereign states signed the Protocol to the Agreement, in accordance with which they formed the Commonwealth of Independent States on equal bases. The Baltic States did not join from the beginning and in 2009, even Georgia stopped being a member of it.²⁶ Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation, positively assessed the creation of the CIS, noting that through this structure, it was possible to avoid global shocks, possible wars between former republics,

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine." https://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2014/eirv41n08-20140221/34-35_4108.pdf (19.06.2017)

²⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Natural_gas_consumption_statistics (26.07.2017)

²⁵ Agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, available at: http://www.mid.ru/integracionnye-struktury-prostranstva-sng/-/asset_publisher/r17Fzr0mbE6x/content/id/608944 (25.04.2017)

²⁶ Georgia finalizes withdrawal from CIS, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/Georgia_Finalizes-Withdrawal_From_CIS/1802284.html (14.05.2017)

and financial and humanitarian disasters that could have occurred after the collapse of the USSR.²⁷ However, after the collapse of the USSR, the program of forming a united military force of the member states was disrupted as the political interests of these countries as well as their understanding of security collided.

Collective Security Treaty Organization. Another step towards ensuring regional security was the signing of a Collective Security Treaty by the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on May 15, 1992,²⁸ which became the basis for the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on May 14, 2002.²⁹ It is noteworthy that the participant countries of the organization are rather consumers of Russian security and military system, than security makers. The aforementioned countries are using USSR heritage weaponry, so they also apply to Russia for the modernization of ammunition, thus falling into a long-term “dependence” on that country.

In turn, Russia is trying to control the surrounding region and to resist challenges out of its immediate borders through military bases in these countries.³⁰

²⁷ According to Yeltsin, the leaders of the republics tried to alleviate the consequences that could affect the people of the former USSR. “That’s why the visa-free regime was set between the newly independent republics, customs barriers were excluded, and so on. We tried to create a structure similar to today’s European Union model with less bureaucracy and concentration.” Available at: <https://ria.ru/politics/20061206/56569859.html> (20.04.2017)

²⁸ Available at the official website of CSTO: http://odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=126 (19.04.2017)

²⁹ In 1993 Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia joined the Treaty. However, in September 1999 the protocol on the extension of the treaty was signed by six states, excluding Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Georgia.

³⁰ There are Russian military bases and facilities in Armenia (Air base in Yerevan, military basis in Gyumri), Azerbaijan (Radar station in Gabala), Belarus (Radar station in Baranovichi and communication center of the navy in Vileyka), Georgia (Military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Kazakhstan (Radar station in Balkash), Kyrgyzstan (Air basis in Kant), Tajikistan (Military bases (Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tube, Tulab) and joint use of the air force at Ayni) etc. Particularly, the absence of a military base in Armenia could make the Caucasus a line of contact between the Russian and enemy states, which is not profitable for Russia.

Margarete Clein, Russia’s Military Capabilities: “Great Power”, Ambitions and Reality, German Institute for International and Security Affairs; available at: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/russias-military-capabilities/> (08.05.2017)

Caucasian Quartet: The next format of regional cooperation in the “Near Abroad” was the Caucasian Quartet which was aimed at the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the South Caucasus, national security, international terrorism, as well as the development of a number of spheres related to cooperation in the humanitarian and other spheres.³¹ RF President Vladimir Putin was convinced that the Quartet could become a real mechanism that would help to reduce the Caucasus Conflict potential. Chairman of the RF Federal Council Sergei Mironov tried to reset the activities of the Quartet in 2004 and 2008, but today this establishment does not play a serious role in the preservation of regional security in the Caucasus, which is conditioned by the tense nature of the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Georgian relations.

New opportunities

Russia will continue to seek to increase regional and subregional integration and coordination potential among CIS, Union State,³² that used to maintain regional security in the “Near Abroad”, but nowadays, the function of these organizations is demonstrative, strictly chary: almost silent. EEU³³ and CSTO, whose functions are dictated by Russia as well, are much more dynamic establishments uniting former USSR countries. One of Russia’s key objectives is strengthening and expanding integration within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic in order to fasten steady development, comprehensive technological modernization and cooperation, enhance the competitiveness of the EAEU member States and improve living standards of their populations. The EAEU aims to ensure the free commodity turnover, services, capital and workforce, and to offer a platform for implementing

³¹Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/diverse/-/asset_publisher/ghZALys7bKD3/content/id/544128 (28.03.2017)

³² Union State is the Commonwealth of Belarus and Russia founded on 2 April 1996.

³³ In 2014, the Eurasian Economic Union was formed aiming at providing economic security and encouraging economic integration processes in the territory of CIS countries. A treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Available at official website of EEU: <http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=am> (09.04.2017)

joint infrastructure and investment projects. The EAEU is based on universal principles of integration, and is designed to play an important role in harmonizing integration processes in Europe and Eurasia.³⁴ However, the united economic region will put its' participant countries Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan into a new dependence on RF.

Russia's Foreign Policy towards "Far Abroad"

The main threats

The implementation of US anti-missile defense systems in Eastern Europe: The Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his concern over US missile systems during the 2007 Munich Security Conference: *"Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times."*³⁵

It is worth mentioning that since the Reagan Era (US 40th President, 1981-1989,) the United States has been striving to create severe anti-missile systems, which are planned to deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic. According to Russian sources, this is done not only in the framework of the fight against terrorism or the threat coming from Iran, but also in order to

³⁴ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 51, Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

³⁵Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2007. The stenography available at the official website of the President of Russia: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (16.03.2017)

have a hotbed of pressure on Russia.³⁶ The “hostage” of these missiles by Poland and the Czech Republic threaten them to be targeted by Russia, especially given the tense relations between Russia and the EU. Already in 2009, at the 45th Munich Security Conference, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov warned that “if the US missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic are installed, Russia will respond more effectively and at lower costs.”³⁷

In 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov while representing the Russian delegation to Munich mentioned that “*Russia still does not give up on the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe and is waiting for it to be adopted by NATO partners.*”³⁸

On March 2015, Russia ceased its participation in the sessions of the Joint Advisory Group on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe expressing a clear disagreement with NATO actions. A year later, in October 2016, Russia deployed short-range missiles (Iskanders) in Kaliningrad. In spite of the small remote-distance, they are located in the heart of Europe and considering the geographical position of Kaliningrad, it can be argued that Russia has taken a “restraining action” against NATO’s eastern enlargement. The Russian side insists that they do not violate the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.³⁹

Later in the RF National Security Doctrine (2015,) it was stated: “*The strengthening of Russia is taking place against a backdrop of new threats to national security that are of a multifarious and interconnected nature. The Russian Federation's implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs. The*

³⁶ During his speech at Valdai Discussion Club 2015, RF President V. Putin stated: “The emergence of nuclear weapon made it clear that there can not be a winner in the global conflict. The result can be one: Mutually assured Destruction”. Putin’s speech at the plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGtYEwm-22Q> (14.06.2017)

³⁷ Sergey Ivanov’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Strategy, the stenography available at: <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=162342&cid=9> (10.05.2017)

³⁸ Official website of MFA RF, available at http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/archive/year/2011 (18.03.2017)

³⁹https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170215/1488022739.html (17.03.2017)

*policy of containing Russia that they are implementing envisions the exertion of political, economic, military, and informational pressure on it.*⁴⁰

According to the Russians, all US actions are aimed at them. The idea of an outward enemy, a Western military threat, is even profitable for the Russian authorities to justify their economic hardship and internal instability. During his speech in 2015 at Valdai, the Russian President Vladimir Putin declared: “The basis of contemporary international security has been violated under the pretext of a nuclear threat from Iran. The contract on anti-missile defense from which the US withdrew has been violated. Additionally, the Iranian nuclear threat was solved, as previously stated, there was no threat from Iran and there currently is not. Thus, the reason to prompt American partners to build a missile defense system disappeared. It would have the right to expect that the work on the development of US missile defense will cease. And what actually happens? Nothing like this, on the contrary - everything continues.”⁴¹

Syrian conflict: From the “far abroad” conflicts, the Russian Federation has the greatest role and participation in the Syrian crisis, where it also lays its definite economic interests. If Syria falls under the influence of Sunnis, the middle-eastern gas (for example, the Qatar gas, which is transported by tankers,) will be transported to European countries via Syria and Turkey. If taken into account that Russia’s economy is mainly based on raw materials by interfering in war actions in Syria, Russia tries to prevent this situation. Being in Syria, Russians dictate their monopoly status in the European gas market. Europe, on the other hand, tries to find alternatives in order to erode its dependency from Russia. By its presence in the Middle East, Russia ensures the neutralization of its competitors such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, that they have their own interests towards European market. On the other hand, Russia uses the Syrian war for both advertising and testing its own weapons thus showing its power to the

⁴⁰Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy 2015, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/18iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

⁴¹Vladimir Putin’s speech at the plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGtYEwm-22Q> (14.06.2017)

world. Russia is guided by common geopolitical and cooperative interests of two countries while providing weapons and ammunition to Syria.

The RF President V. Putin explains the insolubility and uncertainty of the Syrian conflict by ineffective US policy. Referring to the actions of US-led coalition in Syria, he notes that though the USA has the biggest military potential in the world, it is always hard to play a double game. “*It is impossible to succeed in the struggle against terrorism, when most of the terrorists are used for overthrowing the undesirable regimes.*” It is understood that armed fighters in the Middle East are a threat for everyone including Russia.

“Old” organizations

United Nations. In this set of materials, Russia perceives the United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations as a central element of a stable system of international relations, at the basis of which lie respect, equal rights, and mutually beneficial cooperation among nations, resting on civilized political instruments for the resolution of global and regional crisis situations.⁴² “The only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations,”⁴³ in other words, the use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. There is no need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN,⁴⁴ stated V. Putin at Munich 2007.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: The OSCE, the member of which was RF since 1992, according to the Russian official documents is no longer viewed as a tool for ensuring international security.

⁴²The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy to 2020, Official website of RF MFA, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/589768 (09.05.2017)

⁴³Putin’s Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2007, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (16.03.2017)

⁴⁴ During his speech at Munich Security Conference 2008 Russia’s Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov approved: “In cases where the use of military force is necessary, it must be carried out within the framework of international law under the leadership of the United Nations and other international organizations.” Available at: http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2008-02-19/11_ivanov.html (07.05.2017)

*“It is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all – I shall emphasise this – all aspects of security: military, political, economic, and humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres. What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”*⁴⁵ Thus, the RF President expressed his concern about the OSCE’s activities, including those in the former USSR states (except for Turkmenistan). Currently Russia insists that the OSCE interferes in the internal affairs of the member states and dictates their development. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also points to the South Caucasus situation in 2008 as an example of the OSCE’s exhaustion and inefficient operation. Russia’s FM is dissatisfied with OSCE mission statement on Ukraine.⁴⁶

New opportunities

For the protection of the global economy, The Russian Federation declares that it is increasing collaboration with its partners within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), RIC (Russia, India, China,) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,⁴⁷ the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the G-20,⁴⁸ and other international institutions.⁴⁹

⁴⁵Putin’s Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy 2007, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (16.03.2017)

⁴⁶ <http://hvylya.net/news/digest/rossiya-nedovolna-otchetami-obse-o-sobyitiyah-nadonbasse.html> (08.05.2017)

⁴⁷According to Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy 2009, of particular significance for Russia will be the reinforcement of the political potential of the SCO, and the stimulation within its framework of practical steps towards the enhancement of mutual trust and partnership in the Central Asian region.

⁴⁸Russian national Security Doctrine 2009 also indicated the need to deepen relations with the G8 countries. In 2014 after the conflict in Ukraine and Crimea’s annexation, Russia was not invited to the G8 talks, so this structure is no longer mentioned in the 2015 national security doctrine.

⁴⁹The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy to 2020, Official website of RF MFA, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6B6BZ29/content/id/589768 (09.05.2017)

One of the crucial components in RF-Asian countries relations, particularly with the aforementioned ones is the RF's ammunition sale and export which is an essential tool not only for the economic and social purposes, but also for the country's foreign policy. The Soviet Union tried to extend its impact on the world and attempted to create a more favorable political and insecure situation by using weapon sale.

In 2012, the RF President V. Putin announced that the export of weapons is an effective tool for promoting the country's both political and economic national interests.⁵⁰ Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Secretary of the Military-Industrial Committee Dmitry Rogozin stated that the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation is the country's second foreign policy agency and its goal is to sell as much as possible for Russia to achieve or increase its influence in other countries.⁵¹

According to data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia accounted for nearly 21 percent of global arm sales in 2016,⁵² ranking behind only the US and leaving behind China, Germany, France and the United Kingdom by material scale of exports. Between 2000 and 2016, the country was responsible for an annual average of 25 percent of global exports.

In the late 1990s, its arms sales were overwhelmingly concentrated in China and India. This caused some concern in Russia that exports would diminish sharply if either country were able to produce domestic analogues of Russian products, or if other countries were able to supplant Russian products. Russia's customer base has diversified since 2000. It has cultivated a number of significant clients, such as Algeria and Vietnam, easing fears that its arms export performance was excessively dependent on only one or two countries.⁵³

⁵⁰ Meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States, the official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15865> (13.05.2017)

⁵¹ https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20131211/983472868.html (11.04.2017)

⁵² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database – Methodology, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background> (02.05.2017)

⁵³ Russia's Role as an Arm Exporter, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf> (02.05.2017)

Asia is the most important foreign market for Russian arms producers, accounting for 70 percent of their exports since 2000.

India, China and Vietnam are the principal sources of demand for Russian weapons in the region, and Russia is the dominant supplier in a large portion of Asian countries. The Middle East and North Africa is the second-most important market, but competition from other suppliers is much more intense there. Latin America and Africa are of relatively modest importance.

Asia is by far the most important export market for Russian arms. Not only does the region contain Russia's two largest customers, China and India (together responsible for 56 per cent of all Russian arms exports in 2000–16,) it also includes significant customers such as Vietnam (5.6 percent,) Myanmar (1.4 percent,) Malaysia (1.3 percent,) Kazakhstan (1.3 percent,) and Indonesia (1.1 percent). Russia is the dominant supplier of weapons across large swathes of Asia. Between 2000 and 2016, it was responsible for 43.1 percent of the weapons exported to the region. By way of comparison, over the same period the US accounted for 24.6 percent of arms sales to the region and China for 6.8 percent.⁵⁴

Thus, Russia's ammunition export is the principal sector for integrating in the global economy as well as the other tool to spread its' influence in the world.

Russia's Foreign Policy towards Turkey and Iran: Clash of interests in the South Caucasus

The Russian Federation foreign policy is not only guided by its political, military and geopolitical interests, but also by its economic priorities. After the economic sanctions⁵⁵ are applied on RF, it began to place huge importance on trade deals with any country. Turkey continued its trade-economic cooperation with Russia not paying attention on sanctions. Russian-Turkish bilateral cooperation was at risk after Turkey

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ After the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia and the other countries and international organizations applied sanctions against individuals, businesses and officials from Russia and Ukraine. Official website of US Department of State, available at: <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/> (05.04.2017)

downed a Russian jet in late 2015,⁵⁶ but that ended and the relations after the fact have already produced positive results: “*The contract with Ankara to deliver cutting-edge Russian anti-aircraft S-400 missile systems is agreed upon, everything is clear, the issue of a loan has not been resolved yet,*” Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aide on military-technical cooperation, Vladimir Kozhin, said at the 7th International Maritime Defense Show in St. Petersburg. Thus, NATO member Turkey is going to purchase anti-aircraft S 400 missile systems from Russia, not their analogues from the US.

The other major transaction between the two countries is the “Turkish Stream”⁵⁷ natural gas pipeline, which will serve as a transit route to deliver Russian gas to Europe. Given the sanctions imposed on North Stream⁵⁸, the importance of Turkish Stream as a guarantee of Russian economic stability sharply grows. Hereby, Turkey is an important economic partner for RF, although the geopolitical interests of two countries are opposite, particularly in the Syrian crisis.

The Russian Federation has contradictory and different relations and cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Russia is committed to the comprehensive development of cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and seeks to ensure the consistent implementation of the joint comprehensive agreement to settle the situation around the Iranian nuclear program based on UN Security Council resolution 2231 (July 20, 2015,) and relevant IAEA Board of Governors decisions, and assists this process in every possible way.⁵⁹ These two countries have no principled

⁵⁶ On 24 November 2015, a Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jet shot down a Russian SU-24 M attack aircraft near Syria-Turkey border. http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12066900@egNews (22.06.2017)

⁵⁷ The Turk Stream pipeline will surface on the shore of the European part of Turkey near Kiyıköy with gas delivery point at Lüleburgaz for the Turkish customers, and a border crossing between Turkey and Greece in İpsala serving as delivery point for the European customers. <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/> (23.06.2017)

⁵⁸ The North Stream and the North Stream 2 are the optimal pipeline routes to transport Russian gas to Europe, directly linking Russia and Germany. <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/5/> (23.06.2017)

⁵⁹ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 94, Official website of MFA RF,

contradictions in terms of geopolitics, they have cooperation arena in Syria, but as two raw material states, and they are in economic competition. Iran has lost much of its oil market after being under the sanctions for a long time, and now, it denies the agreement⁶⁰ between RF and OPEC, which is aimed at balancing the global oil market. At the same time, Iran has increased oil production and thus, has attracted a number of European countries, which previously used to buy oil from RF, offering them substantially lower oil prices.

Russia and Iran are potential rivals in the gas market as well. According to National Iranian Gas Company data, Iran is currently the third producer of gas with 180 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, but this volume is expected to rise to 400 bcm by 2020.⁶¹ Iran has no gas liquefaction capabilities (like Qatar or USA,) however; it can supply gas to Europe through gas pipelines and seize some of the Russian market, just as it does in oil market.

Thus, Russia's relations with abovementioned countries are complicated and separated by economic and geopolitical sectors. The interests of the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Iran also collide in the South Caucasus. As previously mentioned, South Caucasian states are of vital importance for Russia and are natural barriers to withstand external threats; therefore Russia tries to strengthen its influence and positions in these countries. In turn, Turkey understands that in order to preserve internal stability in the country, it should undertake external expansion and Panturkizm is one of the instruments of foreign expansion. There is a permanent competition between RF and Turkey in keeping Azerbaijan in their influence zone. In that sense, the Russians have irreversibly failed the "rivalry" with Turkey, as Azerbaijan, based on historical ties and the "One

available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

⁶⁰https://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/press_room/OPEC%20agreement.pdf (22.06.2017)

⁶¹<http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/06/18/iran-targets-berth-as-second-gas-producer/> (18.06.2017)

nation, two states” concept, strives to align with Turkey more.⁶² Russia is also interested in normalizing relations with Georgia in areas where the Georgian side is willing to do the same, given the current political environment in the South Caucasus.⁶³ Russia is worried about Georgia, which aspires to be closer to Europe, but actually is under the economic and demographic expansion of Turkey and Azerbaijan. As for Armenia, it is not considered a conflict field in this regard, since the fundamental contradictions between Armenia and Turkey are not resolved.

On the other hand, Iran, as a powerful regional “player,” certainly has its pretensions in South Caucasus.⁶⁴ Iran views the South Caucasus as a part of its natural imperium,⁶⁵ but unlike the Russians and Turks, its political behavior and actions are aimed in the long-term, i.e. centuries, not in today’s immediate interests.

To review, the development of bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation with the South Caucasus Republics, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia is for the Russian Federation a key foreign policy area.⁶⁶ Simultaneously, Russia strongly advocates a political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts in the post-Soviet space, specifically; Russia works within the existing multilateral negotiating mechanism to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by working with other States that are co-chairs in the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

⁶² After the collapse of the USSR Azerbaijan, has also refused from the Alphabet based on the Cyrillic. From the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, the Cyrillic alphabet left Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan, which is a Turkish-speaking country and member in Eurasian Economic Union, is also preparing for the transition of Kazakh language to the Latin alphabet. <https://intmassmedia.com/2017/04/12/kazakhstan-refuses-from-cyrillic-to-latin/> (05.07.2017)

⁶³ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 59, Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6B6Z29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

⁶⁴ Iran has certain claims towards Farsi-Speaking Talishs, and also towards Nakhijevan region, which is connected to Azerbaijan through Iran.

⁶⁵ Caucasian territories were under Iran’s supremacy till Russia completed conquering of all that lands during Russian-Persian wars (1804-1813, 1826-1828).

⁶⁶The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy 2015, 89, Official website of the President of Russia, available at: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/18iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf> (16.03.2017)

Europe (OSCE.)⁶⁷ Russia's future foreign policy will seek to maintain solid historical-political and trade-economic relations with South Caucasian states, as losing its leverage in the South Caucasus would mean to lose the entire Caucasus.

Conclusion

- The analyses of Russia's national security and foreign policy official documents makes it clear that during the historical phase "post-cold war era" the world has become neither "western-centered" nor secure and stable. Russia's main priority behind this is the conviction that a multipolar system is needed for international security and stability.⁶⁸

- The collapse of the USSR and the elimination of ideological contradictions didn't put an end to the Russia-West antagonism as the geopolitical interests of these two were collided. Based on this it is quite reasonable that Russia will continue its' policy of expansionism by trying to fill the vacuums both in the Near and Far Abroad, in order to prevent them to be filled by other countries or forces.

- After the collapse of the USSR, Russia's power hunger and the revival of being a world power has only increased, since now the US is ahead of Russia in both economic and social aspects, and therefore the historical competition which the two countries hold, makes Russia create a foreign and domestic agenda which will bring back its importance in the modern geographical and political sphere.

⁶⁷ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 58, Official website of MFA RF, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6B6Z29/content/id/2542248 (04.04.2017)

⁶⁸The inevitability of multipolarity has been introduced by the formulation of Putin's speech at Munich Security Conference, according to which "the combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future." Official website of the President of Russia, the stenography available at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> (16.03.2017)

- The Russian Federation will use its economic and military levers in efforts to enlarge its power and make the situation in the near and far abroad stable.⁶⁹

- RF's further policy, in "Near Abroad" will be implemented in the deepening of integration processes in the territory of CIS, including the continuation of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union and the United Economic Area, the transformation of the CSTO into a multi-functional structure for regional security and stability capable of responding effectively to current challenges and threats.⁷⁰ On the other hand in Far Abroad Russian diplomacy will work on multilateral formats: UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, etc.⁷¹

- Despite the active efforts of the Russian authorities, the former USSR states, particularly the members of the Eastern Partnership, are simultaneously under the influence of the EU active propaganda. The efficiency of these organizations and the development of the Russia-US relations that lie in a 4km distance through the Bering Strait will be seen in time. Therefore, Russia will continue its' policy of Western resistance, which will be highly disturbed by its' economic situation, low oil prices, internal social situation etc.

Assumptions

Based on the aforementioned and RF's priority to become a center of influence in today's world, it can be argued that RF should first strengthen its positions in the post-Soviet space by enhancing its alliances with the stable countries, and then engage the weaker ones within its institutions. Russia's foreign policy in the South Caucasus should aim to work thoroughly with their societies and applying soft power in those countries,

⁶⁹After the collapse of the USSR, the successor of the USSR, Russian Federation gradually removed its troops from Baltic countries, German, Poland, Mongolia. In order to temporarily keep military-bases treaties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and other countries were signed. Now there are Russian military-bases in the territory of former USSR countries: Armenia, Belarus, South Ossetia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, as well as Vietnam and Syria.

⁷⁰Activity Plan of RF's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 2018, Official website of RF MFA, 1, available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/102086 (25.03.2017)

⁷¹ Ibid

otherwise it will lose its influence on the societies, resulting in the eventual loss of influence on the authorities.

To restore its influence in Georgia, Russia can skillfully use the dissatisfaction of Georgian society, particularly nationalists, from the Turkish-Azerbaijani expansion. In Azerbaijan, RF could work intensively with the national minorities in order to force the Azerbaijani authorities to become more compliant with RF-integration. By selling arms to Azerbaijan and making concessions at the expense of Armenia, RF will further aggravate it, making Azerbaijan even more unmanageable.

Relations with the United States have vague prospects for improvement given the toughening of recent sanctions. To resist them, RF aims to strengthen its economy by dealing with import replacement, and increasing its real economic capacities. RF's currency reserves should be withdrawn from the US by creating alternative payment options with different countries as the risk to freeze those reserves and to disengage RF from the SWIFT⁷² payment system (as it happened to Iran) is high.

RF could seek to continue its cooperation with Iran in the fight against terrorism, trying to deepen trade relations and, most importantly, to use Iran's experience of development under the severe sanctions.

Russia will continue its participation in the Syrian War amidst the final victory against terrorism by cautiously playing on the contradictions of the other countries, thus expanding its political and military role in the Middle East.

RF is interested in cooperation with Turkey as a convenient trade partner, trying to reach the European gas market through Turkey, while not forgetting its expansionist aspirations not only in the former USSR territory, but also in some regions of Russia.

RF will establish a strong trade partnership in the sphere of high-technology products with China as well yet will pay close attention to China's natural demographic-expansionist aspirations towards the Far East and Siberia.

⁷² Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) is a global member-owned cooperative and the world's leading provider of secure financial messaging services.

Thus, despite the current negative turn in global affairs, Russia will remain open but cautious for dialogues with both regional and global powers to overcome the regional challenges and ensure global security and stability.

**ՏԱՐԱԾԱԾՐՋԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԳԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ:
ՌՈՒՍԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԴԱՇՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**
Ամփոփագիր

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Բանալի բառեր՝ Ռուսաստանի Դաշնություն, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, քաղաքաբույժ աշխարհ, Ռուսաստան-Արևմուտք հսկայանարտություն, «մերձավոր արտասահման», միջազգային կառույցներ

Հոդվածում քննարկվում են Ռուսաստանի Դաշնության ազգային շահերի և առաջնահերթությունների թելադրանքով ձևավորված անվտանգային և արտաքին քաղաքականության հիմնական դրույթները՝ համաձայն երկրի պաշտոնական փաստաթղթերի և բարձրաստիճան պաշտոնյաների ելույթների:

ԽՍՀՄ փլուզումից և Սառը պատերազմի ավարտից հետո փոխվել են ՌԴ պատկերացումները «տարածաշրջան» և «տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն» հասկացությունների վերաբերյալ: Այդ հասկացությունների ժամանակակից իմաստը ճշտելու նպատակով քննության է առնվում ՌԴ արտաքին քաղաքականությունը նախկին ԽՍՀՄ անդամ երկրների, ինչպես նաև տարածաշրջանում իրենց շահերն ունեցող համաշխարհային այլ դերակատարների նկատմամբ:

Հոդվածում վերլուծության է ենթարկվում տարածաշրջանային սպառնալիքներին և մարտահրավերներին դիմակայելու նպատակով ձևավորված նախկին և գործող կառույցների գործունեության արդյունավետությունը, ինչպես նաև առաջարկվում են մեխանիզմներ տարածաշրջանային անվտանգության և կայունության ամրապնդման համար:

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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Keywords: *People’s Republic of China, Communist party of China, White paper, National security, Regional security, Defense strategy, Development strategy.*

China's national security strategy

Chinese military strategy has evolved over the past several decades. From a reliance on Maoist concepts primarily centered on conducting a People’s War to focusing on fighting and winning local, informative wars. National security decision-making was largely characterized by the unparalleled authority of the paramount leader: Deng Xiaoping (the chairman of the Central Advisory Committee of the Communist Party of China), and Mao Zedong (the first President of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). The vivid evidence of this was the speech by China's 6th President Hu Jintao at the 18th National Congress of the Communist party of China (CPC) in 2012. President Hu Jintao pointed out that China should continue to pursue peaceful development based on Marxism-Leninism and on the theories of Mao Zedong and Dan Xiaoping, for upholding and developing “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”¹

¹“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” meaning socialism adapted to Chinese conditions, is the official ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC), claimed to be based upon scientific socialism. This ideology supports the creation of a socialist market economy dominated by the public sector since China is, as claimed by the CPC, in the primary stage of socialism.

Dan Xiaoping imported his own theory into the Chinese political system which does not claim to reject Mao Zedong thought² or Marxism–Leninism, but rather seeks to adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of China. Deng also stressed that China should be open to the whole world, implement a "one state, two systems" mechanism.³ The theory included the need to economically develop the country, which was put into practice in 1966-1976, when economic reforms were based on the theory of the Chinese President's "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics".

Mao Zedong's concept of the "**People's War**"⁴, remains a dominant theme in Chinese military ideals. For Chinese leaders, "People's War" serves as the underlying principle for, and provides a scientific assessment of, how wars must be fought. For Chinese military planners, the most common type of future combat they will face – local wars on China's periphery – will be fought with the principles of "People's War" in mind. During the Maoist era, China focused on preparing to fight an "early war, a major war, and a nuclear war",-encouraging army builds based on mass, depth, and protracted war preparation. A concept of "local war under modern conditions" emerged during the 1980s to guide "army building" through the major round of military-wide reforms launched in 1985. In its December 2004 Defense White Paper, China replaced "local wars under

² The essential difference between Maoism and other forms of Marxism is that Mao claimed that peasants should be the essential revolutionary class in China, because, contrary to their industrial working "comrades", they were more suited to establishing a successful revolution and socialist society in China.

³ "One country, two systems" is a constitutional principle for the reunification of China during the early 1980s. It suggested that there would be only one China, but distinct Chinese regions such as Hong Kong and Macau could retain their own capitalist economic and political systems, while the rest of China uses the socialist system. Under the principle, each of the two regions could continue to have its own political system, legal, economic and financial affairs, including external relations with foreign countries.

⁴ People's war, is a military-political strategy first developed by the Chinese Communist revolutionary and political leader Mao Zedong. The basic concept behind People's War is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of Mobile Warfare and guerrilla warfare. It was used by the Communists against Imperial Japanese Army in World War II and the Nationalist Government in the Chinese Civil War.

high tech conditions” with “local wars under the conditions of informatization.”⁵

Whereas Mao Zedong based his thinking on the belief that global war was inevitable, Deng Xiaoping proposed that large scale global war will not occur for a considerable time, and there is hope that world peace will be maintained. Based on this view, Deng submitted the principle that “national defense must be built under the larger perspective of economic construction.”⁶

Over time, analyses of White Papers (China’s national defense papers, which are published by the press of the State Council of the PRC), show that China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by the mid-21st century⁷, besides this China’s main interests are divided into three groups:

- **Security:** Preservation of China’s political system and national security.

- **Sovereignty:** Preservation of territorial integrity. From this point of view, the priority concerns of Beijing are primarily concerned with Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet.

- **Development:** Economic Development, for which a peaceful regional environment is considered as a priority.

The main principle of China’s national security strategy is self-reliance and not joining a military alliance. China maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;

⁵ China’s National Defense in 2004, available at (10.03.2017) <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>

⁶ Shou Xiaosong, *New theory of Deng Xiaoping military thought*, Military science publishing house, Beijing, 2007, p. 398

⁷ China’s National Defense in 2006, available at (12.03.2017) <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>

3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful co-existence.

China develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party.⁸ Beijing perceives national security as a preservation of unity, continuous development of Chinese armed forces, and a consistent process of implementing their own nuclear program.

During the UN 70th Anniversary in 2015, the current Chinese President Xi Jinping once again confirmed that hegemonism and power politics remain key factors, international security and global economic development is uneven, "The winner must take the whole" approach can no longer exist in the world⁹, and the only legal body which can deal with international security is the United Nations. Furthermore, he added that Beijing is ready to assist UN peacekeeping operations in anytime, in any circumstances.¹⁰ While talking about direct threats to national security, Beijing considers **cyber terrorism** as an important one. Speaking about cyber security, Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that states should equally participate in Internet governance.¹¹ In the UN GA session in 2016 Prime Minister Li Keqiang speaking on international and regional security system insisted that terrorism is a serious threat, mentioning that it is necessary to fight against it by raising the role of the UN, by maintaining the highlighted principles of Dag Hammarskjöld¹² (UN second Secretary-General) and by economic development because development is the solution to all

⁸ Ibid

⁹ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, First Edition, (January 2017), available at (15.04.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

¹⁰ Chinese President Xi Jinping - Full Speech at 70th UN General Assembly, available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHNT8jTTh7s>

¹¹ Си Цзиньпин: мир должен совместно бороться с преступлениями в киберпространстве, (09.03.2017) <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2531424>

¹² When Dag Hammarskjöld was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 April 1953, there was a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula; the Organization was deeply divided between East and West for resolving all these problems Dag Hammarskjöld created the first armed peacekeeping operation which took place by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to address the Suez Crisis.

problems.¹³ To this end, the most important step was the adoption of the law on cyber security by the Standing Committee of the National People Congress in October 2016, which entered into force on June 1, 2017. According to this law, the basic network mechanisms and special products must be adapted to national standards.¹⁴

In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping advised China's foreign and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the “**24 charter**” strategy: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Elements of this strategy have often been quoted by senior Chinese national security officials and academics, especially in the context of China's diplomacy and military strategy. Certain aspects of this strategy have been debated in recent years – namely the relative emphasis place upon “never claim leadership” or “make some contributions”. China's increased international profile, especially since 2002, suggests Beijing is leaning toward a more assertive, confident diplomacy. Overall, Deng's strategy remains instructive in that it suggests both a short-term desire to downplay China's capabilities and avoid confrontation, and a long-term strategy to build up China's power to maximize options for the future.

On January 13, 2016 the “**Arab Policy Concept**” was published,¹⁵ which included China's interests in the Middle East surrounding the “Silk road” initiative.¹⁶ Chinese-Arabic mutual cooperation was based on the political will to preserve peace in the Middle East. China is willing to have

¹³ Chinese Premier Li Keqiang addresses UN General Assembly, available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6ZNTJhEkvY>

¹⁴ Cybersecurity law, available at (10.08.2017) <http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraft/?lang=en>

¹⁵ China's Arab Policy Paper, available at (26.06.2017) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/13/c_135006619.htm

¹⁶ On September 7, 2013 President Xi Jinping made a speech titled “Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future” at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University. For the first time the PRC President spoke about “Silk Road”. On land - the plan is to build a new Eurasian land bridge and develop the economic corridors of: China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Indochina peninsula; China-Pakistan; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar ... On the seas - the initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the belt and road.

pragmatic cooperation in the principle of mutual benefit and win-win results with Arab states. In particular, the process of jointly pursuing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, China is willing to coordinate development strategies with Arab states, support each other's advantages and implement potentials in order to enhance cooperation in infrastructure construction. China is willing to cooperate with Arab states to promote the new type of cooperation mechanism featuring openness and reciprocity, mutual benefit and win-win results.

The **"Good, Secure, Rich Neighborhood"** policy was first introduced by Wen Jiabao, the 6th premier of the PRC during the "ASEAN Trade and Investment" conference, which took place in Bali on October 7, 2003. Wen Jiabao pointed out: "The peripheral diplomacy under the new situation is: persist in being good to neighbors, make neighbors our partners, strengthen friendship with them, intensify regional cooperation and bring exchange and cooperation with neighborhood countries to a new level. "Good neighborhood", "Secure neighborhood", and "Wealthy neighborhood" is an important part of the strategy for China's own development. "Good neighborhood" means to carry over and forward the philosophy of "benevolence and good-neighborliness and harmony" of the Chinese nation and, under the principle of peaceful co-existence, make concerted efforts to promote regional stability and harmonious state relations. "Secure neighborhood" means to actively safeguard peace and stability of the region and enhance mutual trust through dialogue and settle disputes through peaceful negotiation so as to create a peaceful and secure regional environment in Asia. "Wealthy neighborhood" means to mutually strengthen beneficial cooperation, deepen the regional and sub-regional cooperation and promote regional economic integration so as to realize common development."¹⁷ If we say the "good-neighbor" policy regards neighboring countries as common neighbors, the policy of "secure and wealthy neighborhood" is to tie China's own interests to those of its

¹⁷ Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the People's Republic of China at the Seventh China-ASEAN summit, Bali, (8 October 2003), available at (06.07.2017) <http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dqc/t27714.htm>

neighbors. That means that China has regarded more neighboring countries as its own partners and friends. On China's path on its "Good neighborhood" policy, president Xi proposed the "**Asian Security Concept**" during the fourth summit on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, in 2017.¹⁸ According to this, the problems arising in Asia should be resolved and secured by Asians. In this concept, Beijing considers India and Japan as the most important regional players. According to Beijing, the US accelerates the deployment of military equipment in the Asia-Pacific region, which leads to strengthening its military ties with Japan.¹⁹

By summarizing all of these concepts, it can be argued that basic values by which the Chinese society should be guided during its existence, were included in the ideologies of "**Core Socialist Values**",²⁰ which was introduced at the 18th National Congress, and "**Chinese dream**" popularized after 2013. Xi urged the implementation of these values in every aspect of life and for the doctrine to be made a "spiritual pursuit" of the public. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has outlined a vision of China's revitalization as a great power, referred to as the "Chinese Dream" by President Xi Jinping. The Chinese Dream, which is another name for the long-standing CCP goal of the "rejuvenation of the Chinese people," and includes two major parts. First, it aims to increase the standard of living for all Chinese people. Second, it seeks to realize China's rise as a great power.

In 2017, China still continues to uphold the official ideology (**Socialism with Chinese Characteristics**) of the Communist Party of China, which is in the new era. This was reaffirmed by reelected President Xi Jinping during the 19th Party Congress.²¹ The new era can mean a

¹⁸ Mian Ahmad Naeem Salik, Pakistan and the New Asian Security Concept, Institute of strategic studies, (25 August 2014), available at (06.04.2017) <http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/policy-paper-new-asian-security-11.pdf>

¹⁹ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, White paper, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, January 2017, available at (25.5.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

²⁰ Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress, available at (16.05.2017) http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm

²¹ Full video: Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, available at (18.10.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3pc3SqK5jI>

transition from the era of world's big power into the era of world's superpower; the progressive transition from the era of "Priority Prosperity" to the era of "Common Prosperity"; the realization of the Chinese Dream of great rejuvenation and making greater contributions to the mankind.

From the very first year of Xi's leadership, the issues of foreign security became more critical and extremely significant, stressing that the internal and external security of the state is indissolubly interrelated. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC in November 2013, a decision was made to establish the **National Security Council** (NSC) in order to improve China's national security strategy and system.²² The principal aims of the NSC include conducting research that focuses on China's major strategic issues in national security such as territory, territorial waters, diplomacy, military, natural resources, economy and people's livelihood; formulating relevant major strategies; supervising and coordinating the implementation of national security strategies; and carrying out efficient and effective crisis management for both domestic and international emergencies.

China's Nuclear Doctrine

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Islamic Republic of Iran

In 2006, the Chinese government published China's **nuclear strategy** for the first time. The White paper titled "China's National Defense in 2006". According to the White Paper, China is:

Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Beijing remains firmly committed to the policy of **no first use** of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

²² 9th Berlin conference on Asian security, International dimensions of national (in)security concepts, challenges and ways forward, discussion paper, Renmin university, Beijing, available at (23.04.2017) https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/projects/BCAS2015_Canrong_Jin_Web.pdf

against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building an effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Beijing exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.²³

In another White Paper published two years later "China's Military Strategy," revealed that the Chinese government made it very clear that "China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature." The document went further, stating that the nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. "China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China."²⁴

On July 14, 2005 major-general Tsu Chenngun, Dean of the International Youth Program of the Chinese National Defense University, mentioned that if the US directs its missiles to China, Beijing will respond with a nuclear weapon. Contrary to this was emphasized in Hu Jintao's speech on September 24, 2009 in the UN GA session, where he noted that the danger of starting or implementing a nuclear war must be eliminated once and for all and the PRC will refrain from using nuclear weapons.²⁵ All

²³ China's National Defense in 2006, available at (27.03.2017)
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>

²⁴ China's Military Strategy 2015, available at (14.03.2017)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001_4.htm

²⁵ H. Jintao, UN: Nuclear weapons, Maxims News Network, (27 September 2009), available at (16.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=panhtpUGnuM>

in all, it is possible to conclude that China will do everything to avoid the use of nuclear weapon, but if it will be necessary, Beijing will strike.

During his visit to Canberra in April 2006, Wen Jiabao said that China takes a responsible role in world affairs;²⁶ China is pursuing a national defense policy within the framework of which the main goal is to control the arms race in the world and promote disarmament. China's authorities are inclined to believe that one of the key challenges to the stability of North-East Asia is the development of nuclear weapons and establishment of ballistic missile technologies by North Korea. The shelling of South Korea's Yŏnphŏng Island in November 2010, showed that the situation in the Korean Peninsula had a direct impact on the formation of security and stability in Asia.

China's position on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is consistent and clear-cut. China is committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its peace and stability, and settlement of the issue through dialogue and consultation. In 2016, Chinese Consul General Hong Lei during his speech at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs stated that they are opposed to the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK and the Korean Peninsula cannot have nuclear, be it the DPRK, or the ROK and its own manufacturing or deployment by others.²⁷ It does not meet the interests of all parties and is not conducive to the DPRK to maintain its own security if nuclear weapons exist on the Peninsula. Therefore, the peninsula must achieve denuclearization, on which China is unswerving. Beijing will encourage other parties to adopt new UN resolutions and take further effective measures to effectively block the DPRK's nuclear development program.

In November 2017, when US President Donald Trump visited China, the two Presidents discussed the issue of demilitarization in the Korean

²⁶ Премьер Госсовета КНР Вэнь Цзябао в Канберре выступил с важной речью, Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики, available at (03.04.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/zyjh/t244162.shtml>

²⁷ Let History be Guidance to Future: Jointly Building A New Type of Major Country Relationship between China and US is the Historical Trend, Speech at Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota by Consul General Hong Lei, (8 October 2016), available at (12.06.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1404093.shtml

peninsula and stressed that the two sides will continue to fully and strictly implement UN Security Council resolutions and stay committed to solving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. Trump stated that China can fix this problem quickly and easily, urging Beijing to cut financial links with North Korea and also calling on Russia to help.²⁸ However, on April 28, 2017, during the UN Security Council China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi had already responded to Trump's remarks insisted that the PRC is not directly involved in the Korean Peninsula, and the key to resolving the problem is not in the hands of Beijing. Beijing is interested in regional security, which is why it is against the US's deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in Korea, reasoning that it is against him and breaks the security situation in the region.²⁹

In addressing Iran's nuclear program, Beijing has always pointed out that the situation in the Middle East is unstable and as a result, the solution to the problem is not seen yet. In order to reach a final solution to the problem, parties only need to implement peaceful and diplomatic measures. This political line continued until 2008, and in the National defense paper in 2012, references to Iran were lacking. When discussing the Iranian nuclear issue, Minister of Foreign Affairs of PRC Wang Yi said that China always supports and safeguards the comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, and will continue to push all parties to faithfully fulfill the agreement.³⁰ In October, 2017 Wang Guo, Director-General of the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China declared that China has firmly supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and participated in its comprehensive and in-depth implementation. He stated that China will continue to take an objective, fair and responsible approach in working with other parties to uphold and

²⁸ Trump says China can fix North Korea threat 'quickly and easily' and does not blame Beijing for trade deficit, Independent, available at (09.11.2017)

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-north-korea-china-threat-no-blame-trade-beijing-xi-jinping-a8045066.html>

²⁹ China Statement on North Korea at UN Security Council, (28 April 2017), available at (18.05.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzPDI2IVnxA>

³⁰ Wang Yi: China Views Its Relations with Iran from a Strategic Height, (25 May 2017), available at (16.07.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1465855.shtml

implement JCPOA.³¹ China has always firmly opposed war, as conflict between the West and Iran could have a tremendous impact on China's energy security. China's anti-war stance abets Iran's friendly attitude towards China, and strengthens Iran's energy cooperation with China. China's role in the negotiation process with Iran has been overshadowed by the Western powers and Russia. While China's part has been vague, this actually means that China profits most from the final result. This is enough to safeguard China's energy interests in Iran. In this regard, contributing to resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis seems like a good opportunity for China to raise its profile and increase its soft power in the region.

Make some contributions: Middle East, Caucasus and Africa

China's interest in the **Middle East** began to emerge from the 1990's due to the expansion of China's geostrategic influence outside the Asia-Pacific region. China's security interests in the Middle East are continuously expanding from an energy and economic point of view. President Xi Jinping's visit to the Middle East was the first by a Chinese leader in seven years, and witnessed the signing of billions of dollars' worth of agreements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt³², and a ten-fold expansion of trade with Iran over the next ten years. The significance may extend beyond commerce as Chinese interests align more with Iranian interests than those of Saudi Arabia. China and Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) signed US\$55 billion worth of cooperation agreements during Xi's visit³³, including a nuclear cooperation pact. Strategic cooperation between the two countries is fundamentally based on protecting China's energy interests in Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia is safe and stable, so is China's largest supplier of oil. With instability and uncertainty, China's economic prospects deteriorate. Due to Saudi Arabia's relations with the United

³¹ International Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal, Arms control Association, available at (05.11.2017) <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2017-10-25/international-support-iran-nuclear-deal>

³² Chinese president signs deals worth billions on Mideast tour, Channel NewsAsia, (21 January 2016), available at (19.08.2017) <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/chinese-president-signs-deals-worth-billions-on-mideast-tour-8200546>

³³ Xi Jinping signing billion-dollar deals on Middle East tour, Taipei times, (23 January 2016), available at (13.07.2017)

<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/01/23/2003637847>

States, China-Saudi military relations have been very limited. From Riyadh's perspective, China does not have the same capability to project power globally, as the United States does, and therefore cannot provide the same security assurances against the international threats Saudi Arabia faces, particularly against Iran or the internal dangers of terrorism.

From Riyadh, Xi went to Iran, becoming the first foreign leader to do so following the lifting of international sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is not a neighboring country with China, that's why Iran can be seen as "China's great neighbor", with whom China plays in the priorities of "Great neighbor diplomacy". Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani (the seventh and current President of the Islamic Republic of Iran) together witnessed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Jointly Advancing Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road as well as multiple bilateral cooperation documents covering energy, production capacity, finance, investment, communications, culture, justice, science, technology, news, customs, climate change and human resources. Iran and China have become natural allies due to practical necessities, not due to ideological compatibility. This is because Iran is a stable country in a region of political instability and has a great deal of resources that China needs.

Chinese officials worry that alleged Saudi funding of Islamic schools in Xinjiang may be encouraging Uygur militants who have staged several attacks in a low intensity campaign for equal rights and autonomy, if not independence. In addition to this, anxiety is linked to the fact that the Uygurs have joined the Islamic State, can return one day and become the basis for Western China's splitting, breaking Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" initiative. It is also worth mentioning that there is a great Kazakh diaspora in the Xinjiang Uygur province, which plays a crucial role in the formation of East Turkestan. From this, it can be concluded that any destructive process that occurs in Kazakhstan may leave its immediate influence on the processes taking place in the autonomous region.

Turkey has expressed its support to China on this issue. During a visit to China in 2010, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that Turkey values its ties with China and would uphold the “One-China policy” and crack down on any activities in Turkey that aim to sabotage China's sovereignty and threaten its territorial integrity. Turkey will work with China to fight separatist and terrorist activities in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region.³⁴ Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visited China June 24-29. He was the first Turkish president visiting China after 14 years.³⁵ Beijing trusted the Turkish “One-China policy” so much that it provided a rare opportunity for the President Gul to give a speech on June 28 at Xinjiang University. In his speech, the President said that the Uygur people in Xinjiang form a bridge of friendship between China and Turkey. During his visit, President Gul was made the Honorary Professor of Xinjiang University.³⁶ Beijing said that it was ready to find ways to cooperate with Ankara to enhance security cooperation and combat the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism.³⁷ Recently, in August, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu during the meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, told that would not allow any anti-China activity inside Turkey or territory controlled by Turkey and they take China's security as their own security.”³⁸ This type of policy towards China can be linked with its national economic problems, which is in dire need for China's “One Belt, One Road” initiative for becoming a nation so strategically located in crossroads between Asia and Europe.

³⁴ Turkey supports China in fighting terrorism, News of the Communist party of China, News of the Communist party of China, (4 July 2013), available at (08.09.2017) <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8310601.html>

³⁵ Turkey-China relations in 2009, World Uyghur congress, (1 January 2010), available at (19.06.2017) <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=1516>

³⁶ Will Xinjiang Debacle Put Turkish-Chinese Relations at Risk? The Finnish institute of international affairs, (22 September 2009), available at (19.06.2017) http://www.fiia.fi/en/news/728/will_xinjiang_debacle_put_turkish-chinese_relations_at_risk/

³⁷ Chinese President Hu Jintao Holds Talks with Turkish President Gul, Consulate general of People's Republic of China in San Francisco, (25 June 2009), available at (15.08.2017) <http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t570489.htm>

³⁸ Turkey promises to eliminate anti-China media reports, available at (15.09.2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-turkey/turkey-promises-to-eliminate-anti-china-media-reports-idUSKBN1AJ1BV>

According to Beijing, counteracting all these factors can lead to tension reduction, promoting the creation of Sunni-Shia economic interests, such as Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, and "Silk Road" which connects Sinjyan and Tehran with Sunni Muslims from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Virtually, religious contradictions can be overlooked, shadowed in the case of state interest.

On June 5, 2014 at the sixth ministerial conference of the **China-Arab** States Cooperation Forum President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech entitled "Promoting Silk Road Spirit and Deepening China-Arab Cooperation". The Chinese president hoped that the two sides would promote the Silk Road spirit and take the joint construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century as a new opportunity. He mentioned that the two sides should hold a broader vision and down-to-earth attitude to establish a "1+2+3" cooperation pattern, namely, to take energy cooperation as the core, infrastructure construction and trade and investment facilitation as two wings, and three high and new technology fields of nuclear energy, space satellite and new energy as new breakthroughs. In the next 10 years, they will strive to increase the bilateral trade volume from last year's 240 billion USD to 600 billion USD, which is an increase in China's non-financial investment stock to the Arab states from last year's 10 billion USD to over 60 billion USD, and would accelerate negotiations to promote the establishment of the free trade area between China and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.³⁹ In China, Arab states see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology. They see a country that is far away and has no imperial agenda in their region, but which is technologically competent and will likely be militarily powerful in time. On January 22, 2016 at the Arab League headquarters, President Xi spoke about China's willingness to continue to unswervingly support Middle East and Arab states in preserving their ethnic and cultural traditions, and

³⁹ Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony of Sixth Ministerial Conference of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and Delivers Important Speech Stressing to Promote Silk Road Spirit and Deepen China-Arab Cooperation, MFA China, available at (27.07.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163554.shtml

oppose all forms of discrimination and prejudice against specific ethnic group and religions.⁴⁰

For centuries, relations between China and the **Caucasus** have been included in the Silk Road project. The fact that China is not so popular in the region can be emphasized by the fact that both the President and the Prime Minister have not arrived in the region on an official visit.

China's interests in the South Caucasus are essentially derived from its wider foreign policy goals: securing access to new sources of raw materials where possible, creating a stable environment around China's extended periphery, and, to an extent, opening up new markets for Chinese companies to expand into. China's interest lies in maintaining regional stability in the South Caucasus, but Beijing does not want to be a mediator in conflict-resolution work. Moreover, Beijing wants to contribute to the reduction of the influence of Islamic extremism and Pan-Turkic aspirations in the region. Objectively, the South Caucasus represents a low-order priority for Beijing. In the longer term, however, two strategic projects have been proposed which, if implemented, would significantly increase the region's importance for Beijing.⁴¹

• **A rail link from western China to Turkey** via Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (with a ferry link across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Baku). This project, still apparently only at the stage of initial discussions, has been floated as one of a number of initiatives designed to revive the concept of a 'Silk Road' transportation network linking China to Europe via the Caspian region. It was reportedly raised by Turkish PM Erdogan during his visit to Beijing in 2012.⁴² From Beijing's standpoint, the potential attraction of such a route lies in its contribution to diversifying China's access to international markets, and reducing its vulnerability to disruption of sea-based exports.

⁴⁰ President Xi's Speech at Arab League Headquarters: Full Text, (22 January 2016), available at (17.03.2017)

<http://english.cntv.cn/2016/01/22/ARTIadCQDyVQjG0ADCKr2tc1160122.shtml>

⁴¹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, China in the South Caucasus, (5 June 2014), available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-in-the-south-caucasus>

⁴² President Erdoğan Goes to China, Presidency of the Republic of China, (12 May 2017), available at (06.07.2017) <https://www.tcgb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75165/president-erdogan-goes-to-china.html>

• The construction of a **Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP)** capable, in principle, of shipping Azeri gas into Central Asia and onwards to China. Officials in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have publicly discussed the idea of gas being transported eastwards via a future TCGP for this purpose. To date, however, there is no evidence of serious negotiations having been held over such a possibility.

There are key points which make Georgia attractive in China's One Belt, One Road initiative. The first one is Free Trade Agreement with both the European Union and China; second one outlet to the Black Sea and overland links with Turkey (with the help of this China can more efficiently conduct trade with European Union; third one flexible position for the OBOR success (the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) group and the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey trilateral group (AGT), Georgia can serve as a maritime outlet to Europe via its ports in Batumi, Poti, and Anaklia. In a May 2017 interview with China's Xinhua news service, Georgian Finance Minister Dmitri Kumsishvili emphasized the potential of Georgia's involvement in the Silk Road Economic Belt SREB to "promote regional connectivity, enhance human exchanges, and expand trade and investment."⁴³

President Serzh Sargsyan, who has paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), held a meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping at China National Convention Center on March 25, 2015. At the end of the negotiations, the Armenian and Chinese Presidents signed the Joint Declaration on Further Development and Enhancement of Friendly and Cooperative Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, more than a dozens of documents aimed at the promotion and strengthening of mutual cooperation between the two countries in a number of areas were signed. Serzh Sargsyan once again welcomed the Chinese initiative to restore the Great Silk Road. He noted that Armenia regards its relations with China as one of the most important foreign policy priorities and places great value on the deepening

⁴³ "Interview: Georgia to contribute to Belt and Road Initiative: deputy PM", Xinhua News Agency, (9 May 2017), available at (16.10.2017) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/09/c_136266698.htm

of friendly relations with China – a country representing one of the world's most ancient civilizations and an influential member of the international community.⁴⁴ In that context, the interlocutors touched upon Chinese companies' potential involvement in the construction projects of the North-South Road Corridor, the Armenia-Iran railway and a new nuclear plant.

China tries to remain politically neutral in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the result of which was the abstention of China during the UN GA session on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict in 2008. Despite this, in August 2013, the Armenian Armed Forces acquired a new missile AR1A system from China. The Chinese complexes supply to Armenia means that China has far-reaching goals for military-political cooperation with Armenia, as these supplies will really help balance the "balance of forces", which already is advantageous to Armenia. In the Armenian case, China is also interested in connecting Armenia to Iran via the Persian Gulf. The construction of that road will give Armenia an immediate entry and exit to the Central Asian market, as well as to Pakistan, India, China and ASEAN countries.

China's patronage for Armenia on the Iran-Armenia railroad will not only boost economic activity, but will also be a good opportunity for Armenia to avoid a deadlock that has been artificially provoked by neighboring states. There are two rival projects that include Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey and China indirectly. The first one connects Kars (Turkey), Nakhijevan (Azerbaijan) and Kaswin (Iran) to each other and the second one connects Rasht (Iran) to Astara (Azerbaijan). They will be connected to each other via railway, from Baku to Nakhijevan, crossing Armenia's territory. Speaking about railways we cannot ignore Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. The opening ceremony was held on 30 October 2017, at Baku International Sea Trade Port in Alyat, where the President of Turkey underlined that the railway will carry Chinese goods to Europe in

⁴⁴ Государственный визит Президента Сержа Саргсяна в Китайскую народную республику, Президент Республики Армения, официальный сайт, (28 Март 2015), <http://www.president.am/ru/foreign-visits/item/2015/03/25/State-visit-of-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-to-China/>

just 12 to 15 days.⁴⁵ The train already began its first official trip from Kazakhstan to Mersin carrying 600 tons of wheat. Let's look what the initiative looks like if PRC will engage into this project. The trains coming from China will enter into Kazakhstan through the Khorgos Gateway, after that, they will reach to Baku. They will continue their way until reaching to Tbilisi, passing through gauge-changing facilities in the Georgian town of Akhalkalaki and reaching Turkish city Kars. It is expected that this project will eventually connect Beijing to London.

China also has plans to build a railway in the South Caucasus. The railway will start from Corgan, which joins the largest city Almaty in the border of China and Kazakhstan, and reaching the territory of the South Caucasus. Regarding Iran-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway, it is already being implemented, and the contract, which tied China to Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, was signed in 2014. The project is expected to start from China's Kashgar to Afghanistan's Herat and finally be connected with the Iranian railroad.⁴⁶

The Chinese Government always attaches great importance to Africa. Relations between China and African countries put forward by late Premier Zhou Enlai during his tour to Africa in 1960's. The new Chinese leadership headed by President Hu Jintao has stated many times that China will further strengthen the solidarity and cooperation with the developing countries including Africa, and will make continued efforts to achieve the goal of common development.⁴⁷

China's rapid economic growth and expanding middle class have fueled an unprecedented need for resources (raw materials and new markets for its products). As a result, China has turned to Africa. From a strategic point of view, Africa can help diversify China's dependence on

⁴⁵ A New Asia-to-Europe Railway Route Is Opening Up, Bloomberg, (29 October 2017), available at (07.11.2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/azerbaijan-to-open-railway-planned-as-new-europe-china-corridor>

⁴⁶ A New Railway Linking Iran to China via Three Asian Countries, Real Iran, (18 December 2014), available at (14.04.2017)

<http://realiran.org/new-railway-linking-iran-china-via-three-asian-countries/>

⁴⁷ China's Policy towards Africa, MFA PRC, (1 January 2004), available at (06.08.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zghfz/zfgx/t165330.htm>

Western powers. From Africa's perspective, China offers new markets for trade. Moreover, China and Africa have common interests in solving global economic problems, involving such issues as South-South cooperation.

In 2006, Beijing government released an important white paper, *China's African Policy*⁴⁸, to clarify Africa's strategic importance to China. It was the first of its kind in China's diplomatic history with Africa, which embodied Chinese long-term plan of enhancing all-rounds cooperation with Africa. China wants to help African countries get rid of poverty and consolidation of independence. The transformation of China-African cooperation is expressed in the form of aid. In 2011, China's then-Premier Wen Jiabao stated that "China had selflessly assisted Africa when it was the poorest. We did not exploit one single drop of oil or extract one single ton of minerals out of Africa."⁴⁹ This seems to suggest that Beijing views Africa first and most keenly through the lens of political ties rather than economic benefits.

China's infrastructural investments in Northeast and East Africa - especially those projects noted in Egypt, Djibouti, and Kenya, demonstrate that the region is of significant importance to the actualization of OBOR (One belt, one road). Africa will benefit from Silk Road via acquiring Silk Road Fund to its infrastructure development. Technological transformation from China to Africa and job creation is other advantages to least developed countries like Ethiopia.

On his first visit to Africa in early 2013, speaking in Tanzania, China's President Xi Jinping called for China and Africa together to realize a fast track of "comprehensive development."⁵⁰ New ports in Tanzania, rail lines in Kenya, naval facilities in Djibouti and industrial zones along the Suez Canal in Egypt are all intended to support this massive new trade

⁴⁸China's African Policy, MFA PRC, (20 September 2006), available at (07.08.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzcc/t481748.htm>

⁴⁹ Wen Jiabao, China Did Not Exploit One Single Drop of Oil or One Single Ton of Minerals from Africa, (15 September 2011), available at (07.08.2017) http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-09/15/content_23419056.htm

⁵⁰ L. A. Johnston, Africa, and China's One Belt, One Road initiative: Why now and what next? ICTSD, (15 September 2016), available at (07.08.2017) <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/africa-and-china%E2%80%99s-one-belt-one-road-initiative-why-now-and-what>

network that president Xi Jinping hopes will become a key pillar of his foreign policy agenda. For Ethiopia, it is located in the Horn of Africa and is a gateway to Africa. This has qualified Ethiopia to be a pilot country for Chinese projects in Africa, including the Belt and Road Initiative. China and Ethiopia have increased their military cooperation since Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Addis Ababa in May 2014. Ethiopia is also relying heavily on Chinese loans to develop its foundations. For example, the Tekeze River Dam in Tigray region, one of Ethiopia's mega hydroelectric projects and the highest dam on the African Continent, was built by the Chinese. China is also financing new dams being built on the Omo River in southwestern Ethiopia and the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River. The Chinese have built most of the roads in Ethiopia, including the Ethio-Djibouti railway project.

Since 2008, China has supported counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Djibouti, already home to other foreign military bases, is the site of China's first permanent naval installation overseas; Chinese troops set sail for Djibouti in July 2017 to set up the base.⁵¹

Good, secure, wealthy neighborhood: China, Japan, India and Pakistan

China attaches great importance to defense and security consultations with neighboring countries. It has established mechanisms for defense and security consultation and policy dialogue with neighboring countries, including Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, India and Pakistan, and has held regular consultations and dialogues at different levels with its neighbors, which focus on Asia-Pacific security, bilateral military relations, and regional flashpoint issues.

China-Japan relationship in particular will remain as a basic determinant of the regional security environment. Territorial disputes between China and Japan, like many other disputes between them, are politically sensitive in both countries. However, their common interest in attaining peace will remain strong for the foreseeable future, which is likely

⁵¹ E. Albert, China in Africa, Council on Foreign relations, (12 July 2017), available at (09.08.2017) <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-africa>

to ensure that territorial disputes will not drag the two countries into a war. In 2004, Beijing was inclined to believe that Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile defense system for future deployment. Such actions led to the Chinese government's engagement in similar provocative moves in the Senkaku Islands. Beginning in 2008, its ships have encroached on the territorial waters around the Senkaku. The frequency of such incursions gradually rose thereafter, spiking noticeably following the Japanese government's purchase of three of the island in September 2012. The 2012 DWP of PRC identifies Japan as a security concern more straight forwardly than in past papers, accusing Japan of "making trouble over the issue" of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Past DWP's have briefly addressed Japan's reconsideration of its concept of self-defense and its "military" alliance relationship with Washington, but have generally focused on the cooperative aspects of the China-Japan defense relationship.

In June 2016 the Japanese destroyer Setogiri spotted a PLA Navy Jiangkai class frigate entering the contiguous zone around the Senkakus at the same time as a group of Russian navy vessels transited the same waters. The response from the Chinese side was naval intelligence-gathering ships entering Japan's territorial sea near Kuchinerabujima and Yakushima islands for the first time and in the southern waters of the Senkaku islands.

One particularly unnerving episode for Japan began in early August 2016 when a China coast guard vessel escorted 300 Chinese fishing vessels into waters around the Senkakus, and over four days a total of 15 coast guard ships repeatedly intruded into the waters, half of them armed.⁵² China's this type of politics is because of Maritime Silk Road policy. China needs to secure its seas on its own terms which lead to the unmanaged open escalation between Japan and China.

Despite all this, China-Japan defense relations have made headway. The two sides have held the seventh and eighth China-Japan Defense and Security Consultation, made their first exchange of port calls by naval ships, and held the first consultation over the establishment of a maritime

⁵² Japan's growing concern over China's naval might, BBC, (28 May 2017), available at (07.11.2017) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39918647>

liaison mechanism⁵³ between their teams of experts. China sincerely fulfills its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by setting up implementation offices at both central and local levels by submitting timely complete annual declarations via subsequent declarations to newly discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China, and through the submission of the annual national protection program. China has hosted more than 240 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Jointly with the OPCW, China has hosted several training courses for OPCW inspectors, as well as international courses on protection and assistance.

In May 2008, China and the OPCW jointly held a training course on protection and assistance.⁵⁴ With a view to facilitating Japan's role in fulfilling its obligation to destroy its chemical weapons abandoned in China, China has assisted Japan in carrying out 150 on-site investigation, excavation, recovery and identification missions, and has excavated almost 50,000 items of abandoned chemical weaponry. In October 2010, China began to destroy chemical weaponry abandoned by Japan in Nanjing. China calls on Japan to increase its input to this process and to accelerate the destruction of its chemical weapons abandoned on Chinese territory.

The U.S. alliance with Japan is also a key factor in understanding Beijing's strategic animus toward Tokyo. China's military leaders are keenly aware that the security treaty that binds the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly allows American forces to use bases in Japan for responding to regional contingencies, including Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Even in the absence of territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the PLA would

⁵³ The maritime liaison mechanism between Chinese and Japanese defense departments is a consensus reached by the defense leaders of both countries aimed to prevent accidents on the sea and in the air due to misjudgment and enhance bilateral defense and security mutual trust. According to the negotiations, China and Japan should apply this mechanism in the economic sea zone, open sea and the East China Sea ADIZ within 200 nautical miles off their respective coast, which doesn't include the contentious territorial waters and air space of the Diaoyu Islands.

⁵⁴ Conference of the States Parties, Report on the implementation of the chemical weapons convention in China, available at (24.07.2017)
https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-2/en/RC-2_NAT.1-EN.pdf

likely focus on challenging the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means of achieving its strategic goals related to Taiwan.

In recent years, China's rapid development has led to its pretentiousness in the Indian Ocean, expanding to South Asia, which contradicts **India's** strategic plans. To this end, China wants military cooperation with **Pakistan** as a counterbalance to NATO and the US in the region.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan is considered as the largest importer of weapons from China, 47% of the exported Chinese military equipment goes to Pakistan. In addition, China also supplies the relevant equipment to support Pakistan's nuclear program. Beijing's support is comparable to the support provided by the US to Israel. When a US delegate once confronted a Chinese diplomat about Beijing's uncompromising support for Pakistan, the Chinese reportedly responded with a heavily-loaded sarcastic remark: "Pakistan is our Israel".⁵⁵ The People's Liberation Army air forces and Pakistan air forces have held regular drills since March 2011 with the first Shaheen exercise held in Pakistan. The second training exercise took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China in September 2013, and the third was held in Punjab, Pakistan, in May 2014.⁵⁶ Pakistan offers China to deploy its naval base at its Gwadar port, which is located right off the Persian Gulf on the way to the Indian Ocean. The port is in a very favorable position and can focus its attention on both commercial and naval ships. It is important and timely for Beijing to have control over the trade route through the Indian Ocean, otherwise it will work via India. In 2013, the management of the Gwadar port was transferred to the Chinese government's Overseas Port Holdings, causing great concern to India. On July 5, 2013, China and Pakistan endorsed the creation of the Pakistan-China economic corridor, which will link the Gulf port to the Arabian Sea.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., T. Deen, China: 'Pakistan is our Israel', ALJAZEERA, (28 October 2010), available at (28.07.2017)

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101028135728235512.html>

⁵⁶ F.S. Gady, China and Pakistan air forces launch joint training exercise, The Diplomat, (12 April 2016), available at (26.07.2017) <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-and-pakistan-air-forces-launch-joint-training-exercise/>

On November 8, 2014 Pakistan and China signed 19 agreements, mainly dealing with the China-Pakistan economic corridor where China pledged to provide \$42 billion.⁵⁷ India has been continuing to express its dissatisfaction with the continuous Chinese investments in the Gwadar port and cooperation with the Pakistani armed forces. At the International Institute for Strategic Studies of Singapore, during the Fullerton lecture, Foreign Secretary of India Jaishankar mentioned that the Silk Road is China's one-sided, own initiative and India is not bound to follow it without essential consultations.⁵⁸ One of the reasons for concern is the China-Pakistan corridor that will pass through Pakistan's Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers as its own territories.

Despite all above-mentioned issues India has one more concern regarding Beijing's policy towards Sri Lanka's Hambantota port. The port, overlooking the Indian Ocean, is expected to play a key role in China's Belt and Road Initiative, which will link ports and roads between China and Europe, that's why after prolonged negotiations and deliberations, China signed a USD 1.1 billion deal (in 2017) with Sri Lanka to lease its Hambantota port. So any change in the status quo in the Indian Ocean is bound to alter the security concern for India. Even more, if the change is connecting with Chinese presence, India cannot afford to look the other way. One of the most contradictory steps on this road was held in 2014, when China docked its submarines at Hambantota, India raised the issue with Sri Lanka.

Core socialist values reflection in Asia-Pacific region and in Taiwan

Beijing is inclined to believe that it plays a key role in the Asia-Pacific region, and its policy has its influence there. Since 2006, China has expressed its concern over Washington's ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing notes that Washington accelerates the deployment of

⁵⁷ Китай-пакистанские отношения,

<http://ru.knowledgr.com/09562869/КитайпакистанскиеОтношения>

⁵⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS Fullerton Lecture - India, the United States and China, India's Foreign Secretary Dr S Jaishankar, available at (24.07.2017)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=et2ihw8jHaY>

military equipment in the Asia-Pacific region, which leads to a strengthening of its military ties with Japan. Such a development led to the fact that in 2008, China ranked the United States on the list of states who continuously and consistently reorganize their military forces and refreshes military equipment. The 2012 Concept focused on Beijing's concerns regarding Washington's rebalancing policy,⁵⁹ as the United States is starting to take more active steps to be involved in the Asia-Pacific region's security. Beijing is trying to counteract Washington's policy, and the first and most important step taken in the contribution to the growth of regional organizations where the US is not a member, such as the SCO. Due to this, Beijing's main goal in the region is military cooperation with Russia. In February 2014, President Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed on the construction of the Silk Road, as it would have direct interconnection with Russian Euro-Asian railways. Committed to pushing forward the building of regional security mechanisms, China initiated with relevant countries the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Six-Party Talks, and Xiangshan Forum, China-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation, and The Center for Comprehensive Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong Sub-Region.⁶⁰

In May 2015, Russia and China declared a partnership between Belt Road Initiative and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies a common economic space on the continent.⁶¹ Russia's involvements into OBOR are becoming real because of its involvement in two Silk Road Economic Belt corridors. The first one is China-Mongolia-

⁵⁹ Diversified employment of China's armed forces, Information office of the state council, The People's Republic of China, (April 2013), available at (24.03.2017) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/node_59506.htm

⁶⁰ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, (January 2017), available at (19.04.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

⁶¹ Russia, China agree to integrate Eurasian Union, Silk Road, sign deals, RT, (May 2015), available at (03.11.2017) <https://www.rt.com/business/256877-russia-china-deals-cooperation/>

Russia Corridor and the second one is the New Eurasian Land Bridge. This type of cooperation is the result of China's viewpoints towards Russia. China inclined to believe that Russia is playing a pivotal role for fostering stability and supporting counterterrorism activities in Central Asian states.

China also gives great importance to ASEAN. At the 13th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN, which took place in July 2006, China called for increased mutual trust among states. Issues such as combating terrorism and international crime were discussed during the 5th and 6th ASEAN inter-parliamentary meetings. Cooperation is also developing rapidly on the China-ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea Republic) platforms. On November 10, 2017 Chinese President Xi Jinping called for closer cooperation between the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He said that both sides should make joint efforts to build an open economy in Asia and the Pacific as well as a framework of regional cooperation featuring equal consultation, common participation and all-win results with a view to a free-trade area of the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese leader also called for inclusive and sustainable development prospering the APEC and ASEAN members align their development strategies with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁶² From the 2010 Concept, it became clear that China is inclined to look for new ways to cooperate with NATO, as well as with the EU as a separate structure. Obviously, China and NATO cooperation is taking place under the Euro-Atlantic security cooperation system.

For Beijing, the SCO is an example of "new regionalism" in that it is defined by "open, functional, interest-based cooperation among contiguous states", which is stipulated by a mutual respect for the member states' sovereignty. Under the label of "new regionalism"—that seeks to protect the regional status quo, promote economic development and combat the perceived common threat of the "three evils" of "extremism, terrorism and separatism".

⁶² President Xi Calls for Cooperation between APEC, ASEAN, available at (11.11.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtaGC0JaJJo>

As for **Taiwan**, the issue is an internal problem and is not separate from China's internal national security interests. The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "*de jure* Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform", thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. China's 2010 White Paper pointed out that if it will be necessary, Beijing's military preparations would be directed to large-scale operations on the South-East coast, whose main purpose is to oppose Taiwan's independence and to promote China's unity. In fact, this has shown that although Beijing expects peaceful settlement, it has not stopped military preparations against Taiwan. Beijing develops a ballistic missile DF-21D (the first and only ballistic missile), in order to avoid greater confrontation and to counteract possible military action. It greatly increases the chances of China's counteracting maritime operations, as well as preventing American passengers from entering Taiwan. The deployment of DF-21D by Beijing has caused concern in the US military context, emphasizing that it is a serious threat.⁶³

On October 18, 2017 during the 19th CPC the President of PRC spoke about Taiwan. He made a clear note for Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen to accept the 1992 Consensus.⁶⁴ And the final part of his speech Xi

⁶³ E. Talmadge, Pacific power may shift with Chinese missile, Associated Press, The Washington times, (6 August 2010), available at (19.09.2017) <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/6/pacific-power-may-shift-with-chinese-missile/>

⁶⁴ A definition of "One China" came out after negotiators from the two sides met in Hong Kong in 1992 and reached a non-written agreement that "there is only one China with each side of the Strait defining the term as it sees fit". This became known as the "1992 Consensus". It was not very precise for either side.

China's slogan described the end result after negotiations: a single state of China that had two economic systems. China was concerned with the substance of the outcome, not so much the form of the negotiations. It was offering a compromise that went beyond the Hong Kong formula for a "high degree of autonomy".

Taiwan's response was to promote the idea of two political entities which were focused on the preconditions and form of the negotiating process. It was concerned more with positioning itself well so it could achieve a higher level of autonomy. Taiwan has been more

stated “We stand firm in safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the historical tragedy of national division to repeat itself. We have the resolve, confidence and ability to defeat separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China”.⁶⁵ We can come to the point that Xi held the same language which he used in the past speeches. Indirectly Xi stated that if Taiwan joins China, its people will receive great benefits; if Tsai bows to pressure and uses PRC-approved language about the 1992 Consensus, then we can talk again; but if Taiwan tries to declare independence, China will respond with force.

On October 26 Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen made a public speech and sent a direct message to the Chinese authorities. She stated “In 1992, we held talks with the other side in Hong Kong and launched the cross-strait institutionalized consultations, including the remarkable talks between Wang and Gu in the 1990s.” Besides this she added “The Chinese mainland’s ruling party has just completed the Party Congress and entered a new stage. I once again call on leaders of both sides to benefit the long-term welfare of people on both sides and to forever eliminate hostilities and conflict.”⁶⁶ In the end the future of Taiwan remains the single most controversial issue plaguing U.S. and Chinese strategic cooperation. Understanding China’s national security approach to Taiwan remains the most important element of interpreting Chinese grand strategy.

In different time period, China’s national security policy has differed. However, Chinese has always maintained its idealist cause – to establish a harmony and orderly international relation. With the rapid development of national strength, China is playing more important role in international affairs. China is not only state that pays attention to its national security. China’s strategy and policy on national security

concerned with form and process than substance and nearly all the rhetoric has resulted in delay.

⁶⁵ Full video: Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, available at (18.10.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3pc3SqK5jI>

⁶⁶ 十九大后 蔡英文吁习近平展现政治智慧 强调两不变两不会, available at (07.11.2017) <http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20171026002213-260407>

influences not only China, but also East Asia and even the world. China is working to set up a mechanism for unified and efficient national defense mobilization, stepping up the mobilization of economy, science and technology, information and transportation, and making improvements in the building of its reserve force. China strives to make innovations in the content and forms of The People's War, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for the People's War in the current conditions of the Information Age. China's national defense policy for the new stage in the new century basically includes the following: upholding national security and unity, ensuring the interests of national development, achieving the all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of China's national defense and armed forces, enhancing the performance of the armed forces with informationization as the major measuring criterion, implementing an active defense military strategy, pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development.

Conclusion

The Chinese leadership chose to heed their ancestral lessons, and launched a restrained military operation with clearly limited aims.

- China's interest in the Middle East in the coming decade will mainly focus on economy and culture. Despite this, China could still strengthen its military presence in Middle East. China has decided to build a logistical base for its navy in Djibouti. If the opportunity arises, China could build similar bases in Middle East in the future — Oman, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, and Iran are suitable choices, based on geography alone.

- China remains ambivalent about the Caucasian stretch of the Silk Road, interested in the strategic relevance of the region, but recognizes that commercial engagement remains tentative. Yet Russia and China have not openly clashed over this equally important region, and they could easily collaborate on security issues to avoid upsetting each other's interests.

- China is now Africa's largest trade partner and its businesses are finding success in African markets, so the Western competitors will have to

accept this new reality. On the other hand, China needs to strengthen its relationship with a real “developing” continent (Africa). The most important step on this way should be concrete contributions to African peace and security.

- Beijing’s strategy is to integrate Central Asia and Pakistan with western China and China proper so that common economic and political interests trump the terrorist separatist challenge. Beijing will move to acquire undisputed hegemony in Central Asia to secure access to vital natural resources and resolve several domestic concerns. The overall balance of power between China and India currently is in China’s favor, and Beijing intends to keep it that way. China’s primary mechanism in this regard is its support for Pakistan. China’s regional expansion in the Asia-Pacific will continue driving India into a security partnership with the United States and Japan as part of its Act East policy.

- China aims to secure a central role in the East Asian regional economy and production networks in the intermediate future, and it has the resources to do so. If the Chinese leadership remains cautious and avoids being overly ambitious, its regionalism strategy in East Asia will facilitate China’s economic development and its attainment of major power status.

- China shares many common interests with all the countries in the Asia-Pacific, including the US. The most notable is the preservation of the peace and stability crucial to regional development, especially in the face of terrorism and tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Within the Asia-Pacific, China will expand its role through bold new initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank and the New Development Bank. China will seek reunification with Taiwan, which is the unstated end goal of its recent naval buildup and maritime expansion.

**ՏԱՐԱԾԱԾՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ԴԻՆԱՍԻԿԱ: ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԺՈՂՈՎՐԴԱԿԱՆ
ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

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***Բանալի բառեր՝** Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետություն,
Չինաստանի Կոմունիստական Կուսակցություն, Սպիտակ գիրք,
տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, պաշտպանական ռազմավարություն,
գարգացման ռազմավարություն*

Սույն հոդվածում քննարկվում են Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության հիմնական ուղղությունները, ինչպես նաև միջազգային անվտանգության մարտահրավերների վերաբերյալ պատկերացումները: Հետազոտությունը փորձում է վեր հանել Պեկինի տնտեսական, քաղաքական շահերի վեկտորները տարբեր տարածաշրջաններում՝ ազգային անվտանգության տեսանկյունից:

Հոդվածում ներկայացվում են Չինաստանի Կոմունիստական Կուսակցության կողմից ընդունված փաստաթղթերի, բարձրաստիճան պաշտոնյաների կողմից արված հայտարարությունների և Սպիտակ գրքերի՝ տարածաշրջանային և միջազգային անվտանգությանը վերաբերվող հատվածների վերլուծությունը: Հոդվածի վերջում առաջ են քաշվում արտաքին քաղաքականության մի քանի հնարավոր ուղղություններ, որոնց Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետությունը կշարունակի հետևել ապագայում:

EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND WIDER SOUTH CAUCASUS

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Keywords: *Armenia, Turkey, EU, Foreign and Security Policy, South
Caucasus, Integration.*

Introduction

The proposed paper is an attempt to examine the EU foreign and security policy within two major thematic contexts: Turkish-Armenian relations and Wider South Caucasus region, and to identify major features of the EU policy in light of regional processes. The analysis of the above mentioned requires comprehensive revision of several important aspects that determine EU policy in the region in general and in Turkish-Armenian relations in particular.

These aspects particularly include analysis of the general logic of EU Foreign policy development after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the rethinking of EU Neighborhood and Enlargement policy, the revision of ENP and launch of Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Barcelona Process (Euro-Med) an attempt have regional focuses in ENP.

Another important aspect of the process relates to the EU-NATO relations in light of rethinking of the EU security with regard to global security threats that EU is facing as a more organized political entity after Lisbon Treaty has entered into force.

Finally the involvement of the EU in regional processes, its relations with the three EaP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Iran and Turkey should be taken into account bearing in mind foreign policy and security priorities that EU has set for itself. The paper will touch upon several important priorities, such as energy, communication, trade, migration, conflicts and terrorism threat that are all set as key priorities for

the EU in its Global Strategy and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Russian factor should also be taken into account due to strong Russian presence in the region, traditional Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle, as well as involvement of Russia in important processes around the region: Ukraine and Syria.

Wider South Caucasus is a conditional term that includes three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), as well as Russia, Iran and Turkey. This region is a crossroad for serious geopolitical processes with significant infrastructural potential and numerous threats and challenges including conflicts, migration, and governance issues.

The ENP revision and launching of two neighborhood initiatives: Eastern Partnership for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) that involves 15 neighbors to the EU's south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans region; has given even more weight to the Wider South Caucasus region since geographically it is the meeting point of the Southern and Eastern Neighborhoods of the EU.

EU Foreign and Security Policy before Lisbon Treaty

The period between the end of Cold War and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was essential for forming the present day EU. The events of the last decade of the 20th century, such as conflicts in Balkans and 9/11, have convinced the EU that it should have a joint foreign and security strategy that will allow the Union to be more prepared to the challenges of the changing world.

After the official establishment of the European Union in 1992 the three fundamental pillars of the EU were formed in accordance with the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. This reform has expanded the supranational functions of the EU: the previously functioning European Economic Community which was the major supranational instrument before the three pillar system was modified and the European Communities became the supranational body working on internal economic, social and environmental issues. The Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) were formed to coordinate the fight against crime on the

EU level. Finally, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were formed to carry out foreign policy and military matters. In fact by establishment the three pillars the EU has started the process of institutionalization and expanding as a multifunctional supranational entity.

The post-Cold War period was crucial for the EU in terms of identification of its political borders. The three waves of enlargement in 1995, 2004 and 2007 have more or less formed the political geography of the EU and the major consolidation of the European Union was completed. This was followed by two extremely important steps:

- a. Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty as a comprehensive set of internal rules,
- b. Reflection on EUs further Enlargement and Neighborhood policy and as a result more institutionalized frameworks for initiatives focusing on eastern and southern neighbors, aiming at setting the margins of the EU membership.

This reflection also brought up a necessity to identify key threats and challenges for the EU in post-Cold War world. Establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and creation of the External Action Service have in fact formalized the European Union as a global political actor and gave the EU mechanisms necessary to jointly identify security and foreign policy priorities for EU member states. The European Security Strategy adopted by the EU in 2003 was one of the first serious steps to form a joint foreign and security agenda for EU member states. The 4 major threats identified in this document were Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organized Crime¹.

The structural changes in the EU after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty illustrate that joint efforts to ensure EU security and defense, as well as further positioning of the EU as a global power and more active involvement in global politics as one entity are explicitly prioritized. The fact that the second highest position established by the Treaty which is the Vice-president of the Commission is combined with the position of High

¹ A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) can be considered as major signs of this prioritization.

But unlike state-powers the EUs practice and working style as a global actor is less direct and straightforward due to a number of reasons. First of all the decision making process in the EU, particularly after the Enlargement, is multilateral and time consuming, secondly the major tools that EU uses in foreign policy are based on the internal structural logic of the Union, i.e. the economic cooperation, financial assistance and integrative mechanisms are offered by the EU to external partners as a benefit for cooperation, while disintegration, economic sanctions, cutting financial assistance and limitations of mobility are used as major pressure mechanisms.

Being a regional economic, social and political integration product, the logic of EUs relations with its neighbors can be perceived as foreign relations combined with the integration inertia beyond its political borders. In this respect work with neighbors is one of the most important parts of EUs foreign policy, which from the perspective of EU as an integration product is not solely foreign or external process, due to the fact that there is always an opportunity for further enlargement.

In 2003 the European Neighborhood policy was launched to offer financial assistance to countries within the European Neighborhood, so long as they meet the strict conditions of government reform, economic reform and other issues surrounding positive transformation. The ENP does not cover Turkey as well as other countries in current EU enlargement agenda. Relations with Russia also have a special status and thus Russia is not involved in the ENP as well.

By setting the ENP the European Union has developed a common policy framework for the majority of its southern and eastern neighbors, which initially had only bilateral content. In case of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were signed to set the general framework of bilateral cooperation.

The developments within the EU such as enlargement, delegation of more authority from national to supranational levels as well as increase of

EUs influence on global policy along with such threats as migration, terrorism, and conflicts have influenced ENPs further regionalization.

The official launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative that took place in May 2009 has set new agenda of EUs cooperation with its eastern neighbors. 2009 Prague summit declaration entitled “A more ambitious partnership between the European Union and the partner countries” particularly states: “The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries”². By launching Eastern Partnership the EU has basically framed its relations with Eastern Neighborhood by proposing the 6 EaP countries the Association Agreements, DC FTA in exchange for systemic reforms. Eastern Partnership can be assessed as EU’s attempt to set common rules for its eastern neighbors aimed at making the latter more stable and predictable. By offering economic and financial benefits, such as financial assistance and in a longer term-perspective access to Free Trade Area the EU expected more adequate management and governance that would allow cooperating in spheres of migration flows and security. This approach to some extent is an attempt to use the EU integration model through creation of common economic space in neighboring countries interconnected via EU and thus transformative in terms of reforming the governance system, legislative framework and most importantly in terms of stability and security. The Eastern Partnership - focusing on key priorities and deliverables document adopted by the EC on December 15, 2016 can be considered as a very illustrative proof for this statement. This document sets up 20 deliverables based on the priorities identified during the EaP summit in Riga for the 6 EaP countries to be reached by 2020. All the deliverables are aimed at ensuring stable and sustainable developments in governance, economy, civil society, ensuring energy security, people to people contacts, etc. The document contains a set of guiding principles for

² Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009, available at (14. 07. 2017)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf

the EaP countries bringing them closer to the European standards and values.

Another aspect of the EaP is a natural consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The former soviet republics that have been disintegrated in 1890s were ready to be involved in new stage of integration. In this respect the Eastern Partnership became an extremely provocative action in terms of “encroachment” on what Russia considers area of its dominance. This resulted in Ukraine crisis, Armenia’s September 3rd U-turn, Russia’s efforts to strengthen its political presence in Moldova, Belarus and Georgia and finally large scale information war between Russia and the West.

Developments within the EaP has put much stricter and clearly formulated borders between Russia and the EU influence zones. It should be mentioned though that the clarification of these borders began before the EaP was launched, the whole process was launched with the Rose Revolution in Georgia followed by August 2008 war. The crisis in Ukraine that was preceded by Euromaidan, Armenian president’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement and decision to enter the Eurasian Economic Union, political fluctuations in Moldova after the signing of the AA, as well as the periodic actions of Belarusian president Lukashenko (provocative actions within the EEU and relative progress in relations with the official Brussels in 2015-2016) illustrate that this process is still going on.

While South Caucasus states and Turkey are well placed in already existing paths of EU’s neighborhood policy, Iran and Russia are more singular in terms of the format of their relations with the EU.

In case of Iran, the long lasting history of sanctions combined with the nuclear program issue and the strategic interest of the EU in Iranian oil and gas are the main factors that define EU relations with Iran.

Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program between the E3/EU+3 (EU, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States) with Iran resulted in agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. The deal is aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program while providing for

the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as EU and US sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program³.

This process that was mainly initiated by Obama administration was much supported by the EU despite Israel's active opposing to the process.⁴ However, after Donald Trump was elected certain shift in supporting and leading the process happened and thus EU had to decide whether it is going to become the major supporter of the process or slow down for new favorable situation. On August 5th, 2017 Mogherini attends inauguration of Iranian President, holds bilateral talks which can be a sign that the EU will try to lead the process as much as it is possible. This assumption is made also due to the fact that functionally the EU has certain mandate for taking lead in the process, since the High Representative is the coordinator of the JCPOA.

From the point of view of Armenian-Turkish relations, the improvement of the EU-Iran relations are crucial in terms of rethinking the necessity to stimulate the dialogue between the two sides due to the fact that the opportunities that can appear in case there are sustainably normalized relations between the EU and Iran will have a serious impact on the balance of powers in the region and will create the necessity of strengthening infrastructures and creating alternative communications to ensure sustainability of projects.

EU-Russia relations had two major phases of development. In terms of classical EU-shaped neighborhood policy the first phase of relations was based on gradual development of bilateral cooperation through 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which was followed by Partnership for Modernization that was developed in 2008 and concluded in 2010. Due to its special status, Russia was never a part of ENP and EU-Russia relations were built as a bilateral format.

³ Iran and the EU, available at (14. 07. 2017)

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2281/iran-and-eu_en

⁴ Israel: EU diplomatic office in Iran a 'grave mistake' July 14, 2016, available at (19. 07. 2017) <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-eu-diplomatic-office-in-iran-a-grave-mistake/>

The situation started to change after the August war in Georgia and fall into deep crisis after the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Donbas.

As a reaction to EU's engaging policy in its eastern neighborhood Russia used two major tools to remain the main power in the territory it considers its traditional interest zone.

The first step was use of force both directly as in Ukraine and indirectly as in Armenia. The three major instruments that Russia uses to make pressure on its former Soviet neighbors are conflicts, migrants, and strong economic presence. Depending on the level of resistance, Russian authorities activate one or another tool to reach its goals. In case of Ukraine, the most radical step was undertaken and resulted in a large scale conflict. Russia needed much less pressure to make Serzh Sargsyan announce the U-turn of Armenia and decision to join Eurasian Economic Union on September 3rd 2013.

In order to formally propose an alternative integration format, Russia has created the Eurasian Economic Union which was preceded by the Customs Union. Through creation of the EEU Russia has basically duplicated the EU-NATO system pairing EEU with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Existences of the two pairs of economic-military systems despite the level of development of any of the organizations are illustrating the current opposing structures in the region. Wider South Caucasus is one of the meeting points of these systems which creates significant threats and challenges which, from a different perspective, can be perceived as opportunities.

EU-Turkey relations

The relations between the EU and Turkey have long and complicated history rich with ups and downs, drastic changes in perceptions of the integration potential.

The first serious milestone in EU-Turkey relations was the signing of Association agreement in 1963 which have created preferential conditions for bilateral trade relations. In 1987, Turkey submits application for full membership and becomes officially a candidate country in 1999.

Meanwhile, to boost the economic cooperation the EU-Turkey Customs Union negotiations started in 1993 and took effect in 1996. The scope of this Customs Union, based on the status of goods in free circulation, is however limited to products other than agricultural products, and coal and steel products, which are subject only to preferential agreements based on their originating status.

In 2001 the European Council adopts the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership, providing a road map for Turkey's EU accession process. The Turkish Government adopts the NPAA, the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, reflecting the Accession Partnership. At the Copenhagen Summit, the European Council decides to increase significantly EU financial support through what is now called "pre-accession instrument" (IPA). In 2005, Turkey's Accession negotiations open.

After Justice and Development party came to power the relations between the two sides became more fragile and ended up in decision to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns voted by the European Parliament in 2016.

Throughout more than 50 years of relations between the two sides there have been several key factors that were crucial in terms of defining the temperature of relations.

- The internal factor related to the reforms, situation with human rights, freedom of media, as well as Kurdish factor,
- The volume of trade and general economic factor and its influence on the EU internal market,
- The communications and infrastructures factor which is key important for the EU particularly from the point of view of energy security,
- The migration factor not only from the point of view of Turkish migrants in the EU but also, particularly after the Syrian conflict has started the role of Turkey as a buffer for migration flow,
- The relations with neighbors including Middle Eastern aspect and Turkish-Armenian relations.

The balance of these factors defines the quality of bilateral relations and, in case there is a significant change in any of these factors, there is a

serious shift in bilateral relations. During recent years there have been several such cases that illustrate the interconnected influence of these factors. Namely, the role of Turkey as a buffer zone during Syrian crisis has opened space for additional cooperation talks between EU and Turkey. Another example is the post 2016 coup repressions which were the main reason for the EP resolution and suspension of accession negotiations.

In terms of Armenian-Turkish relations (1) the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide is being articulated by the EU or its member states in two of the above mentioned aspects: the internal aspect, as a call to Turkey to face its history and to recognize the Genocide, as it was done by France during the 2005 round of membership perspectives and (2) as a factor of relations with neighbors, in this particular case Armenia. It should also be mentioned that each case of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by an EU Member State or the 2015 EP resolution on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide⁵ are usually preceded or conceded by worsening of the bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey. Thus, these happenings can be perceived as motions to either “warn” Turkey or to “punish” it. However, apart from realpolitik and in the context of the philosophy of the European integration, the attitude of the EU towards the issue of Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide has a more conceptual essence. The recognition will be to some extent a proof of commitment of Turkey towards the European values and readiness to face its own past and illustrate its readiness and willingness to normalize its relations with all neighbors⁶. This is also a warranty of regional stability: minimization of potential security threats through normalizing the most hardened conflicts.

In November 2015, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan⁷ was formalized according to which all illegal migrants that have entered the EU through Greece via crossing the Aegean Sea will be returned to Turkey. By

⁵ European Parliament resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide, available at (18. 07. 2017) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

⁶ Genocide Recognition Precondition to Turkey’s EU Bid, Says Euro-Parliament President, Available at (21. 07. 2017) <http://asbarez.com/105486/>

⁷ EU-Turkey joint action plan Brussels, 15 October 2015, available at (10. 07. 2017) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm

reaching this agreement the EU has basically gave Turkey the role of a buffer zone for migrant flows. In return, Turkey was promised additional efforts from the EU side for the long-awaited EU accession process, as well as financial incentives to help with the burden of hosting refugee populations within its borders. This deal was strongly criticized by human rights organizations⁸, foreign policy and migration experts⁹. The reasoning behind this criticism was based on two major assumptions. Firstly, the EU cannot regulate and oversee the migration flows outside its borders. Secondly, the agreement will give Erdogan more freedom in terms of domestic policy in the pre-referendum period.

The future developments have illustrated that the criticism was not at all groundless and resulted in a serious crisis in EU-Turkey relations. One day after the EP decision to freeze Turkey's EU accession process, Erdogan has threatened to cancel the refugee deal: "If you go any further, these border gates will be opened. Neither I nor my people will be affected by these empty threats."¹⁰

The Constitutional referendum held in Turkey on 16 April 2017 on whether to approve 18 proposed amendments to the Turkish constitution that were brought forward by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). With 51.41% voting for the proposed amendments Turkey has moved from parliamentary system to executive residency system.

Although overseas election campaigning, even in diplomatic missions, is illegal under Turkish law, the ruling AKP have organized pro-“Yes” campaigns in EU Member States with strong Turkish community. This caused several incidents in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.

Namely, the Netherlands barred the aircraft of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Çavuşoğlu from landing, and expelled Turkish

⁸ Kondylia Gogou, The EU-Turkey deal: Europe's year of shame, 20 March 2017, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/>

⁹ Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, available at (19. 07. 2017.) <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal>

¹⁰ Turkey threatens to end refugee deal in row over EU accession, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/25/turkey-threatens-end-refugee-deal-row-eu-accession-erdogan>

Minister of Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya from the country, when both tried to speak at rallies. In response, Turkey expelled the Dutch ambassador from the country, and Turkish President Erdoğan called the Dutch "fascists" and "remnants of Nazism" and accused the Netherlands of "massacring" Muslims in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War in 1995. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte called Erdoğan's remarks "unacceptable" and a "vile falsification of history" and demanded an apology.¹¹

This diplomatic incident and reaction of Turkish President were very illustrative in terms of showing the serious crisis in EU-Turkey relations. Erdoğan's call for the Turkish Diaspora in the European Union to "Make not three, but five children. Because you are the future of Europe. That will be the best response to the injustices against you."¹²

In a nutshell, in the current phase of the EU-Turkey relations is quite critical the balance of the factors mentioned above has put the two sides in a situation where no effective dialogue can be made unless there is a drastic improvement in either of the factors or an external factor appears to open an opportunity for stimulating the dialogue.

EU-Armenia relations

As it was already mentioned above, the EU has involved Armenia in its Neighborhood framework and afterwards in Eastern Partnership along with five other post-Soviet countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The bilateral relations were regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that entered into force in 1999. This framework agreement was regulating wide spectrum of bilateral relations and identified major fields of cooperation and defining EUs financial assistance for Armenia.

¹¹ Sam Meredith, Steve Sedgwick, Increasingly hysterical comments from Turkey's Erdoğan are unacceptable: Netherlands PM, 14 March 2017, available at (24. 07. 2017) <https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/increasingly-hysterical-comments-from-turkeys-erdogan-are-unacceptable-netherlands-pm.html>

¹² Russell Goldmanmarch, 'You Are the Future of Europe,' Erdoğan Tells Turks, 2017, available at (14. 07. 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-future-of-europe.html?_r=0

After the launch of the Eastern Partnership, Armenia together with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has started negotiations over the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DC DTA) that was supposed to move the quality of relations with the EU to a new level of integration that is the most comprehensive format for a non-candidate country.

It should be mentioned that the process of negotiations particularly in the period between November 2012-May 2013 were quite impressive. However, on September 3rd Serzh Sargsyan has surprisingly announced that Armenia will not sign the AA and will join Russia's EEU. According to Sargsyan, this decision was made based on Armenia's security interests. Sargsyan has opposed to the "either-or" logic (integration to either one format or another) with "both are possible" proposal, i.e. Armenia will integrate simultaneously to both formats to the extent possible.

The September 3rd U-turn was shocking for both EU officials and the significant part of the Armenian society including many people involved in the establishment and taking part in the AA/DC FTA negotiations. However, the natural demand of the situation was to develop a new format of relations, since the PCA was already outdated and there was a need to replace the AA with a new framework agreement that would regulate bilateral relations.

After around 2 years of reflection, the EU and Armenia have announced about the launch of negotiations over a new agreement, a so-called AA-minus that would contain all provisions of the already negotiated Association Agreement excluding those components that are conflicting with the new obligations of Armenia in light of its membership in the EEU. These components mainly related to the customs and trade relations, since Armenia has granted that authority to the supranational EEU. Negotiations on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement were successfully concluded on 26 February 2017 and are supposed to be signed in November 2017 during the EaP Summit in Brussels¹³.

¹³ EU-Armenia relations, Bruxelles, 27/02/2017, available at (15. 07. 2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4080/EU-Armenia%20relations

In addition to the general framework of relations, the EU has several other integration instruments that involve Armenia. The Mobility Partnership¹⁴, Bologna process, Erasmus Mundus, Visa Facilitation are the processes that concentrate on People to People contacts and mobility related issues which are extremely important for Armenia taking into account the mobile essence of the Armenian society.

Finally, the EU special representative in South Caucasus (EUSR) is another important institution that EU has in the region. EUSRs task is to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict¹⁵. These mechanisms along with the EUs position over the NK settlement process in assisting the Minsk OSCE group express the general approach of the EU towards the NK process which can be formulated as: not being directly responsible for facilitation but assisting all processes that can lead to effective settlement.

Armenian-Turkish relations and the EU

Although there have been several attempts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey ever since Armenia became independent, the major milestone of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the recent period was the signing of Zurich Protocols in 2009 that were supposed to be ratified by both Parliaments but are frozen up till today. This attempt was the most public one and thus had both more significant impacts on public perception of the process and was more influenced by the external factors.

The processes that were launched in parallel with the political talks, particularly, various initiatives aimed at establishing dialogue processes between different segments of Armenian and Turkish societies, were initially aimed at creating grounds for more smooth adaptation in case the diplomatic relations are established and the border is open. Thus, the contacts between businessmen, CSOs, academia representatives, etc. were

¹⁴ Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Armenia, available at (14. 07. 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/specific-tools/docs/mobility_partnership_armenia_en.pdf

¹⁵ EU Special Representatives, 14/06/2016, available at (17. 07. 2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives

mainly targeted on the opportunities that may appear in case of political normalization is in place.

However, after the freezing of the process these initiatives had to reorient and restructure from working on perspective of official normalization to becoming the only working format for dialogue which made the inter-society dialogue a central process in bilateral relations.

It is obvious, that the global and regional actors perceive the issue of Armenian-Turkish relations from the perspective of their interests. In this respect, one of the major external factors, that did not allow the normalization to happen, was Russia's fear to lose the dominance in the region. The opening of the border would create much more communication opportunities and room for independent regional development which would naturally bring to short and long term transformations that are not favorable for Russia. The short term transformations are the economic and political effect that various infrastructural projects can bring to the region and support multilateral integration. The opportunity for regional economic integration will lead to longer term effect which will take place on the level of perception of stability and peace in the societies of the regional countries. This assumption is made, despite the fact that Russia was officially involved in the process of facilitation and the protocol signing ceremony in Zurich was attended by Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov, as well as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner.

Unlike Russia the EU has been active supporter of the normalization process, since it was completely in line with the logic of EU's foreign and security policy: more stable and predictable neighborhood connected through various integration projects with each other and with the EU. The level and quality of involvement of the EU throughout the process is also in accordance with the transformations of EU foreign policy during the last decade. The process of the normalization that was mainly initiated by the US was supported by the EU. The first wave of the process of promoting the societal dialogue was also initiated by the US, however, after the failure of the protocols, the EU took the initiative of supporting the dialogue

between the CSOs, journalists, businessmen, etc. and continues this support up till today. There have been several multi-million projects to promote the Armenian-Turkish dialogue on the level of civil societies that have been funded by the EU.

At the same time, on the political level the EU is also periodically expressing its readiness to support the relaunch of the interrupted official dialogue. The most recent expression of this was the address of High Commissioner Mogherini during the EU-Armenia Coordination council meeting that took place in Brussels in May 2017: “The EU has also reiterated its commitment to support the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey and our encouragement to both sides to engage in this process without preconditions.”¹⁶ This and other similar expressions signal to both sides that the EU is keeping the possible relaunch of the dialogue on its agenda and is ready to support. Meanwhile, the EU continues to support civil society initiatives and accumulate cases of effective cooperation between the two societies that can be used more constructively in case the official dialogue relaunches.

Conclusion

With the change of the global situation, particularly, Trump election, Ukraine crisis and Brexit, which resulted in certain redistribution of responsibilities among the global actors, the transformed quality of the EU as a global player has created a new logic for foreign policy of the EU. If previously the EU was mainly acting as a supporter to processes initiated by the US or EU Member States, currently it is facing a new reality. The processes that have been launched by Obama administration or even before that and have been backed by the EU in this new reality should have the “second wave responsible” in case the EU decides that it is in its core interests it will take the political lead of the process. This statement is fair for the AA signee countries and may be functional in case of Iran.

¹⁶ Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the EU-Armenia Cooperation Council, available at (14 . 07 . 2017) Bruxelles, 23/05/2017 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26687/remarks-hrvp-federica-mogherini-press-conference-following-eu-armenia-cooperation-council_en

In case of Armenian-Turkish relations, the situation is more complicated. The relations with Turkey are in deep crisis and Armenia is extremely dependent on Russia in all aspects of its foreign policy. In this respect, although the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is extremely important for the EU, the latter cannot become the new initiator and leader of any official political process at present. In light of this fact the only process the EU can undertake is the utilization of its soft power tools, i.e. support to people-to-people contacts and promoting the dialogue between the societies. As the developments of the previous decade have illustrated, the EU has taken the lead from the US in the societal dialogue process and will work on that level until a new more favorable political situation is created for official reconciliation process to be launched. The accumulation of joint Armenian-Turkish cooperation cases on civil society level will become an important leverage that will be activated in case of relaunch of official talks.

**ԵՄ ԱՐՏԱԲԻՆ ԵՎ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ԵՎ ԸՆԴՂԱՅՆՎԱԾ ՀԱՐԱՎԱՅԻՆ
ԿՈՎԿԱՍՐ¹⁷
Ամփոփագիր**

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***Բանալի բառեր՝** Հայաստան, Թուրքիա, ԵՄ, Արտաքին և անվտանգության քաղաքականություն, Հարավային Կովկաս, ինտեգրում*

Ներկայացվող ուսումնասիրությունը փորձ է վերլուծել ԵՄ արտաքին և անվտանգության քաղաքականությունը երկու հիմնական՝ հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների և Ընդլայնված Հարավային Կովկասի տարածաշրջանի համատեքստերում՝ քացահայտելով ԵՄ քաղաքականության հիմնական

¹⁷ Ընդլայնված Հարավային Կովկասը պայմանական եզր է, որն իր մեջ է ներառում հարավկովկասյան երեք ճանաչված պետությունները, երեք չճանաչված, կամ մասնակի ճանաչված պետությունները, ինչպես նաև Թուրքիան, Իրանը և Ռուսաստանը:

առանձնահատկությունները տարածաշրջանային գործընթացների լույսի ներքո: Վերը նշվածը համակողմանիորեն ուսումնասիրելու նպատակով անհրաժեշտ է անդրադառնալ մի շարք առանցքային հարցերի, որոնք անմիջականորեն ազդում են տարածաշրջանում և հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների համատեքստում ԵՄ քաղաքականության վրա:

Նշված հարցերը ներառում են ԵՄ արտաքին քաղաքականության հիմնական տրամաբանությունը և միտումները, մասնավորապես՝ ԵՀԶ, ԱԳ և Եվրոմեդ ձևաչափերի շարունակական վերաիմաստավորման և լրամշակման տեսանկյունից, ինչպես նաև ԵՄ երկկողմ հարաբերությունները տարածաշրջանային պետությունների՝ Հայաստանի, Թուրքիայի, Վրաստանի, Ադրբեջանի, Իրանի և Ռուսաստանի հետ: Բացի այդ տարածաշրջանում առկա հակամարտությունները, սառեցված հարաբերությունները և գերտերությունների շահերի բախումները նույնպես ազդում են ԵՄ տարածաշրջանային քաղաքականության վրա: Հոդվածում հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունները դիտարկվում են որպես առանցքային գործոն՝ տարածաշրջանի անվտանգության և ինտեգրացիոն գործընթացների տեսանկյունից:

Հետազոտությունը նաև անդրադառնում է տարածաշրջանում և հայ-թուրքական հարաբերություններում ԵՄ դերի և ներգրավվածության հնարավորություններին և դրանց համար անհրաժեշտ պայմաններին:

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DYNAMICS: FOREIGN
POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Russia, China, Persian Gulf, Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran)**

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Keywords: *USA, South Caucasus, The Greater Middle East, G.W. Bush, D. Trump, National Security, foreign policy, Russia, China, Gulf, Turkey, Iran.*

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to review and analyze U.S. national security strategy according to its foreign policy interests over the past 25 years in order to gain a deeper understand of its implications of the South Caucasus and the Greater Middle East. First, it will outline what U.S. national interests are according to each Presidential administration from George H.W. Bush to the current Trump Presidency. Then, it will summarize how each administration conducted its national security agenda towards (1) China, (2) Russia, (3) The Greater Middle East, (4) Iran, (5) Turkey, and (6) the South Caucasus. Finally, it will conclude with policy considerations based on the Trump Administration: a shift from a neoliberal multilateral approach to an ‘America First’ one.

U.S. National Interests: Main Goals & Priorities

In the 20th century, U.S. national interests identified with keeping its population safe and free.¹ Following the two world wars and the spread of

¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian. “State of the Union Address.” Web. 31 July 2017. <http://history.house.gov/Institution/SOTU/State-of-the-Union/> Note: This is particularly evident from the first of 82 deliveries of the U.S. State of the Union

the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe,² the U.S. practiced a staunch foreign policy of containment of Soviet influence. Throughout the Cold War, it actively supported nations that would oppose communism. The Western philosophy held that the Soviet Union (USSR) was a rival and could never be trusted.³ U.S. foreign policy was mainly driven by bolstering countries (even ones with right-wing dictatorships) that were perceived to be at risk of swinging toward communism. Oftentimes, it resorted to military force and nuclear proliferation, as seen from the first H-bomb test in the Marshall Islands, Explorer I in response to the Soviet R-7 Missile during the ‘Space Race,’ the Korean Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, etc.⁴ After the Cold War, President H.W. Bush praised the U.S. victory over the USSR, validating containment and military intervention.⁵ However, the U.S. had to adjust its foreign policy to deal with swift changes in the post-Soviet bloc and in other countries, with a high alert on potential nuclear threats despite the end of the Cold War.⁶ It realigns its national security objectives to advance the Western model defined by spreading liberalism and capitalism in the new world order. In this context, it was and still is crucial for U.S. foreign policy to define and execute its national interests accordingly and realistically; however, Kissinger has observed that by framing its international objectives along

Address to Congress and moreover, to the general public by President Woodrow Wilson in 1913

² Churchill, Winston. “Iron Curtain Speech.” 5 March 1946. Note: This speech provided the basis for the division of the world into two spheres: East and West, where the Soviet Union embodies the East and the Free World is considered the West.

³ Kennan, George. “Article X.” July 1947. Foreign Affairs. Web. 31 July 2017.

⁴ U.S. Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.” 7 April 1950. U.S. Department of State. Web. 31 July 2017. Note: This report is commonly referred to as “NSC-68,” and was not declassified until 1975, but is commonly cited in the U.S. national security policy over WMD realm throughout and following the Cold War.

⁵ Bush, George H.W., “A Proclamation.” *Proclamation 6073—Thanksgiving Day, 1989*. November 17, 1989. Web 31 July 2017.

⁶ Ferguson, Charles D., Perry, William J., Scowcrowft, Brent. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR, CFR.org. Web. 31 July 2017.

altruistic lines, immoral policies can be perceived as seen in the American quest to achieve absolute security at home and abroad in the 20th century.⁷

Since 1986, the U.S. executive branch has produced 16 national security strategies (NSS) outlining each presidential administration's domestic and international priorities.⁸ Each President from George H.W. Bush through Barack Obama has published detailed reports addressing the lessons to be learned from the past with remarkable consistency emphasizing that U.S. national security policy domestically has been and continues to be driven by remaining engaged in the world, acknowledging that globalization is alive and continues to spread.⁹ Based on the available U.S. NSS reports from H.W. Bush to the Obama Administrations, U.S. national security priorities have shifted from the following over the past 25 years:¹⁰

- President H.W. Bush (1990-1994) a former CIA Director, was focused on initially containing a common enemy (the USSR,) but changed by facing the major challenge of adjusting security policy in a no-longer bipolar world by seeking to delegate international responsibility-sharing to reduce military costs from the Cold War past by calling on Western Alliances (AA, OSCE, NAA, etc.) in light of regional conflicts in the Post-Soviet bloc and the Persian Gulf War. This was viewed as a “New World Order” policy.

- President Clinton (1994-2001) focused on increasing the amount of market democracies and peacekeeping partners via preventive diplomacy and boosting intelligence as support mechanisms for mitigating global refugee and environmental crises that arose from oil shocks, state-sponsored terrorism, and regional conflicts.

⁷ Kissinger, Henry. “An Inquiry into the American National Interest.” *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 51-97. 1977, 1974, 1969.

⁸ National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy Report.” <http://nssarchive.us/> Note: structured chronologically by U.S. Presidential Administration and key international security events and geopolitical initiatives.

⁹ Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org

¹⁰ National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy Report.” 29 June 2017 <http://nssarchive.us/>

• President Bush (2001-2008) circled back to burden-sharing objectives based on Gulf War policies in addressing transnational challenges with allies i.e. environmental protection in oil-rich countries such as Kuwait, but quickly inherited a post-9/11 national security climate; this caused a major shift in the U.S. national defense approach (primarily in the Middle East) by setting out to tackle the remaining tyrannies of the world, but in practice, invaded Afghanistan, removed the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, conducted a global War on Terror with domestic implications, and focused on the oil and gas market. NATO also expanded by seven countries in 2004.

• President Obama (2008-2017) to combat recurring and new transnational threats – primarily removed troops from Iraq, eliminated Osama bin Laden, updated vast nuclear sanctions programs, and forwarded counterterrorism efforts in light of the rise in diffuse violent extremist networks such as ISIL and al-Qa’ida, – and lead the world in addressing global climate change,¹¹ and widespread pandemics with a multilateral approach. He also normalized relations with Cuba, lifted sanctions on Iran, and began an “Asian Shift” in trade (TPP) and military cooperation.

With strategic economic and political stakes in almost every country in the world, U.S. national interests continued to lie where it believed it could aid nations in need that rely on American support and ideals, nations that are at risk of aggression by other world powers, and those that still pose nuclear threats¹² i.e. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran; thereby still aligning with Kennan’s rhetoric of exceptionalism in conducting foreign policy. After winning two World Wars, ending the Cold War, and the post-1989 era via its main priority remained being the superior military and economic force worldwide.¹³ Particularly, this grand legacy of U.S.

¹¹ Note: The Paris Climate Accord (also known as the Paris Agreement) was signed during the Obama Administration, took effect shortly before President Trump got elected, and has major consequences for future U.S. national security policy priorities.

¹² NTI, “The Nunn-Lugar Vision.” NTI.org. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: Each President from H.W. to Obama supported and continued to amend the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, which formed a nonproliferation partnership with Moscow in 1991.

¹³ Fried, Daniel. “Read U.S. Diplomat Daniel Fried’s Retirement Speech Warning Against Isolationism.” 25 February 2017. Time. <http://time.com/4682994/diplomat-daniel-fried-retirement-speech/>

national security strategy is evident in cases when the U.S. utilizes military intervention, and when it is faced with when to use nuclear weapons (WMD,) which is only when it absolutely has to: U.S. proliferation strategy stipulates that having nuclear capabilities is a deterrence measure, as seen in the post-Cold War U.S. Administrations.¹⁴ In addition to military action and WMD usage, when the U.S. sets economic sanctions, restructures commercial diplomacy platforms to effectively increase trade for vital resources as seen in U.S.-Saudi Arabia policy over market interests (oil and arms sales,) when it engages in humanitarian aid with new and old allies, and more recently, enhances cybersecurity in light of the rise in terrorism and widespread fear, U.S. national security strategy aligned with a realist Kissinger approach to foreign policy is vital to consider for how the U.S. will define and execute its future national security objectives. Based on the findings from the NSS reports, (and the extent the current Trump Administration’s policy on its national security objectives,) U.S. foreign policy emphasized that international peace and a new world order should exist where the U.S. will prosper first and foremost via multilateral, multi-sectoral, and government-civilian-military approach so every other nation can and will follow suit, allowing the U.S. to remain as the global undisputable hegemon.¹⁵

1. U.S. National Security Policy towards China: Implications for East Asia

After the Cold War, a more unipolar system emerged with the U.S. as the world’s indispensable leader. America held a unique capability to build a rule-based, open international system. No diplomatic relationship challenges this issue more than the rapidly shifting power balance between the U.S. and China. Theoretically, China’s rise as a global power would not trigger U.S. retaliation, so long as the ascendance was through peaceful

¹⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note: This will be elaborated on with specific policy programs with China, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.

¹⁵ Hicks, et.al. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org

means.¹⁶ The implications of such an ascendance concerns U.S. policy makers, considering its actual behavior and suspicions as some suspect China's economic and military growth to be the groundwork for a grand strategy wherein China replaces the U.S. as global hegemon. The greatest source of divergence in the Sino-American relationship is the perception of each country's intentions and commitment to fair competition. During the first Bush Administration, Bush 41 tried to improve relations following the Reagan Era sanctions – a policy designed to cut-off China from the rest of the world.¹⁷ Bush 41 began with a pragmatic approach in its response to the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstration; it did not want to ruin relations despite widespread disapproval of Beijing's crackdown.¹⁸ Over time, however, Bush 41 drew similarities between China and the former Soviet Union, including Beijing's systemic domestic and regional destabilization, more tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. has strong relations with Taiwan.¹⁹ Despite the aforementioned issues, it was in the U.S.' best national security policy interests to engage China as an emerging power to keep its nuclear and military capabilities in check; Bush 41 added China to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).²⁰ Similarly, the Clinton Presidency identified the U.S. interest to encourage an economically open and politically democratic China, and work within the

¹⁶ "Remarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo: 'Turning Your Eyes to China.'" *Harvard Gazette Archives*. 10 December 2003.

¹⁷ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1990, 12. Note, full quote: "China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as it proceeds inexorably toward major systemic change. China's inward focus and struggle to achieve stability will not preclude increasing interaction with its neighbors as trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact with China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure. The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive relations with Taiwan where rapid economic and political change is underway. One of our goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait."

¹⁸ Knott, Stephen. "George H.W. Bush: Foreign Affairs." Miller Center, University of Virginia. Web. 31 July 2017. <https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs> Note: In June 1989, the Chinese military killed hundreds of peaceful protesters and the U.S. Congress wanted China to face more punishment than 'limited U.S. economic sanctions.'

¹⁹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1991, 9.

²⁰ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1993, 16.

region to deter nuclear threats.²¹ In 1994, the Clinton Administration prevented a large-scale plutonium production program in the region by implementing the Agreed Framework with North Korea.²² Throughout his Presidency, Clinton continued on this path, applauding China's membership in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).²³ By the end of the Clinton years, U.S. national security strategy also drew parallels to the challenges faced by China and the former USSR, publicly urging democratization only to promote their stability and reduce the risk of WMD. It was also in Washington's interest to boost its economy.²⁴ The second Bush Administration and the Obama Administration held a similar attitude towards U.S.-China foreign policy, but strayed from past nuclear deterrence strategies. Bush 43 identified China's path as having severe consequences to national interests in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, arguing that China must democratize.²⁵ In 2001, China became a WTO member with U.S. support. However, W. Bush, unlike his predecessors, did not engage with Kim Jong Il despite knowing the government had a clandestine uranium enrichment program, which caused the second North Korean nuclear crisis; he referred to the DPRK as "an axis of evil," thereby causing North Korea to withdraw from the NPT, increase its WMD supply, and eliminate any chance of reaching a breakthrough in the two military superpowers' bilateral relations.²⁶ China was North Korea's patron and

²¹ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." 1997, 15.

²² Goodby, James E. "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away." May 1, 2003. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web. 31 July 2017. Note: Clinton utilized what is commonly referred to as the "Perry Process," which involves engagement with North Korea.

²³ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for A Global Age." 2001, 3.

²⁴ William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." January 27, 2000.

²⁵ George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." 2002, 24. Note, full quote: "The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future."

²⁶ Goodby, James E. "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away." May 1, 2003. Brookings.edu. Web. 31 July 2017.

protector.²⁷ Although Bush 43 strategy stressed multilateralism in trying to terminate North Korea's nuclear program, it did not take the lead: prospects for economic cooperation within the Asia Pacific were run by Russia and China as the interlocutors for infrastructure projects and commercial relations.²⁸ Even Japan had doubts about Bush 43's WMD approach to China and North Korea.²⁹ Unlike Bush 43, the Obama Administration also addressed regional security threats in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea as being vital to U.S. foreign policy priorities; by welcoming Beijing to work with Washington and the international community to address key national security issues such as nonproliferation, economic growth, and military modernization along peaceful lines, the Obama approach vastly differed.³⁰ President held that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral nexus in the 21st century;³¹ it was (and still is) difficult for China and the U.S. to avoid each's interest in keeping their own nuclear arsenals in light of the enduring disagreement over Taiwan, how to work with Russia, mitigate North Korea, and China's past with

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Note: China did not want the North Korean regime to fall. If it does, that can cause a massive influx of North Korean refugees seeking refuge in China.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Note: The EU and Sweden played an important role in engaging North Korea with the rest of the world during Bush 43.

²⁹ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy." 15. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note, Full quote: "On the one hand, Tokyo is one of the strongest advocates for nuclear disarmament, but on the other, it relies on U.S. nuclear arms for protection. Japanese leaders believe that the long-term sustainability of the nonproliferation regime depends on the nuclear weapon states following through on their commitments to pursue disarmament. Nonetheless, some Japanese officials have expressed concern about whether U.S. nuclear posture provides an effective umbrella for Japan, especially in regard to China."

³⁰ Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy." 2010, 43. Note, full quote: "We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected."

³¹ Li, Cheng. "Assessing U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration." 30 Aug 2016. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web 31 July 2017. Note: President Obama also stated that he U.S. and China are the top two worlds greatest economic superpowers.

India and Pakistan (another global nuclear threat,) and more.³² In terms of trade and regional stability, U.S.-Chinese relations remained complex after (1) TPP, (2) how the U.S. sought to improve relations with Japan, which was intended to ameliorate Chinese-Japanese relations, perceived as containment, and (3) the lack of a resolution on the East China Sea with Russia.³³ Currently, the Trump Administration has taken a different approach to U.S.-China policy: the impact China has on the U.S. economy – particularly unemployment – is a sharp issue in U.S. domestic politics. In 2016, Republican candidates spoke on the issue at the Nevada caucus. Despite the Chinese backing of a \$1 billion auto plant in the state, anti-China sentiment was evident from the audience’s applause of those who made accusations against China’s economic practices. Current U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that Chinese currency regulation and “one-sided trade policies” were aimed at harming U.S. interests.³⁴ This animosity toward China is a prime example of the “tendency in each society to blame others for internal difficulties.”³⁵ Trump also stated the following: *“We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country. And that’s what they’re doing. It’s the greatest theft in the history of the world.”*³⁶ This past April, President Trump hosted President Xi Jinping at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida to begin U.S.-China Negotiations, and although the 45th Administration’s policy of “economic nationalism – hostility to multilateral trade agreements,” the One China Policy, and how to address North Korea’s nuclear threat, are alive and well as set forth by Trump chief strategist Steve Bannon, there is still an overall lack of clarity

³² Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 4. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note: Although China and India have resolved the Border War in 1962, historical tensions remain, causing gridlock at present.

³³ Li, Cheng. “Assessing U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration.” 30 Aug 2016. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web 31 July 2017. Note: While this piece is an op-ed, it reiterates the aforementioned Obama NSS Reports released in 2010 & 2015.

³⁴ Nash, James. “Nevadans Cheer Trump’s China-Bashing Even as Nation Buoy State.” Bloomberg, Bloomberg.com. 23 February 2016. Web. 9 July 2017. Note, Full Quote: “They’ve taken our jobs, they’ve taken our money, they’ve taken everything. They’ve rebuilt China with our money.”

³⁵ Hachigian, Nina. *Debating China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 9. Print.

³⁶ Trump, Donald. “Trump Accuses China of ‘Raping’ U.S.” *New York Times*, NYTimes.com. 2 May 2016. Web 10 July 2017.

as to how the Administration conducts its national security policy towards China.³⁷ The results of the Mar-a-Lago meeting demonstrated this: the 100-Day Plan between the two was not completed. Despite remarks on the meeting as “positive and productive,” there are few details to support the White House’s optimistic public remarks.³⁸ China trade and security relations were then linked to North Korea. President Trump recently called President Jinping the President of Taiwan.³⁹ Such symbolism has tremendous consequences for already complex U.S.-Chinese foreign relations. The narrowing power gap between the U.S. and China, along with cybersecurity has intensified mutual suspicion of each other. Despite how both sides, “have long been committed to preventing disagreements from dominating the relationship,” the perception of each other’s “grand strategy” is unsettling.⁴⁰ The remedy for this suspicion then is not blindly trust each other - this is unrealistic. Instead, each side must be especially pragmatic and detail-oriented considering the tenuous equilibrium and high stakes.

2. U.S. National Security Policy towards Russia

Over the past 25 years, U.S.-Russian relations were adversarial and complicated, and are vital for the stabilization of global and economic security.⁴¹ Bush 41 recognized the potential danger of regional conflicts as a result of redrawn borders after the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise in radicalism and terrorism, and access to WMD.⁴² To address this, Bush 41

³⁷ J.A., Democracy in America. “Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping.” The Economist, Economist.com. 6 April 2017. Web. 19 July 2017.

³⁸ Soergel, Andrew. “Analyst: Donald Trump’s China Summit Short on ‘Concrete Deliverables.’” U.S. News & World Report. Usnews.com. 10 April 2017. Web. 20 July 2017.

³⁹ Phillips, Tom. “Wrong China Policy: White House Calls Xi Jinping president of Taiwan.” The Guardian, TheGuardian.com. 9 July 2017. Web. 9 July 2017.

⁴⁰ Hachigian, Nina. Debating China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 9. Print.

⁴¹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁴² George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1990, 6. Note, Full quote: “Instability in areas troubled by poverty, injustice, racial, religious or ethnic tension will continue, whether or not exploited by the Soviets. Religious fanaticism may continue to

sought to reform the relationship with the former USSR via increased multilateralism. Despite its imminent collapse and turmoil in the Gulf, U.S. national security strategy made the former USSR, and its existing structures its top foreign policy priority.⁴³ In efforts to execute this multilaterally, Bush 41 worked with the Kremlin in implementing nuclear deterrence strategies; some examples in Bush 41 national security strategy are the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START,) and the Global Protection System (GPS).⁴⁴ GPS and START served as a blueprint for joint-nonproliferation efforts in order to rebuild diplomatic and commercial relations in light of global nuclear threats.⁴⁵ Similar to Bush 41, the Clinton Administration worked with the Kremlin to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the region by multilateral engagement. START II & START III – a continuation of START that includes additional agreements to “...deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to take them out of combat status, thus removing thousands of warheads from alert status years ahead of schedule...” – was agreed upon as a top national security priority between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.⁴⁶ There were swift changes to US national security policy after the full dissolution of the Soviet Union: Russia’s involvement in states such as Georgia and Moldova, NATO expansion, and the war in Chechnya are some examples.⁴⁷ Russian economic growth through market and democratic reform was also a top national security priority not just for Moscow, but for the other states

endanger American lives, or countries friendly to us in the Middle East, on whose energy resources the free world continues to depend.”

⁴³ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1993, 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 18. Note, Full quote: “At the June 1992 Summit, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed to work together, with allies and other interested states, in developing a concept for a Global Protection System (GPS) against limited ballistic missile attack. Since then, we have discussed GPS in detail with friends, NATO allies, and with high-level representatives of Russia and other former Soviet republics. This commitment to cooperation on a Global Protection System is a landmark in U.S.-Russian relations and will ensure that missile defense can be deployed in a stabilizing manner for the benefit of the community of nations.”

⁴⁵ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1991, 14.

⁴⁶ Bill Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1996, 5.

⁴⁷ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

in the region.⁴⁸ In addition to START II & III, the Clinton Administration further emphasized the need for Russian-NATO cooperation in light of NATO enlargement in order to create a secure post-Cold War European security system.⁴⁹ After the Yeltsin and Clinton presidencies, U.S. national security objectives set forth by both the U.S. and Russia expanded by launching a worldwide nuclear testing ban.⁵⁰ U.S.-Russian relations became increasingly complex with the rise of Vladimir Putin.⁵¹ Bush 43 also sought to reset U.S.-Russian relations in light of national security developments in the new century i.e. in a post-9/11 world.⁵² While Bush 43 continued START and similar initiatives such as SORT, it re-prioritized its stance, indicating that Moscow is no longer an enemy based on the decline of Soviet ideology and communism, the nonproliferation Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions, and joining forces in the War on Terror.⁵³ The Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 did not sever relations, it withdrew from the ABM in 2002, and Russia became a WTO member in 2012.⁵⁴ The Obama Administration sought to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations into the

⁴⁸ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1994, 19.

⁴⁹ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1996, 22.

⁵⁰ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” 1997-1999, 7.

⁵¹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁵² George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 2002, 25.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 27. Note, Full quote: “With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the twenty-first century: The United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United States. Russia’s top leaders have a realistic assessment of their country’s current weakness and the policies—internal and external—needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas. United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the global war on terrorism.”

⁵⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 4. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 36. April 2009. CFR. Note: Missile proliferation and defense was a vital issue in U.S.-Russia dialogue.

new decade in light of the new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev coming to power after the War on Terror.⁵⁵ The Obama years faced new regional and global geopolitical challenges with Russia, requiring unseen approaches. Specifically, the newest version of START – the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – was signed early on due to the rising threat of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.⁵⁶ Obama security strategy spearheaded a more inclusive gathering of international stakeholders commonly committed to nuclear deterrence, proliferation, and improving U.S.-Russian relations.⁵⁷ In addition to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, Obama made it a top foreign policy priority to utilize multilateralism, particularly through empowering NATO: U.S.-European allies facilitated more diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and Russia.⁵⁸ Vladimir Putin’s return as Russian President in late 2011 *and* Russia’s concerns with NATO’s intervention in Libya complicated U.S.-Russian relations.⁵⁹ By trying to work through Moscow’s skepticism towards spread of the Western model, the Obama sought to rebuild a working bilateral relationship.⁶⁰ However, Russia’s seizure of Crimea was an additional strain on U.S.-Russian relations due to

⁵⁵ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web. 9 July 2017.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 27, 2010. Note, Full quote: “To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades. And at April’s Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring 44 nations together here in Washington, DC, behind a clear goal: securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.”

⁵⁸ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 25, 2011.

⁵⁹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017. Note: Former VP Joe Biden proposed to “press the reset button” on U.S.-Russian Relations in a speech in Munich a few weeks after the inauguration in 2009.

⁶⁰ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” February 12, 2013. Note, Full quote: “At the same time, we’ll engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals and continue leading the global effort to secure nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands, because our ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead and meet our obligations.”

insecurity of NATO allies.⁶¹ Tensions between the U.S. and Russia never quite subsided following the events in Ukraine, which had a negative spillover effect on the end of the Obama years in its effort to fulfill its top national security goal, which is to monitor and combat ISIL and Al Qaida.⁶² During the current administration, U.S. President Donald Trump has inherited a complex relationship with the Kremlin: one that has arguably not been this volatile since the Cold War Era due to the war in Syria and the alleged Russian interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections in November 2016.⁶³ While Moscow appreciates the Trump Administration's attitude towards NATO, – which differs from the previous administrations adherence to the alliance and multilateral cooperation – it is unclear how the two great powers will move forward. Recently, Presidents Trump and Putin met at the G-20 Summit where they discussed how to move forward with Syria, Ukraine, and cybersecurity – all of which was warmly welcomed and up for discussion to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations.⁶⁴ However, Russia's disapproval of the recent U.S. involvement in Syria where a Syrian fighter plane and drone was shot down, and U.S. sanctions on Russia have increased, further complicate the relationship between the two countries.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 20, 2015. Note, Full quote: “We’re upholding the principle that bigger nations can’t bully the small, by opposing Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine’s democracy and reassuring our NATO allies.”

⁶² Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 12, 2016. Note, Full quote: “Even as their economy severely contracts, Russia is pouring resources in to prop up Ukraine and Syria, client states that they saw slipping away from their orbit. Priority number one is protecting the American people and going after terrorist networks. Both Al Qaida and now ISIL pose a direct threat to our people, because in today’s world, even a handful of terrorists who place no value on human life, including their own, can do a lot of damage. They use the Internet to poison the minds of individuals inside our country. We have to take them out.”

⁶³ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁶⁴ Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, July 9, 2017, 10:25 AM., <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump>

⁶⁵ Sampathkumar, Mythili. “Syria war: Tensions between America and Russia escalate as countries clash over drones and airspace.” The Independent, Independent.co.uk. 20 June 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

3. U.S. National Security Strategy in the Persian Gulf

To combat future threats to U.S. national security and regional stability within the Greater Middle East (i.e. American allies and potential partners,) Bush 41 emphasized that it stays committed to the following: (1) moving beyond containment, (2) form a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union in light of its military power and provision of WMD to Syria and Libya, (3) facilitate the peace process between Israel and Palestine, and (4) maintain a strong naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.⁶⁶ The Persian Gulf War brought about a new set of foreign policy challenges for Bush 41 to achieve its goals.⁶⁷ The notable military acts that took place – Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm – highlighted the first Bush Administration’s dedication to stand up to aggression, protecting the Middle East via promoting long-term peaceful resolution processes, and overall global leadership in the Gulf War in light of national interests and future international partnerships.⁶⁸ Despite liberating Kuwait and facilitating peace talks between Israel and the Arab world,⁶⁹ national security policy was largely driven by economic interests i.e. oil shocks from the Gulf War, while maintaining multinational alliances by calling on international coalitions to push for the Western mold. With regard to nuclear proliferation, Bush 41 sought to engage the Middle East by containing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and attempting to improve U.S.-Iranian relations under the conditions that it will no longer participate in terrorist-related activities and hostage crises.⁷⁰ Additionally, the first Bush Administration sought to restore the balance of power on local and regional levels with the following goals in mind: destabilizing arms sales and

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 9-13.

⁶⁷ George H.W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 29, 1991. Note: Beginning on August 2, 1990, the 41st Administration during the Gulf War sought to drive Iraq under Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in order to reestablish regional stability by working with a plethora of multilateral actors – the Arab League, the European Community, the United Nations – in order to reach a diplomatic solution and establish a new world order sans bloodshed.

⁶⁸ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1993, 4.

⁶⁹ George H.W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 1992.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 10. Note: The subject of Iran within the first Bush Administration will be analyzed in-depth at a later point in this paper.

carrying forth an increased naval presence in the region, and promoting an Israeli-Palestinian peace process to support Israel's security.⁷¹ Bush 41 also called on multilateral actors to contribute to the three-tiered non-proliferation strategy by opening membership and strengthening existing arrangements, and creating new programs such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁷² One of the critical policies regarding nuclear proliferation – the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – faced skepticism from Congress for increased funding despite its efforts on behalf of the administration to lower nuclear capabilities in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Syria.⁷³ By the end of Bush 41, the Gulf War ended, but a power vacuum held by the U.S. arose.⁷⁴ President Clinton carried out a similar attitude towards the region after the conclusion of the Gulf War and nonproliferation i.e. CWC.⁷⁵ Much of this ambition to defeat Saddam Hussein and supplying chemical weapons in the region was supported by multilateral efforts, primarily NATO and U.N. weapons inspectors.⁷⁶ However, Clinton recognized and prioritized the Persian Gulf's oil access.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration tried to pursue its Middle East security strategy by involving multilateral actors and acknowledging religious differences.⁷⁸ Bush 43 took a different approach given the events of 9/11 and its ramifications for the U.S. national security climate: there was a rollback of

⁷¹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1990, 13.

⁷² George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1991, 15.

⁷³ George H.W. Bush, "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." January 28, 1992.

⁷⁴ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1993, 4. Note, Full quote: "The United States has taken the lead both to defeat aggression, notably in the Persian Gulf, and to promote peaceful resolution of longstanding conflicts, such as in the Middle East, which threaten international peace and our vital interests."

⁷⁵ William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." February 4, 1997. Note, Full quote: "Now we must rise to a new test of leadership, ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. It will make our troops safer from chemical attack. It will help us to fight terrorism. We have no more important obligations, especially in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War."

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 1997-1999, 18. Note, Full quote: "The United States depends on oil for more than 40 percent of its primary energy needs. Roughly half our oil needs are met with imports, and a large, though diminishing, share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area."

⁷⁸ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 2001, 65.

containment, and reliance on preemption and justifying the use of offensive force, stipulating that terrorist networks are borderless, citizenless, and have chaotic dictators with mass WMD scattered in the region.⁷⁹ Particularly, Bush 43 was concerned with counterterrorism efforts in the War on Terror and stopping Al Qaida.⁸⁰ In invading Afghanistan in 2001, Yemen in 2002, and Iraq in 2003, Bush 43 national security policy sought to ensure safety at home and military prowess abroad over the next five years while bringing U.S. national interests in the Middle East to the forefront.⁸¹ This most definitely did not take place: The Afghan and Iraq Wars caused a sharp increase in civilian casualties and troop requirements by 2006, followed by a shift in the Bush 43 narrative to go after the Taliban in Pakistan and Iraq *and* Al-Qaida under a “return on success” policy (causing an additional 20,000 US Troops surge in the region,) and violated treaty rights per a Supreme Court Case (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* concerning holding prisoners in Guantanamo,) and the national fear of constantly being watched under the Terrorist Surveillance Program, respectively.⁸² Although there was evidence of nuclear-motivated terrorists in the region and Pakistan, the War on Terror could have been prevented.⁸³ The Taliban was toppled in 2001 in Afghanistan, yet there were approximately 210,000 civilian casualties as of 2015.⁸⁴ Obama adhered to standing by its allies and protecting national interests in its foreign policy in the Gulf by utilizing a hands-off approach in invading countries in the region, and sought to engage Muslim communities around the world via collective action and

⁷⁹ George W. Bush, “Bush’s Speech at West Point.” 1 June 2002. NYTimes. Web. 1 August 2017.

⁸⁰ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2003.

⁸¹ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2008.

⁸² Greg II, Gary L. “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs.” UVA Miller Center. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: Bush 43 “return on success” policy stipulated that the more secure America is at home, the faster troops can return from the War on Terror.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Watson Institute, International & Public Affairs. “Civilians Killed & Wounded.” Brown University. March 2015. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: This death toll has not been updated since March 2015.

multilateralism.⁸⁵ In practice, the Administration recognized its national interests on a broader regional scale by utilizing multinational institutions within the region such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.⁸⁶ Despite its shortcomings in addressing the rise of ISIL partly due to prematurely withdrawing troops from Iraq (2011,) falling short in the no-drama approach in providing military aid in Syria (2011-12,) overthrowing Gadhafi without monitoring the resulting national chaos in Libya, and supporting Egypt's autocrat al-Sisi, Obama did not abandon Afghanistan due to vital operational bases in the war-torn fragile state dealing with its Pakistani foes on the Pashtun belt.⁸⁷ What did persist over the past four administrations, however, was the U.S. willingness to work with Saudi Arabia due to oil interests as the world's largest crude reserves holder. The disagreements over prospects for the Kingdom to ameliorate its relationship with Israel, Saudi intervention in the 2015 War in Yemen, disapproval in the no-drama approach to Syria and Egypt, how to disarm a nuclear Iran, and its human rights injustices ensued.⁸⁸ It is clear that the U.S. relationship with the Gulf Kingdoms remained an important national security priority from the end of the Gulf War due to common business interests and economic ties.⁸⁹ President Trump faces different issues i.e. the escalation of ISIL in the Middle East, and particularly the ongoing Civil War in Syria. Some of President Trump's foreign policy goals include getting the "...Gulf States to pay for safe zones in Syria 'because they have nothing but money,' and to build an Arab coalition to roll back Iranian influence in

⁸⁵Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy." 2010, 3-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 45. Note, Full quote: "We have an array of enduring interests, longstanding commitments and new opportunities for broadening and deepening relationships in the greater Middle East. This includes maintaining a strong partnership with Israel while supporting Israel's lasting integration into the region. The U.S. will also continue to develop our key security relationships in the region with such Arab states as with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—partnerships that enable our militaries and defense systems to work together more effectively."

⁸⁷O'Hanlan, Michael. "Obama the Carpenter: The President's National Security Legacy." Brookings. May 2015. Web 1 Aug 2017. Note: Obama's Middle East foreign policy is commonly referred to as the no-drama and the hands-off approach.

⁸⁸ CFR.org Staff, "U.S.-Saudi Relations." CFR. 12 May 2017. Web. 1 August 1, 2017.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

the region...and negotiating peace between Israel and the Palestinians.”⁹⁰ Also, President Trump has had business interests in the region for over 20 years (and continues to retain them while holding office,) and “is backing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because Qatar is ‘a funder of terror at a very high level.’”⁹¹ He launched the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center to be co-chaired by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and will include the GCC states as members.⁹² President Trump made his first foreign visit to the Middle East and Europe with its first stop in Saudi Arabia, which was insisted by the Trump national security team as a trip for human rights and to discourage radicalization. With the first stop as Saudi Arabia – a host to 9/11 extremists with a dismal human rights record, – there is disagreement between the Pentagon and the State Department.⁹³ With Qatar, which is currently accused as a site for housing terrorists, the President reached out to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani over the phone in early February amidst the attempted travel ban from several Middle Eastern countries.⁹⁴ Currently, there is also discrepancy between President Trump’s and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s national security strategy on how to proceed with Qatar: “the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command and home to some 10,000 American troops,” and of which President Trump supports the Qatar blockade and Tillerson does not.⁹⁵ Under the current administration, U.S. nonproliferation policy has indicated a willingness to work with the Saudis on containing Iran and its nuclear capabilities to expand in the rest of the region.⁹⁶

⁹⁰Sokolsky, Richard.; Miller, Aaron. “Trump Thinks He’ll Get a Great Deal From the Gulf Arab States. Good Luck With That.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 7 March 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁹¹ Kirkpatrick, David D. “Trump’s Business Ties in the Gulf Raise Questions About His Allegiances.” New York Times. 18 June 2017. Web 10 July 2017.

⁹² Donald Trump, “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit.” Whitehouse.gov. 21 May 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹³ Cohen, Eliot A. “What Did Trump Accomplish on His First Foreign Trip?” The Atlantic. 28 May 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁴ BBC U.S. & Canada, “What has President Trump said about your country in his first 100 days?” BBC.com. 27 April 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁵Kelemen, Michele. “In an Afternoon, Trump and Tillerson Appear to Contradict Each Other on Qatar.” NPR.org. 9 June 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁶ CFR.org Staff, “U.S.-Saudi Relations.” CFR. 12 May 2017. Web. 1 August 1, 2017.

4. U.S.-Iran National Security Strategy

Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, U.S. national security strategy toward Iran has primarily centered on its aims to contain and implement negotiations to combat Iranian support for terrorism, threats to Israel, and potential expansion of its nuclear arsenal. From remaining open to an improved relationship with Tehran following the hostage crisis and funding and supplying terrorist groups with WMD during the first Bush Administration, to the Clinton Administration imposing an economic embargo while working with multilateral actors such as the G-7 and post-Soviet states to implement additional COCOM export controls to limit WMD sales in efforts to maintain peace in the Greater Middle East, to Bush 41's strategy "...to block the threats posed by the regime (i.e. thwarting Middle East peace and sponsoring terrorism by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites thereby violating international nonproliferation treaties such as a) while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing," and finally by the end of the Obama Administration, the U.S. led a global sanctions regime to rollback its nuclear proliferation. In addition to wanting to maintain an international world order without nuclear weapons, one of the main reasons behind the aforementioned U.S.-Iran national security policies is due to its regional consequences: "other states, particularly in the Middle East, are starting nuclear power programs modeled after that of Iran." Currently, Iran is bound to the Iran Deal set forth by the IAEA during the latter end of Obama's presidency (implemented January 2016,) stipulating that the following sanctions will remain in place: terror list, missile technology, ballistic missiles, human rights abuses, and destabilizing regional activities including in Syria and Yemen. Without the Iran Deal set forth by both Bush Presidencies urging to impose economic sanctions rather than military ones, and implemented by Obama, Iran would have the nuclear capability to emulate North Korea. This would have colossal regional security consequences if the Trump Administration continues to oppose the Iran Deal, despite its 6 months of adhering to previous Middle East policies.

5. U.S.-Turkey National Security Strategy

Similarly, U.S. national security strategy and how it deals with Turkish foreign policy has been vital yet challenging in preserving regional stability. From Bush 41's dealings with Turkey's domestic Kurdish issue over Operation Provide Comfort amidst the Gulf War where the U.S. provided support for Iraqi Kurds,⁹⁷ to Clinton's policy of careful enlargement with Turkish viability of entering the EU as a vital NATO ally in Bosnia, the NIS, and the Middle East despite the Cyprus issue troubling reconciliation with Greece,⁹⁸ to Bush 43 strongly opposing Turkey's Kurdish policy against in Iraq during the War on Terror,⁹⁹ to the Obama Administration emphasizing Turkey's vital geostrategic role as a NATO

⁹⁷ Gunter, Andrew. "Insight Turkey, Vol.13." No.2. 98. 2011. Web 31 July 2017. Note, Full quote: "To abandon OPC, however, would alienate Washington and strip Ankara of important influence over the course of events. OPC, for example, enabled Turkey to launch military strikes into Iraqi Kurdistan against the PKK at almost any time. If the United States refused to allow such Turkish incursions, Turkey could threaten to withdraw its permission for OPC. Although it might have seemed ironic that an operation that was supposed to protect the Iraqi Kurds was allowing Turkey to attack the Turkish Kurds as well as in ICT collateral damage on the hosting Iraqi Kurds, such was the logic of the Kurdish imbroglio and part of the dilemma for America foreign policy."

⁹⁸William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 1997-1999. 22-23. Note, Full quote: "There are significant security challenges in southeastern Europe. The interrelated issues of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish disagreements in the Aegean, and Turkey's relationship with Europe have serious consequences for regional stability and the evolution of European political and security structures; thus, our immediate goals are to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions and to pursue a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. A democratic, secular, stable and western-oriented Turkey has supported U.S. efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, the NIS and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world's most sensitive regions is critical. We continue to support Turkey's active, constructive role within NATO and Europe."

⁹⁹ Gunter, Andrew. "Insight Turkey, Vol.13." No.2. 101. 2011. Web 31 July 2017. Note, Full quote: "The new situation was further illustrated in July 2003 when the United States apprehended eleven Turkish commandos in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaymaniya who were apparently seeking to carry out acts intended to destabilize the de facto Kurdish government in northern Iraq. Previously, as the strategic ally of the United States, Turkey had carte blanche to do practically anything it wanted to in northern Iraq. No longer was this true. The "Sulaymaniya incident" caused what one high-ranking Turkish general called the "worst crisis" to which the United States was willing to protect the Iraqi Kurds from unwanted Turkish interference. What is more, Washington now began to reject Turkish proposals that either the United States eliminate the PKK guerrillas holed up in northern Iraq or permit the Turkish army to do so."

ally despite the U.S. concern for Kurdish rights,¹⁰⁰ it is in the U.S. best national interests to reform its partnership with Ankara.¹⁰¹ While Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952, which by nature brought the country more deeply involved in Western affairs and ideals of democracy,¹⁰² its foreign policy of Zero Problems with Its Neighbors has failed and strained its relations with the West. The inability to resolve the Cyprus issue has resulted in a complicated relationship with the U.S due to the strong Greek voices in the congressional lobby to disseminate the Turkish military presence in Cyprus: a similar phenomenon to the prominent Armenian lobby in Washington that pushes for Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide.¹⁰³ It has become increasingly difficult for the West to work with President Erdogan and the AKP on controlling the rise in migration in the region and increased terrorist activity in the Middle East. Turkey is increasingly being drawn to the Arab Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, due to its heavy trade relationship with many key Gulf States and its interest in maintaining security and stability in its own backyard. The recurring themes and regional problems that affect Saudi Arabia such as energy security, pipeline diplomacy, and rising Iran are also critical to Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey's increasing engagement with the Middle East enhanced its strategic posture and bolstered its leadership as a peacemaker especially as a strategic partner to many Arab states, Israel, and the United States. Soon after September 11, 2001, Turkey seemed to represent not

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 100-102. Note, Full quote: "Although the United States had always paid lip service to the idea of Kurdish rights, whenever it was necessary to make a choice, the United States always backed its strategic NATO ally Turkey on the Kurdish issue...the United States has very strongly opposed the "bad" Kurds of the PKK. Turkey's longtime and continuing geostrategically important position as a U.S. NATO ally is clearly the main reason for this situation."

¹⁰¹ Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force Report, "US-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership," 3. May 2012. Note, Full quote: "To make the vision for a new U.S.-Turkey partnership a reality, Ankara and Washington should observe the following principles: •equality and mutual respect for each other's interests; •confidentiality and trust; •close and intensive consultations to identify common goals and strategies on issues of critical importance; •avoidance of foreign policy surprises; and •recognition and management of inevitable differences between Washington and Ankara."

¹⁰² Fuller, Graham. "The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World." United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008. 152.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 153.

only a crucial Muslim ally in the war against terrorism but also a unique example of secularism and democracy in the Islamic world. In that sense, Ankara's active presence in the anti-terror alliance strengthened the point that the war on terror is not a crusade against Islam. In the words of President Bush, Turkey has "provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy." With regard to national security risks, the U.S. should push Turkey to respect its minorities i.e. the Kurds living in Iraq and Syria as they are supporting military efforts to dismantle ISIS and ISIL, ameliorate its relations with Israel and become the middle man between Iran and the rest of the region as it once did in the past.¹⁰⁴ However, this solution is not that simple. America's invasion of Iraq and the ensuing problems in the country threaten 50 years of Turkish-American strategic partnership. Differences over Iraq – the Turkish parliament's March 1, 2003 refusal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish territory for the invasion, and Turkish frustration over American support for Iraqi Kurds – have led to unprecedented mutual resentment between Ankara and Washington. In the past, Ankara could always rely on its solid strategic partnership with Washington in case things went wrong with Europe. Such an alternative may now no longer exist. Most Turks believe the U.S. has betrayed its promises to prevent Kurdish domination of Northern Iraq and is now maintaining a "double-standard" about fighting terrorism. These developments put the U.S. under an extremely negative light in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. During 2005, a colorful example of Turkey's frustration with the U.S. was a best-selling fictional novel depicting a Turkish-American war over Kirkuk. Moreover, Turks have not gotten over their anger over a July 4, 2003 incident in which U.S. forces in northern Iraq arrested a dozen Turkish Special Forces troops and detained them, hooded, for 24 hours. According to a June 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, anti-Americanism in Turkey is now the highest in the world – ahead of Pakistan, Egypt and Palestinian territories. Ankara's longstanding fear that Kurdish nationalists would dominate northern Iraq – thereby setting a precedent for Turkey's own 15 million Kurds – has now

¹⁰⁴ Pope, Hugh. "PaxOttomana: The Mixed Success of Turkey's New Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs*, December 2010. 171.

become reality. A great majority of Turks, including senior military leaders, blame Washington for this development, as well as for the re-emergence of Kurdish terrorism within Turkey. Turkey is no longer a serious E.U. candidate, has been exposed for its ISIL ties, and is increasingly isolated. Currently, President Trump has longstanding business interests in Turkey (similar to those in Riyadh and in Baku,) was praised by President Erdogan for his positive response to the July 2016 coup attempt and was congratulated on winning the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.¹⁰⁵ After meeting in May, however, relations remain strained.¹⁰⁶

6. U.S.-Caucasus National Security Strategy

The past 25 years of U.S. national security policy have had to “confront three countries that were entirely new to U.S. foreign policy in this region.”¹⁰⁷ During the first Bush Administration, which emphasized a smooth and democratic transition for post-Soviet countries after the end of the Cold War, President H.W. Bush had a Kissinger-realist approach.¹⁰⁸ While maintaining regional conflicts and providing warning signs of having a lot of nationalism were at the forefront of Bush 41 policy in the post-Soviet bloc, the U.S. did not have too many vital national interests in the region, except oil and gas.¹⁰⁹ Clinton did recognize the national interests at stake in the Caucasus, primarily by addressing the frozen Nagorno-

¹⁰⁵ Kenney, Carolyn,; Norris, John. “Trump’s Conflicts of Interest in Turkey.” Center for American Progress. 14 June 2017. Web. 2 August 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Sanchez, Raf. “4 things you need to know about Donald Trump’s meeting with Turkish President Erdogan.” The Telegraph. 16 May 2017. Web. 30 August 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul. “U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus Take Three.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 31 May 2017. Web. 11 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸ George W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” February 9, 1989. Note, Full quote: “And it’s a time of great change in the world, and especially in the Soviet Union. But I’ve personally assured General Secretary Gorbachev that at the conclusion of such a review we will be ready to move forward. We will not miss any opportunity to work for peace. The fundamental facts remain that the Soviets retain a very powerful military machine in the services of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So, let us take the new openness seriously, but let’s also be realistic. And let’s always be strong.”

¹⁰⁹ William J. Clinton, “A New Security Strategy for A New Century.” 1997-1999, 22-23.

Karabakh conflict and Caspian oil.¹¹⁰ Another national security goal set forth by the Clinton Administration that was applied to the Caucasus was its emphasis on multilateralism, particularly through the OSCE.¹¹¹ By the early 2000s, the second Bush Administration, even while preoccupied with the War on Terror, did recognize other parts of the Caucasus as being vital to U.S. national security interests: Georgia is a prime example of this – where the U.S. supported Georgia’s efforts in the Rose Revolution in 2003 and in its war against Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹¹² Bush 41 essentially applauded Georgia’s decision-making as it aligned with U.S. national interests to spread liberal capitalism and the Western model.¹¹³ To this end, the Obama Administration inherited problems with Russia over U.S. support for Georgia during the 2008 Crisis.¹¹⁴ As a result, its national security strategy towards the Caucasus called for a democratic and multilateral resolve to regional conflicts via the Trans-Atlantic community at-large i.e. NATO.¹¹⁵ U.S. officials have visited Georgia, and the President

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24. Note, Full quote: “A stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with substantial U.S. commercial participation. While the new states in the region have made progress in their quest for sovereignty, stability, prosperity and a secure place in the international arena, much remains to be done—in particular in resolving regional conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh.”

¹¹¹ William J. Clinton, “A New Security Strategy for A New Global Age.” 2001. 46. Note, Full quote: “The United States will continue to give strong support to the OSCE as our best choice to engage all the countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in an effort to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one another when instability, insecurity, and human rights violations threaten peace in the region.”

¹¹² Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul. “U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus Take Three.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 31 May 2017. Web. 11 July 2017.

¹¹³ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2008. Note, Full quote: “Our foreign policy is based on a clear premise: We trust that people, when given the chance, will choose a future of freedom and peace. In the last 7 years, we have witnessed stirring moments in the history of liberty. We’ve seen citizens in Georgia and Ukraine stand up for their right to free and fair elections.”

¹¹⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR.

¹¹⁵ Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy.” 2010. 42. Note, Full quote: “We will remain dedicated to advancing stability and democracy in the Balkans and to resolving conflicts in the Caucasus and in Cyprus. We will continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in its region.”

did host several Georgian officials including Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili at the White House on May 8th, 2017, and applauded the country of Georgia for its “decision to pursue integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO.”¹¹⁶ While this appraisal can be viewed as one of fulfilling the longstanding U.S. national interest to create a liberal capitalist world order under the Western model, it has and may continue to upset Moscow: a staunch opponent of Georgia joining NATO and its desire to join the EU and NATO.¹¹⁷ Toward the end of the Obama Administration and in the current Trump Administration, involvement in the region has been reduced as policy primarily appears focused on fighting ISIL and economic ties in the region. Particularly, the U.S. has trade and investment i.e. oil interests in Azerbaijan,¹¹⁸ which overshadows its human rights and democratic failures. Furthermore, the U.S. understands the longstanding ‘Divided Azerbaijan’ concept¹¹⁹ as leverage over Iran, fueling national and separatist sentiment and language in an already weakened bilateral relationship.¹²⁰ As a Northern neighbor of Iran, this has severe consequences for U.S.-Armenian ties: the U.S. Embassy in Armenia is the largest in the Middle East and South Caucasus, yet without a clear strategy to address the ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the ‘Divided Azerbaijan’ concept, tensions ensue.¹²¹ While Moscow and Yerevan have strong relations, the U.S. and Russia do not fight over Armenia; this is an issue where the two countries share a common goal: to support Armenia’s security goals and development. In U.S. Ambassador Richard Mills’ most

¹¹⁶ Wigglesworth, Alex. “Trump welcomes Georgia’s prime minister.” Los Angeles Times. 8 May 2017. Web 11 July 2017.

¹¹⁷ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 82. April 2009. CFR.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan. “U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations.” U.S. Department of State. <https://az.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/us-azerbaijan-relations/> Web. 13 September 2017.

¹¹⁹ Nassibli, Nasib L.. “Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects.” Harvard Kennedy School, November 30, 1999.

¹²⁰ Atabaki, Touraj. “Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran.” I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2000.

¹²¹ Urchik, Daniel. “A Cost-Efficient Investment: Enhancing US-Azerbaijan Relations.” Diplomatic Courier. 19 April 2017. Web. 13 September 2017.

<https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/cost-efficient-investment-enhancing-us-azerbaijan-relations/>

recent speech, he discussed the prospect of providing Armenia more tools to make Armenia a more sovereign state.¹²² On Washington's end, the role of the Armenian lobby primarily over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide remains as a determining factor in U.S.-Armenian relations; it serves as the second largest ethnic lobby in the U.S., which further complicates U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-Armenian relations in the region.¹²³ The current Administration has no policy or previous dealings with Yerevan, and did not use the term 'genocide' on this past April 24th, which is known as Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day.¹²⁴

Conclusion

To conclude, twenty-five years after the post-Soviet states are still transitioning from a bipolar world, U.S. foreign policy resumed to operate under containment, deterrence, nonproliferation, and democracy and Western values abroad in order to protect U.S. interests. According to the NSS Reports and SOTU Addresses analyzed, U.S. foreign policy recognized the need to enhance these policies realistically by maintaining a prominent naval presence, multilateral cooperation, increasing access to trade and market openness, improving its cybersecurity and counterterrorism tactics, and moreover, restoring the balance of power that has been offset since the collapse of the USSR. On paper and in front of the U.S. Congress, U.S. Presidents over the past 25 years delivered promises they could not keep, primarily in preventing nuclear arsenals from expanding, a complex set of challenges set forth by Russia's hot and cold nuclear defense planning, uncertainties in China's strategic development in East Asia, and the turmoil in the Middle East from the Gulf War to the ongoing War on Terror and the rise of transnational terrorist networks such

¹²² Mills, Amb. Richard. "Armenian PM, US Ambassador discuss bilateral mutual cooperation." 25 August 2017. Web. 30 August 2017. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/903097/armenian-pm-us-ambassador-discuss-bilateral-mutual-cooperation.html>

¹²³ Note: The largest ethnic lobby in the U.S. is the Jewish one.

¹²⁴ Trump, Donald J. "Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Armenian Remembrance Day 2017." The White House, Office of the Press Secretary." 24 April 2017. Web. 30 August 2017.

as ISIL.¹²⁵ Therefore, it is imperative for the Trump Administration to prioritize the rebuilding of bilateral relations with Russia and China as previous Presidents attempted to via multilateral cooperation and nuclear treaties. “America First” national security strategy as set out by Chief Strategist Steve Bannon and top Trump security advisors have been putting forth.¹²⁶ As of August 2, 2017, Congress and President Trump implemented new economic sanctions on Russia, further complicating current U.S. security strategy towards Moscow, Iran, North Korea, and potentially the rest of the world by instigating what the Kremlin refers to as a trade war.¹²⁷ That has expanded with diplomatic counter measures. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration can learn from the lessons from the past national strategies abroad in order to protect American interests at home such as making realistic budget cuts in light of spending billions of dollars on nuclear detection equipment from the War on Terror, and enhance its cybersecurity capabilities via increased intelligence sharing for the future of when and how the U.S. uses its nuclear weapons complex.¹²⁸ In terms of economic policy i.e. the ‘capitalist’ part in spreading the Western model, it remains to be seen where the Trump Administration ends up on international trade; ending TPP and possibly exiting TTIP, NAFTA, and the WTO would appear to undo all of the progress in creating and spreading the liberal economic model order set forth by its predecessors.¹²⁹

¹²⁵Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 7. April 2009. CFR.

¹²⁶Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org. Note: Panelists commonly cite the H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn op-ed outlining the “America first doesn’t mean America alone” national security strategy as a blueprint for Trump’s first NSS report.

¹²⁷Rampton, Roberta,; Zengerle, Patricia. “Trump signs Russia sanctions bill, Moscow calls it ‘trade war.’ Reuters. 2 August 2017. Web. 3 August 2017. Note, Full quote: “Trump’s litany of concerns about the sanctions, which also affect Iran and North Korea, raised the question of how vigorously Trump will implement them regarding Russia. ‘While I favor tough measures to punish and deter aggressive and destabilizing behavior by Iran, North Korea, and Russia...’”

¹²⁸ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 69. April 2009. CFR.

¹²⁹Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org.

On a broad level, it is safe to say that the national security challenges at present must be resolved by having clear and shared goals at home in order to have a successful strategy to address them.¹³⁰ In President Obama's letter to President Trump, he wrote:

*“Second, American leadership in this world really is indispensable. It's up to us, through action and example, to sustain the international order that's expanded steadily since the end of the Cold War, and upon which our own wealth and safety depend.”*¹³¹

But, the current Administration is disruptive and unpredictable. Obama's advice followed the theme of his predecessors to maintain global security and reduce threats. The Trump Administration has changed the priorities so that U.S. policies are now in a transitional phase. Whether traditions return or an “America First” policy prevails, ignoring the transitional, disruptive situation of 2017 creates more risk than that of the past twenty-five years.

¹³⁰ Porter, Michael. *Shared Vision, Common Goals: A Better Framework for Problem Solving*. No Labels, Governor Jon Huntsman & Senator Joe Lieberman. 67. Note, Full quote: “I can't think of a more important priority in America today than defining our shared goals as a nation, and having a national strategy to address them.”

¹³¹ Obama, Barack. “Inauguration Day Parting Letter.” Full Text Available, Liptak, Kevin. “Exclusive: Read the Inauguration Day letter Obama left for Trump.” 4 September 2017. CNN Politics. Web. 5 September 2017.

**ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ: ԱՄԵՐԻԿԱՅԻ
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ԹՈՒՐԲԻԱ, ԻՐԱՆ)**

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***Բանալի բառեր:** ԱՄՆ, Հարավային Կովկաս, Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելք, Ջ.Վ. Բուշ, Դ. Թրամփ, ազգային անվտանգություն, արտաքին քաղաքականություն, Ռուսաստան, Չինաստան, Ծոց, Թուրքիա, Իրան*

Հոդվածի հիմնական նպատակն է վերանայել և վերլուծել վերջին 25 տարիների ԱՄՆ-ի ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարությունը՝ արտաքին քաղաքականության շահերին համապատասխան, որպեսզի ավելի լավ հասկանանք դրանց հետևանքները Հարավային Կովկասում և Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելքում: Հոդվածում ներկայացված է ԱՄՆ-ի ազգային շահերը՝ սկսած Ջ.Վ. Բուշի նախագահության տարիներից մինչև ներկայիս նախագահ Դ. Թրամփի նախագահությունը: Այնուհետև ամփոփվում է, թե ինչպես է յուրաքանչյուր վարչակազմ վարում իր արտաքին քաղաքականությունը ՉԺՀ-ի, ՌԴ-ի, Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելքի, Իրանի, Թուրքիայի և Հարավային Կովկասի հետ: Վերջում ամփոփ ներկայացվում են Թրամփի վարչակարգում ներառված քաղաքական նկատառումներ՝ անցում նեոլիբերալ բազմակողմանի մոտեցումից՝ «Նախ ԱՄՆ-ն» քաղաքականությանը:

REVIEWS AND SPEECHES

*Presented during the International Conference "Regional and National Security Dynamics: Armenia-Turkey Relations",
29 September 2017, Yerevan, Armenia*

SESSION 1.

DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: ARMENIA AND TURKEY

**REVIEW ON ÜNAL ÇEVİKÖZ'S PAPER
"PERSPECTIVES FOR SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE
SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE ROLE OF NORMALISATION
BETWEEN TURKEY AND ARMENIA"**

*Vahram Ter-Matevosyan
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The relations between Turkey and Armenia have been widely covered in the academic literature. It has been approached from many perspectives and it seems no dimension is left out from the discussions. However, as long as the two countries have no diplomatic relations and the land border between them remains closed, no effort should be spared to evaluate existing and emerging predicaments and find ways to move forward. From this standpoint, Mr. Ambassador's well written paper is yet another informed effort to look into the essence and prospects of normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

The main objective of his paper is to evaluate recent transformations and the current debates in the Turkish foreign policy and how the prospects of normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations fit into that context. The paper provides a comprehensive picture of the origins of post-Cold war Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus and shares insights on its limitations. The author rightly argues: "Turkey's Caucasus policy fails to be comprehensive due to lack of diplomatic relations with Armenia". This claim, which constitutes one of the central arguments of the paper, sets the right context to construct the flow of analysis. Another central argument of the paper is certainly the identification of the main problem that has existed

between Turkey and Armenia for the past couple of years if not decades – “the lack of trust and confidence” between two governments. This not only hinders the process but also deepens the suspicion towards each other.

In addition to these focal points, the paper has also touched upon a number of other questions that require further discussions and clarifications. Of course, it is rather challenging to write a review for a paper the author of which has served in the Turkish foreign ministry for decades, who has been Turkey’s ambassador to a number of countries and, more importantly, who has hands-on experience on the Zurich protocols. On different occasions, I had the chance to discuss all these issues with Mr. Ambassador and he knows very well my position. However, here I have to reassert certain ideas that I have exchanged with him before.

In this review, I will touch upon a set of conceptual problems that exist not only in the paper under consideration but also in the literature that exists on Turkish-Armenian relations. Therefore, I intend to discuss three contentious issues: 1) the question of the closed border and its relevance to the conflict in Karabakh; 2) the need to disentangle the processes of normalization and reconciliation; 3) the importance of separating domestic considerations from the geopolitical context. The critical rethinking of these approaches will expand our understanding of the origins of the current deadlock.

The first issue is about the border closing date. Like many politicians, scholars, and journalists, the author also mentions a few times that Turkey closed the border with Turkey on April 3, 1993. This seemingly obvious assertion needs further clarification if not revision. First and foremost, it needs to be stated that it is somehow misleading to claim that the Republic of Turkey closed *the border* with Armenia in April 1993. The reality is that the interstate land border between Turkey and Armenia was never officially open in the first place; instead, the crossing points were open on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian relief from Canada and Europe to Armenia and for the operation of the Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish-Armenian border even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, between 1993 and

1999, when the border was allegedly closed, some officials were still able to travel through the border gates, which again implies that the border was never legally open for 24-hour access and its two crossing points (Akhuryan/Doğu Kapı west of Gyumri and the Markara/Alican southwest of Yerevan) were accessible only when two parties agreed to use them for short-term objectives. To the best of our knowledge, there are no legal documents concerning the decision to open the border as such. This distinction between the border and crossing points is important because it defines the true meaning behind the border politics that ensued since then. Moreover, Turkey used the crossing points as leverages on Armenia as it delayed for months the delivery of humanitarian aid to Armenia. Even when shipping the wheat from its own reserves, that the European community had promised to replace, Turkey was doing it at a very slow pace and at a very high price. For instance, Turkey charged \$56 per ton in hard currency for transportation of wheat to Armenia, whereas the transportation of one metric ton of wheat from Russia to Armenia cost only \$2. As a result, Armenia was forced to deplete its foreign currency reserves to avoid bread riots. Armenia was not allowed to use the border-gates for exporting. Some petty traders and tourists were using the train to visit Turkey. Another evidence supporting the claim that there was no functioning border, in a conventional way of understanding, is the fact that in order for the citizens of Armenia to go to Turkey, they had to go to Tbilisi to obtain entry visas. Whereas, if they chose to enter Turkey from Georgia, they could obtain it on the Turkish-Georgian border.

This clarification has an important bearing on our discussion. On a more subtle level, one may rightly argue that in December 1991, when Turkey recognized Armenia's independence, Turkey had the chance both to open the border and establish diplomatic relations. Back then, the conflict in Karabakh was not in its active stage, and Turkey could open the border without reference to the situation in Karabakh. Turkey, instead, chose to do neither of them. This is to suggest that Turkey's policy of imposing a blockade on the Republic of Armenia started from 1991. In other words, attempts to connect the closing of the border-gates [aka-the

border] in April 1993 with the events in Karabakh aimed to please and support Azerbaijan when the latter lost the strategically important region connecting Karabakh and Armenia. Connecting the issues of Karabakh and the Turkish-Armenian border had political, symbolic, and also propaganda objectives. Furthermore, from that point onwards, analysts and politicians took this interpretation of Turkey into consideration without questioning its true intentions. The closing or opening of the border should be decoupled from the Karabakh conflict and be seen from purely bilateral perspectives. Therefore, once again, it needs to be stated that Turkey refused to open the border with independent Armenia from the early days on, hence, the claim that the border was closed in April 1993 is at least misleading.

The other issue that Mr. Ambassador discusses in the paper has to do with the Zurich protocols that were signed on October 10, 2009. Here I argue that during the Swiss facilitated negotiations, which led to the preparing and signing of two protocols, some methodological mistakes occurred. In this sense, what was left out from the discussion, however, was a set of crucial questions: Why sign two protocols when the whole purpose of negotiations, at least for Armenia, was to establish diplomatic relations? And: Why put two separate issues – development of diplomatic relations and reconciliation – into one basket, creating much confusion and inherent problems? The decision to bring these two documents together was a methodological flaw that cost the entire process dearly.

The crux of the problem has to do with the fact that bringing together the process of normalization and reconciliation carried a risk that the two parties were not capable of overcoming. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that normalization of relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries that have a disputed past and a troubled present requires a completely different toolbox and set of policy initiatives than the process of reconciliation. Underestimation of these significant differences had serious implications for the entire process.

When starting the negotiations, both parties had different and sometimes diametrically opposed expectations for the process. For the Armenian side, it was crucial that Turkey would continue the negotiations

without any preconditions. The short-term goal for the Armenian side was to establish diplomatic relations with a hope to secure the opening of the border with Turkey, thereby removing the economic and communication blockade imposed on Armenia by Turkey since 1991. For the Turkish side, the objectives were quite different, as Turkey never concealed the true reasons for not establishing diplomatic relations and for not opening the border. Since 1991, the Turkish side has presented at least three reasons for not opening the border: Armenian Genocide claims and worldwide recognition campaigns should be ceased, the border disputes between Turkey and Armenia should be resolved once and for all, and the Karabakh conflict should be resolved. However, since 1993, the last reason started to dominate Turkey's list of preconditions, effectively pushing the first two into the background. This short explanation alone was sufficient to understand that two parties sought different objectives and hence pursued different strategies in attaining their goals. For the Armenian side, the normalization of relations came first, while for Turkey the reconciliation process was more significant. These different views were reflected in the two protocols and, instead of devising a short and plain document about the establishment of diplomatic relations, the parties took the most complex road by bringing together all the complications of their relations and putting them into two documents with multiple cross-references. Thus, the failure to disentangle normalization from reconciliation should be seen as a methodological error and one of the reasons for the current deadlock.

This important dimension should be taken into account in all future initiatives that will bring the leaders of the two nations to the negotiation table. The reasons for the lack of official relations between Turkey and Armenia have different facets and layers. Some of the existing problems may be addressed through official documents, some may be solved through mere contacts between two nations and by better knowing, each other and some may remain unsolvable for some time to come. Hence, Turkish-Armenian relations should be separated from Turkey-Armenia relations. The officials from both countries should retake the hard and arduous road of normalization of official relations, and leave the reconciliation process

to societal actors: scholars, artists, and civil society members of the two nations. The states can facilitate the reconciliation but, given the sensitive nature of relations, should not direct the process. The lessons of the Zurich protocols should not be ignored.

Geopolitical dynamics should also be constantly revisited when the future of Armenia-Turkey relations are discussed. Although it seems that the relations between Turkey and Armenia have been exclusively a bilateral issue, there is little doubt that certain countries keep having an impact on the process. The influence of these countries sometimes is visible, whereas more often their real impact remains unclear. Azerbaijan and Turkey keep working closely on multiple of issues related to Turkey's relations with Armenia, the Armenian Genocide, and Diaspora as well as on problems related to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. Mr. Ambassador also discusses examples of how Azerbaijan was able to demonstrate resistance to a number of initiatives which aimed to advance the relations between Armenia and Turkey or between two societies. Turkey, in turn, keeps referring to Azerbaijan and its concerns regarding the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh as important preconditions to expect any progress in the relations between Armenia and Turkey. It remains a big question though, how tangible is the actual influence of Azerbaijan on the relations between Armenia and Turkey? Notwithstanding the rhetoric deriving from the logic of the much-acclaimed "one nation, two states" formula, on many occasions the Turkish leaders have been ambivalent about Azerbaijan and its actual role in the equation. Therefore, Turkey's refusal to normalize relations with Armenia should be seen solely from Turkish perspective without a need to drag Azerbaijan into the picture. Based on this, it can be argued with certainty, that Turkey's ruling establishment and especially its foreign policy architects abused the influence that Azerbaijan had on building bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey. In public statements, the Turkish ruling party has overestimated, hence inflated the actual weight of Azerbaijani demands concerning Turkey's relations with Armenia. European diplomats, who were part of the Zurich process, repeatedly mentioned that they found Turkish backpedaling based on

Azerbaijani resentment as insincere and contrary to the spirit of the negotiations. Some Turkish diplomats also alluded to that fact that Azerbaijan's political leadership knew quite well all the details of the negotiation process between Armenia and Turkey as they were informed on a regular basis. Those who kept the Azerbaijani leadership updated recall no visible resentment against the process because, as they have told the Azerbaijan's leadership, the normalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey would positively affect the Karabakh problem also. The paper under review also follows that line of argumentation.

The second tier of countries, which can both positively and negatively influence the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey, include Russia, USA, France, Germany, Georgia and the EU as an organization. Between 2005 and 2009, a number of countries were engaged in a process, which was coined "Football diplomacy". The USA had a leading role in it, and, with Obama's election to the presidency, the process received additional boost. When the negotiations were leading towards the signing of the protocols, a number of other countries came forward to support it including Switzerland, which has been hosting and facilitating the negotiation process from early on, Russia, USA, France, EU etc. After the signing ceremony of the protocols was over, it was time to act and support the parties to ratify them and move to implementation. It was exactly at that time that, albeit for different reasons, both Armenia and Turkey needed external support. Thus, the countries, which were present during the signing ceremony, left the process early enough, except USA, assuming that both parties would stay committed to the mutual agreements, time and efforts they spent on the process and move on. However, it turned out to be quite a long and tenuous road, which left the normalization process in disarray, with no positive developments in sight. Therefore, the normalization prospects between Armenia and Turkey need unconditional support from global and emerging powers, international organizations, think-tanks etc. Expecting that the President of France, Fr. Macron, as Mr. Ambassador claims, can be of any help is a good proposition. Leaders of Scandinavian countries and Benelux can also assume such role.

On the other hand, nowadays the international system goes through a challenging period of thorough revision. The primary actors, who might be interested in establishing diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, are dealing with problems elsewhere, which are different in scope and urgency. Hence, Armenia-Turkey relations are pushed to the backstage of the international relations with no prospects bringing it back to the forefront. Tellingly, Turkey also goes through a challenging period where its future is determined for the next few years if not decades. With the expanding tide of censorship, suppression of free speech and jailing of journalists, left wing and liberal intellectuals, the number of supporters of the Armenian cause is drastically decreasing. Winning over new supporters is becoming a daunting task for those who care about the normalization, hence, the Turkish leadership does not feel the urgency to deal with Armenia and the Armenian question.

At the end of the paper, the author engages in an interesting discussion about the prospects of normalization by discussing five scenarios. Two of them are worthy of separate consideration: Turkey's domestic transformations and Armenia's possible choices. According to the first claim that Mr. Ambassador proposed, in view of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, it is unlikely that Turkey's ruling elite makes any initiatives toward normalization of relations because it "would risk losing authority and being exposed to criticism before the critical elections". This view is certainly interesting, however, it needs elaboration and the best way to do so is to ask a question: "For how long the election circles are going to determine Turkey's policy towards Armenia?" Furthermore, the paper claims that any bold moves can come from "a self-confident and authoritative executive leader". The next question that may want to pose is "how much self-confident and authoritative should the current leader be in order to make any step toward Armenia?" I guess the answer to that question should be sought in the opposite direction. The more democratic is Turkey, the higher the chances for any bold moves. Only in these circumstances, one can engage in open discussion about Turkish-Armenian relations when the voice of dissent is

not silenced, when there are checks and balances, when the word "Armenian Genocide" is not banned in the Turkish parliament, when free speech is not punished, when journalists are released from prison. More importantly, the authoritarian leader may close the border as abruptly as it was opened.

The second and last point is the Armenian context. A few days ago, in his UN speech, Armenia's president has clearly laid the road-map for the protocols and gave Turkey a new deadline for doing any tangible moves - March 1, 2018. He declared the protocols "futile" and not reflecting the existing realities. Hence, there is less likely, as the paper claims, that Armenia will take "a bold step forward ... ratifies the protocols". Armenian president statement can be interpreted as a final and hopeless gesture not only to Turkey but also to the international community.

It is widely known that Armenia's gradual withdrawal from the process took some 7 years now. In April 2010, after "the reasonable timeframe", which was mentioned in the protocols has passed, the Armenian president decided to suspend the process of ratification in the parliament. The next turning point was in February 2015 when the president of Armenia decided to withdraw the protocols from the parliament's agenda. Thus, Sargsyan's last statement is the third, and hopefully, the last reminder to Erdogan about the importance to making his mind.

To conclude, the fruitless process of "football diplomacy" did not change the status quo, as Turkey keeps its border with Armenia hermetically sealed. Moreover, the situation became more strained and complex as the parties became increasingly distrustful of one another's intentions and policy preferences. Diplomatic communications between Turkey and Armenia have effectively broken down, with no hopeful perspectives in sight. As a result, the relations between two countries have only deteriorated since the failure of the Football diplomacy. The lack of understanding on many key questions has effectively diminished any trace of the minimal trust developed during the "football diplomacy".

**Ü. ÇEVİKÖZ'S RESPONDING REMARKS TO THE
REVIEW BY V. TER-MATEVOSYAN**

Thank you

Thank you Tatevik for this very eloquent presentation of Vahram's critique of my paper.

Certainly, I know Vahram and we have known each other for many years now, I know his ideas. If I had a response to his critique of my paper, my critique would be as long as Tatevik has read, so I don't want to bore you. But perhaps I just want to underline a few points. First, I am so glad that Vahram is also a Macron fan, because he has supported my idea to ask the president of France to take an initiative and this has been supported frankly in my paper. The key issue that Vahram has underlined is the border issue. I think there is a misunderstanding here. Look, this border has been the border between Turkey and The Soviet Union. It has been the border between NATO and Warsaw Pact, NATO and the Soviet Union and in 1991 when the Soviet Union disappeared this border did not disappear, but simply it changed hands from the USSR to Armenia. So, the status of the border has not changed. It continues to exist and it continues to function as it used to function during the Soviet time. Because during the Soviet time, this border was only used for train transport and it was not used for tourism purposes and tourists were not passing from that border. So, the status of that border did not change and that is the reason why since Turkey and Armenia have been unable to establish the diplomatic relations but Turkey recognized Armenia, the status of the border did not need to be declared as open, because it was already open, but it has been closed officially and this is an official declaration of closure in 1993. So, I think this has to be understood and I think Vahram is probably looking at it from a different perspective. The border did not need to be declared as open because it was already open. And it simply transformed from a border between two different countries from another set of two countries.

The second issue, that Vahram underlines, is perhaps the two protocols and the two approaches of the two countries. It is true that Armenia focused mostly on the opening of the border during the negotiations and Turkey tried to get rid of the historic issues which presented the difficulty between our two countries. Vahram asks why signing two protocols, I mean it is not only Turkey, Armenia also signed these protocols, so I think the criticism is also directed to the Armenian side as well, but the fact that these two protocols have been jointly signed and that they are mutually interlocked is that there are two very strong positions of two countries and you can only overcome to find a compromise between two extreme positions of the two parties by interlocking these issues to one another and believe me the Swiss head of delegation is a professor of mathematics and I particularly appreciate the role of applied mathematics in social sciences as well and I think the interlocking status between the two protocols has been a magnificent mechanism and I simply do not agree with Vahram in that sense.

And the third issue is about domestic politics. Domestic politics is something that foreign policy should get rid of. Unfortunately, even about the Nagorno Karabakh process, for example, elections play an important role. The two parties meet each other, the two presidents get together and they get very close to a solution, but then in about six months' time or eight months' time there is an election in one of the two parties, and who is going to have elections stops the process. This is always the case and this has been the case for the last 25 years. And this has also affected Turkish politics. It is not Azerbaijan who is blocking the normalization between Turkey and Armenia, it is the attitude of Azerbaijan, which is probably been exploited by certain opposition powers in Turkish domestic politics and this is how the perspectives and the path forward or the initiatives of the government are taken hostage. It is not Azerbaijan, who is taking, maybe Azerbaijan is taking hostage the Turkish domestic politics indirectly, but it is the Turkish domestic political opposition, which is taking hostage of government's behavior. So, this is also something that has to be underlined. As I thought, I mean there are a lot of other issues it will probably be better to discuss with Vahram directly. Thank you very much."

**RE-ASSESSING ARMENIA'S SECURITY CHALLENGES:
A RESPONSE TO THE PAPER "REGIONAL SECURITY
DYNAMIC: ARMENIA" BY TATEVIK MKRTCHYAN AND HAYK
KOCHARYAN**

Armenia's Security Policies: Principles versus Reality

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The paper presented by Tatevik Mkrtchyan and Hayk Kocharyan outlines the main security challenges that Armenia is facing and analyzes the responses to those challenges, as envisaged by the security policies of the Armenian government. The authors offer a sound analysis of the documents that regulate government policies in the field of security, such as the National Security Strategy, the National Military Doctrine, etc. They have done a wonderful job analyzing these documents and their applications in practice, showing how the government strategies correspond with the realities on the ground. As I agree with most of the points made by the authors, I would rather focus on some of the aspects of the issues left out of the paper for the simple reason that all aspects of the problem of Armenia's security simply cannot be covered within the limits of a single academic paper. For the same reason I do not claim to offer a detailed analysis of these issues myself, but rather I will try to draw the attention of the speakers and the audience to some issues, which should also become a subject of discussion.

Obviously, the paper deals quite a lot with the document central for Armenia's security policies, the National Security Strategy (the NSS) as well as other documents that encapsulate the principles on which Armenia's security policies are based. I would suggest, that the topic for further discussion here is the relation between the normative and the practical, or in other words, to what extent the principles outlined in NSS and other official documents adequately reflect the realities on the ground

and to what extent are the policies prescribed by these documents correspond to the actual policies of the Armenian government.

Armenia between the West and the East: Not Putting All Eggs in One Basket

Thus, the authors have done a great job analyzing various aspects of the NSS. I would suggest that we continue this discussion by putting the NSS into its historical context and looking at the dynamic of the changing security environment of Armenia. In this sense, a possible topic for further discussion here is to what extent is the NSS, a document conceived in a different historical period, still applicable to the changing realities of today. The authors correctly claim that there is a strong need to re-assess the NSS, as it does not always correspond to the realities of today.

Here is a quote from NSS, brought by Tatevik Mkrtychyan and Hayk Kocharyan, which describes the principles of “complementarity” and “engagement”, upon which Armenia’s foreign and security policy is based:

“Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and its intensification of the cooperation with the NATO alliance explained as contribution to the consolidation of the potential of Armenia’s policy of complementarity (NSS Chapter IV).

This quote, in essence sums up the main goals and trends of Armenia’s foreign policy for the last two decades, or maybe even longer. The ease with which, the authors of document put in the same sentence such goals as “strategic partnership with Russia”, “adoption of a European model of development”, “mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and United States” reflects a much easier time, before the Ukraine crisis, the war in Syria, the recent presidential election in US. It was a time when contradictions between various geopolitical actors existed, and at some points they could have been quite sharp (as over Kosovo or Georgia), but, in spite of those contradictions, both Russia and the West operated within a

single security framework, based on shared approaches and principles. Today, this security framework, which has never been formalized and existed mostly due to the goodwill and understanding between various actors, is gone up in smoke of the burning tires on Kiev's Maidan, the heavy artillery guns in Eastern Ukraine, the fires of Aleppo. Probably, the last hopes of returning to this common security framework were killed by the actions of the alleged Russian hackers in the presidential elections.

What does all this mean for Armenia? To what extent are the principles of "complementarity" and "engagement" possible to maintain in this new security environment. So far, Armenia has resisted the urge to make a choice between the poles of the emerging global and regional competition, since that would entail serious security risks. However, at certain moments, the pressure to make a choice becomes so strong that resisting that pressure is ripe with even worse security risks. Thus, on September 3 2013, Armenia surprisingly ditched the already negotiated Association Agreement with the EU, opting instead for the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (later to become the Eurasian Economic Union). To the outside world Armenian officials tried to sell the story, according to which Armenia's choice was based on economic benefit. But in internal discussions even some government figures explained the decision by security considerations. A repetition of the same scenario on a smaller scale took place recently, when Armenian government opted out of the NATO wargame "Agile Spirit" in neighboring Georgia, and the decision was announced on the last minute once again.

However, while time after time being force to make a reluctant choice, Armenia sticks to the policy of complementarity (though the word itself is no longer used as it is associated with a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is in opposition to the current government). Hayk Kocharyan and Tatevik Mkrtychyan quote one of the recent speeches of Serzh Sargsyan, in which he says the following about Armenia-EU partnership "Throughout this process Armenia has vividly demonstrated that it has been possible to make compatible various integration processes while

harvesting and sowing everything positive and useful, which unite and does not divide nations”¹.

These policies, with a different extent of success, are performed by most post-Soviet countries, including almost all Russian allies, even an ally as close to Moscow as Belarus. These policies are often called “multi-vector policies” or “maintaining the balance between East and West”, which is probably not a very accurate term, since in most cases there is a strong imbalance between the West and East in this relationship. Rather, a term borrowed from world of finance, “strategic hedging” explains the situation better, at least in case of Armenia. “Strategic hedging” in this case means that Armenia is heavily invested in its security relationship with Russia, yet it is hedging this strategic choice by developing relationships with the EU, USA and NATO, following the famous principle of “not putting all eggs in one basket”.

Number One Challenge to Armenia’s Security: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Obviously the paper pays significant attention to the most pressing issue for Armenia’s security, that of the Karabakh conflict. As the paper deals with the issue in detail, we shall focus only on some of the aspects of the Karabakh conflict.

As with other issues, when it comes to Armenia’s security policies, the subject of the relations between the principles and policies outlined in official documents and the policies on the ground remains a major topic of discussion. Thus, when it comes to the issue of which is the solution, seen as the preferred one for Armenia, the NSS in effect outlines a model of solution, which is not far from that suggested by “the Madrid principles”: “Nagorno Karabakh should have a geographic link to Armenia and its security should be guaranteed” (NSS, Chapter III).. Of course, the concept of “geographic link with Armenia” is open to interpretation. In a recent

¹Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Congress of the European People’s Party, 29.03.2017, Available at: <http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2017/03/29/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-statement-at-the-EPP-congress-in-Malta/>

statement, the outgoing US Minsk Group co-chair, Richard Hoaglande interpreted the concept of the geographic link with Armenia as follows: "It must be wide enough to provide secure passage, but it cannot encompass the entire area of the Lachin district"², (and nothing was said of the Kelbajar district, as if its return to Azerbaijan is simply out of question). Obviously, this is hardly the interpretation that the Armenian government prefers. However, it is quite an interesting detail, worth noting: instead of fostering maximalist expectations regarding the fate of Karabakh, the NSS prefers a quite moderate approach, which would probably be considered excessively soft by the majority of Armenian public opinion today.

There are couples of additional issues, related to Karabakh conflict, which I would like to raise to stimulate the discussion, in addition to those that have been presented by the paper. Thus, one question, which concerns Armenian society, especially in the wake of the 2016 escalation, is the following: to what extent has Armenia's security alliance with Russia, and Armenia's membership in the CSTO served the purpose of ensuring the security of Armenia and, specifically, Nagorno-Karabakh.

When it comes to this issue, there is a distinction in Armenia between membership in CSTO and the bilateral relationship with Russia. This is also reflected in a speech by Serzh Sargsyan, quoted by the authors of the paper: "There is no doubt that each country has its own interests and priorities, but they should not be cited against our shared interests and mutual obligations. Every time when the armed forces of Azerbaijan use guns, rocket mortars, or artillery against the Republic of Armenia, they are firing at Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Moscow, and Minsk"³. The concern expressed in this statement reflects the fact that during the April escalation the CSTO members and the organization in general failed to offer political

² Minsk Group US Co-Chair Presents Six Main Points for Karabakh Conflict Settlement, Epress.am, 24 August, 2017, <http://epress.am/en/2017/08/24/minsk-group-us-co-chair-presents-six-main-points-for-karabakh-conflict-settlement.html>

³ The Statement of the President of RA at the session of the CSTO Collective Security Council, Working visit of president Serzh Sargsyan to Russian Federation, 21.12.2015, <http://www.president.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2015/12/21/Working-visit-of-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-to-Russia-December-21/>

support (let alone military) to its member Armenia, with the exception of one quite timid statement by the acting secretary of the organization on the first day. Moreover, some members, Belarus and Kazakhstan signified support for the position of Azerbaijan, a country that is a member of neither CSTO nor EAEU.

Hence, Armenia's membership in CSTO is seen through the lens of its bilateral security relationship with Russia. Whatever Sargsyan says no serious policy maker or military planner in Armenia expects Belarusian and Tajik military to come to Armenia's aid in case of an Azerbaijani attack on Armenian border. Obviously, what matters for Armenia's security is the strategic relationship with Russia. However, here as well some serious questions have been raised, especially in the aftermath of the April war in 2016. Russian weapon sails to Azerbaijan, which have been continued even after the April escalation, as well as Moscow's reluctance to offer political support to its ally, have led to a serious disappointment in Armenia, raising the question, to what extent Armenia's reliance on Russia in its security issues is justified. To an extent, Armenian government has since then tried to deal with this issue by taking steps in two directions: on the one hand, by raising the issue with Russia, and on the other by engaging in "strategic hedging", as described before. In particular, "the strategic hedging" approach manifests itself in maintaining relations with NATO, as well as, recently, in the attempts to foster military cooperation with China⁴.

The April escalation in Karabakh also gave rise to the so-called concept of "nation-army" put forward by the government in 2016. The authors discuss this topic, so I will not go into details regarding this issue. However, there are certain questions that need to be asked in relation to the government's use of the term "nation-army". To what extent is the "nation-army" an idea that the government is willing to put in action, and to what extent is it simply a PR stunt or political manipulation, aimed at

⁴ Armenian defense minister begins official visit to China, Panorama.am, September 5, 2017, <https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/04/Armenian-defense-minister-begins-official-visit-to-China/1828971>

consolidation of society around the ruling government and marginalizing opponents? There are reasons to think that this may be more of a political tool than a real program. In those countries, where the concept of “nation-army” has been implemented, usually this includes arming of the general population in some form. It is highly questionable that Armenian government would implement that model, because of concern for public safety, as well as concerns for a possible popular uprising (especially in the wake of the *Sasna Tsrer* incident in July 2016).

So far, the only instance where the concept of “nation-army” was put in practice, was the introduction of a *de facto* tax, which envisages that every working Armenian citizen, irrespective of the size of their income, will have to pay 1000 drams from their salary for a special fund, designed to support the families of the soldiers killed in battle. When opponents raised concerns related to constitutionality and social justice in connection with this *de facto* tax, government officials and pro-government media simply accused the opponents of acting against Armenia’s interests and in this way breaking the ranks of “the nation-army”.

Other Issues for Discussion

As I don’t have enough time and space to offer a detailed discussion of other aspects of Armenia’s security policies I will simply list some of the aspects, which also need to be discussed.

The paper has discussed the issue of Armenia-Turkey relations and their security implications for Armenia. Hence, I will not go into this issue. However, I would like to draw attention to the conundrum of Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhijevan, where the security challenges presented by the Karabakh conflict and Armenia-Turkey relations converge. Nakhijevan has a border with Turkey, and has seen a high rate of Azerbaijani-Turkish military cooperation in the recent years⁵. According to the controversial 1921 Kars treaty, Turkey has a status of guarantor of Nakhijevan’s status,

⁵ Eduard Abrahamyan, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Evolving Implicit Rivalry Over Nakhchivan, Jamestown, August 3, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-and-azerbaijans-evolving-implicit-rivalry-over-nakhchivan/>

which may offer Turkey a pretext to intervene into the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in case military actions involve the territory of Nakhijevan. In addition, Nakhijevan is in the immediate vicinity of Yerevan (only 50 km to the suburbs of Yerevan) and the deployment of rocket systems such as the Russian-supplied 9K58 Smerch (60–90 km range) multiple rocket launchers is a grave source of concern from the point of view of Armenia's security⁶.

In addition to the issues discussed so far, I would like to point attention to those aspects of security that do not necessarily have a military dimension, yet are equally serious. Unfortunately, both Armenian government and Armenian analytical community are often operating with a narrow definition of security, as something that has to do mostly with military issues and/or covert actions. Such understanding of security leaves out many important dimensions of the problem.

Thus, to bring one example, this narrow understanding of security leaves out matters of environmental security. In case of Armenia, an extremely important aspect is the issue of seismic activity, which presents a deadly threat for the security of Armenia's population. In fact, the indifference of both the government and the society to the gravity of the seismic threat is simply astonishing for a country that has experienced a devastating deadly earthquake less than three decades ago.

Equally neglected are issues related to public health. Socio-economic difficulties and the degradation of the public health system may put Armenia at risk of public health emergencies, devastating effects of which may be comparable to those of war or natural disaster.

An extremely problematic aspect of Armenia's security is energy security. As in the field of military security, here Armenia is heavily relying on Russia, which has helped to provide for the needs of the country in the short term, but presents serious challenges in the long term perspective. The paper mentions Armenia's deal with Gazprom, which guarantees the Russian company a monopolist position in the Armenian market until 2043, and this is only one of the challenges that need to be discussed when it comes to

⁶ Ibid.

energy security. And in certain cases, as in the case of the Armenian nuclear power plant different dimensions of security, such as energy security, environmental security and military security come together.

Issue of cyber security is another topic that needs to be discussed. Cyber-security is increasingly becomes a challenge globally, and in case of Armenia the challenges in this field come both from the global trends, and from the conflicts that exist in the region. It is true that, as a country with a relatively low level of proliferation of IT in various spheres of economy, may be less vulnerable to cyber threats than some of the more advanced countries. However, even Armenia is still advancing in such fields as digitalization of state services, of business, etc. So, in these fields there is a need to take precautions against the possible risks associated with cyber warfare and other possible cyber risks.

Cyber security is often related to information security. In Armenia, usually when it comes to information security, the most common perceptions of threats point to Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, an important issue is often overlooked, that of the influence of foreign media, particularly Russian media on the Armenian society. Of course, Russia is Armenia's ally, however, whatever their relationship, the two countries may have diverging interests in a number of issues, so the domination of a foreign country's media in the information field, is a cause for concern.

Finally, there is another issue that deserves to be discussed - the problem of securitization of the public discourse. In Armenia the expression "a matter of national security" is often invoked in relation to issues that would normally considered to be very far from the field of security, such as the rights of LGBT persons or the proliferation of religious teachings that differ from those of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The concept of security perceived in this way is often used by the government to silence its critics, or by different political and social groups in order to marginalize and demonize their opponents, presenting their views and actions as "threats to national security". This is a worrying trend, which not only leads to unhealthy conditions for the public debate, but also diverts attention from the real issues related to the security of our country.

SESSION 2.

DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: EU, USA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA

REVIEW ON LENA D. KRİKORIAN'S PAPER "NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DYNAMICS: FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Russia, China, Persian Gulf, Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran)"⁷

*Anna Ohanyan
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Well thank you very much for the invitation. And I am thrilled to be part of this panel and having an opportunity to read on the research as produced by local researchers. I would like to first thank Lena Krikorian for an insightful paper and I don't even know where Lena is - I haven't met her, there is Lena. Thank you, Lena, very much for all the work and the insightful research you put in to this work. Overall, I agree with most of the analysis. What I would like to do is to challenge you a little bit in an effort to give you some feedback as you start thinking forward about your research. I also wanted to briefly refer to what ambassador Cevikoz mentioned, arguing that the South Caucasus is not highlighted, is not viewed as important in global politics. It is that criticism or lament that we always hear that in big conversations among great powers, the South Caucasus in general is not registering. And I agree with that, and I think as academics, we bare responsibility for that reality. What I would argue, what I would call Lena and other researchers to start reflecting on, is how we think about research on Armenia, on Georgia, and on Azerbaijan.

And to this end, my first point to Lena is, to really challenge the Western theoretical dominance. Looking at the way great power policies affect the foreign policies of smaller states such as Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan is important. But, I would advocate that we should also flip that

⁷ The text is the transcription of the speech given at the conference.

relationship and challenge realism as an International Relations theory: we should start also asking how Armenia and other small states, affect the foreign policies of greater powers. To this end, situating Armenia in the scholarship of small states is overdue. Looking at variables such as the institutions, new power arrangements, new forms of power that smaller states are able to create are important to consider.

The objective of the paper was to study US foreign policy relative to various other major powers in world politics, and understand the implications of those on South Caucasus. I do think that the paper did a very good job in analyzing the US foreign policy, but I think that looking and showing the causal links and mechanisms of impact between US foreign policy on Armenia were somewhat missing. I realize that Lena's task was to look at official statements, and as content analysis it is a very valuable exercise, but I worry that just by looking at the official statements you miss a lot of politicking that is happening. So, I would call for you to diversify your research methodologies, looking also at the scholarship and existing research on these topics including opinion polling, civil society actors.

There is a lot there. I was asked to comment on Russia so I will focus on US-Russia relations a bit. You mentioned that the US is promoting the western model. I would want to hear what that western model is. There are so many definitions that are being floated around. What is the core? Is democracy assumed in that model? Is it market capitalism? Is it human rights? And to what extent that is western to what extent that is American? Prior to the last election, which resulted in a Trump presidency, many western analysts were looking at the world through the prism of China's rise, focused on whether the US will be challenged by China or some other power. No one expected that essentially the United States, which created that benign hegemony and allowed many countries to rise in that framework, would self-sabotage, and start pulling from some of the regional groupings that it created. So, there are fascinating developments that are happening here. It would be fruitful to explore as to why there is such an anti-systemic movement in the US, skepticism against NAFTA and other regional blocs

(note that United States pulled out of Trans Pacific Partnership). I can talk about these issues if there is time.

One quick point. You mentioned US spreading globalization and in Armenia I often hear a concern and fear on globalization and its impact in Armenia. On this, I would like to cite Amartya Sen who argued in an article that globalization is not new, it's not western, and it's not a curse. Essentially thinking about how small states in particular can utilize global forces is really an exciting research avenue. On the point in regards to China's rise within this model, significant research has been carried out to date. Realist analysis in particular has been arguing that historically, periods of great power transitions always have been conflictual. Anytime a new power has been rising and challenging the existing status quo power, conflicts between the two have inevitably resulted, followed by new rules created as a result of such confrontations. Now, international relations as a field of study has been criticized, and rightfully so, for not doing enough work in understanding peaceful mechanisms of power transition. China's rise to date has been quite peaceful. And ironically, as the Trump Administration has been announcing about the "America First" policy and pulling out of Trans Pacific Partnership, the Chinese President has been defending globalization and advocating for free trade. This indicates that this western model did produce certain stakeholders. This is not to say that this model did not increase inequalities, including in Armenia, including all the other countries in South Caucasus.

One more point on this realist assumption regards to the power transitions theory, which has maintained that the US will be overtaken by China or by some other powers - again, this analysis operates in a bilateral model, or a state-centric model. What we are witnessing in contrast is the rise of, what I am going to call, a 3D politics, meaning that we now have non-state actors as exerting significant anti-systemic influence on world politics. Self-determination movements, from Europe all the way to Iraq, de-facto states. There are over 20 de-facto states and there is some scholarship on this. What is the systemic significance of this phenomenon? How do we think about these states? Non-state actors, from terrorists to NGOs, and I apologize for putting these actors in the same sentence, but they do operate via similar

mechanisms in plugging into world systems. Social movements, extreme right or extreme left, that are also on the rise. It appears that we are entering into very uncertain strategic environment. Explanations on polarity and state-centric approaches are not going to do the job, and Armenian scholars need to register that moving forward.

In regard to Russia, there is a mention in the paper that US-Russia relationships were always adversarial, but the paper also admits this statement to be potentially problematic as the relationship deteriorated mostly since President Putin came to power. By some accounts, there are over 70 books since 2010 on Russia that have been published. This scholarship is exploding. However, I think that analysts are struggling to situate Russia as a subject of study. And here the key challenge is to differentiate between geopolitical factors, individual leadership analysis of President Putin as well as domestic factors. Let me clarify a little bit. At the individual levels of analysis one focuses on Putin's leadership as an individual, when trying, for example, to explain the annexation of Crimea. Others argue that the domestic factors, such as regime survival concerns, are important in the shaping of Russia's foreign policy. Yet another group of scholars highlights Russia's imperial nationalism. I have only 3 minutes and I am almost done.

I would actually challenge the statement in the paper that both Russia and the US have Armenia's security goals at hand. I would argue that diplomatic capacities in South Caucasus need to be deepened, and that Armenia needs to take charge of its diplomacy: blaming everything on greater powers, while important to consider, I don't think is sufficient anymore. I would conclude with just a reference to an article by Tom Long on small states. He argues that this is a good time to be a small state, and that globalization provides all kinds of opportunities, economic and political, and protecting territorial integrity, creating opportunities into global economy for small states⁸. In short, Lena, just flip your model by looking at how great powers influence Armenia's or Georgia's or Azerbaijan's foreign policies, but also start looking as to what is the role of small states in shaping these very complicated great power transitions. Thank You.

⁸ International Studies Review, Volume 19, Issue 2, 1 June 2017, Pages 185–205.

REVIEW ON SHOUSHAN KYUREGHYAN'S PAPER "REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION"⁹

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Let me express my gratitude to the organizers to be here, to be in Yerevan once again. That is really a pleasure for me. Now, let me pass to the paper on the Russian Regional Security Dynamics. Shushan Kyureghyan's work focuses attention on Russia's national security and foreign policy, that is to say, Russia's main and long-term national security politics in the "Near" and "Far" abroad. Well, in fact this definition of "Near Abroad" was some kind of 1990s and now it is politely cut out from the official documents. Anyway, the author is quite right in this term, that there are different policies towards Western countries, different rising powers, existing powers and states under power transformation. The author is interested in why this politics unfolds as it does and why it is reasonable to "define the countries of the world as "near" and "far" abroad" (p.1-2), and provides a process-oriented, theoretically/explanatory framework that considers the sources of Russia's concerns, including long-term threats, NATO's eastern enlargement, militarization of the regions adjacent to Russia. The introduction is well written and outlines the theses of the paper.

The author considers different phases of the Russian policy processes: the sources of long-term security problems, why some problems emerge on the Russian security agenda and others not, RF's success in creating intergovernmental institutions to address regional security problems, and how the effectiveness of regional cooperation institutions might be evaluated.

⁹ The text is the transcription of the speech given at the conference.

The titles of different parts of the paper consider the long-term threats, NATO's eastern enlargement, and militarization of the regions adjacent to Russia, increase of EU interest towards USSR ex-member countries, old structures/organizations, and new opportunities for the Russia's foreign policy towards those states in transition. The final part of the paper considers the future of Russia's foreign policy and Russia's vision of national security including a discussion on current debates related to conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, the erosion of state sovereignty in the light of the recent developments in Syria.

Kyureghyan writes, "The idea of an outward enemy, a Western military threat, is even profitable for the Russian authorities to justify their economic hardship and internal instability" (p. 8). This is the primary strength of the paper - dazzling array of the Russian security and foreign policy doctrines and documents are surveyed, organized, and summarized, allowing them to speak to the various aspects of the explanatory framework. At the outset, the author also makes clear that the paper seeks to describe or explain the many security challenges and threats facing Russia and the wide range of policy efforts trying to address them. So there are "new" and "old" intergovernmental organizations and politics among states in the South Caucasus, and of course, giving attention to actors such as EU and USA, and traditional regional powers Turkey and Iran. The author writes that "by its presence in the Middle East, Russia ensures the neutralization of its competitors such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, that they have their own interests towards European market". She then proceeds to differentiate between deterministic and probabilistic causality, and discusses how causal claims may be based on correlations, counterfactuals, and process tracing, concluding that, "Russia uses the Syrian war for both advertising and testing its own weapons thus showing its power to the world. So, Russia is guided by common geopolitical and cooperative interests of two countries while providing weapons and ammunition to Syria".

It might also be pointed out that the geopolitical interests, foreign-policy approach of the paper translates into a rather detached treatment of

divergent regional perspectives on the South Caucasus security environment. To demonstrate how these factors interact, Kyureghyan examines contentious politics in the region and how “the interests of the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Iran also collide in the South Caucasus” (p.11). In reference to perspectives, the author writes that “Russia will continue its’ policy of expansionism by trying to fill the vacuums both in the Near and Far Abroad, in order to prevent them to be filled by other countries or forces. Russia will continue its’ policy of Western resistance, which will be highly disturbed by its’ economic situation, low oil prices, internal social situation” (p.14). More specifically, the author seeks to understand the type and degree of influence of Russia’s future foreign policy. Kyureghyan concludes that “Russia will remain open but cautious for dialogues with both regional and global powers to overcome the regional challenges and ensure global security and stability” (p.14).

So, in general, the author holds a positive view of Russia politics as an advocate for political and diplomatic settlement of Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. However, the author concludes, “Russia's foreign policy in the South Caucasus should aim to work thoroughly with their societies and applying soft power in those countries” (p.15). This conclusion about the soft power of Russia is very important, so maybe more prospective trying to compare it with “hard” power approach as it was previously. But the most interesting part of the paper contains the conclusion and some future scenarios to help policy makers to deal with the dynamics of national and regional security. Thank You.

REVIEW ON MIKAYEL HOVHANNISYAN'S PAPER "EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND WIDER SOUTH CAUCASUS"¹⁰

Iris Kempe

Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat, EU

Thank You. Let me start by expressing my gratitude: thank you Gevorg, thank you, Vazgen, for inviting me again. I spent almost 5 years in the South Caucasus, not in an easy period of time. We arrived in Tbilisi, Georgia, at the end of July 2008, and you all probably know what happened in August. Some Russians organized a smooth welcoming party. But it was a wonderful time. Later on, I was elected as a founding Steering Committee member of the EU Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, together with Ulad Vialichkas and Katarzyna Pelczyńska-Nałęcz, and we are still in almost daily Skype contact. Currently, I am not working in a government mandate anymore so on the paper be careful, otherwise, I would be in trouble for not being able to say something. I am from Cologne and grew up with the spirit of openness and humor I know I can talk endlessly.

Mikayel: - I forgot to say that you have 10 minutes.

Iris: - Yes, I know. But my priority is, let us have a dialogue, which is missing so far. I am in favor of a dialogue, and I will try to be as sharp and short as possible. So my issue was your brilliant paper, congratulations, which is about relations between the European Union and Russia. That means Armenia as an Eastern Partnership country, in particular, after the Riga summit, after new challenges, and being a member - after the U-turn in 2013-2015 - of the Eurasian Union, and I would disagree. Russia is not behaving OK, again being what it is. At least, since the escalation in Eastern Ukraine, in Crimea, the sanctions of European Union started. It's not a cold war, but it's something very challenging, and Paata Zakareishvili will tell anybody what it means to be in conflict with Russia. For Armenia it is not easy, the Europeans are in a crisis, and Russia is in what we can call a kind of

¹⁰ The text is the transcription of the speech given at the conference.

new post-war situation, so it is not easy to be in relationship with EU and Russia. So I disagree with you, EU foreign policy is not fully developed to a joint foreign ministry and ministry of defense, currently. It would be a very new statement, but that would be for the EU. They are now busy resolving Brexit, and other issues.

Mikayel: - You are in fact disagreeing with me, because there is no involvement bilaterally.

Iris: - My first point: the first challenge is the upcoming EU summit, is not taking place in Tallinn but in Brussels since the Estonian EU presidency is busy making the presidency a necessary success. This will be something new. After Eastern Partnership it is not easy, because the Eastern Partnership countries, Armenia included, are in deep crisis, and these are issues that are not mentioned so far. Russia is using all kind of instruments. They are using territorial, ethnic conflicts to intervene: it's Karabakh, Abkhazia, the South Ossetia and plenty of other territories. Russia is also using public diplomacy, so it's also clear. And plenty of others have an interest in the Eastern countries, Armenia included. And I would be happy if someone will come up with this: What does it mean for Armenia, is it fine for you? Is this the right way? Is Russia behaving democratically? All answered or is there a problem? I see a problem! So, that is not easy, but to expect new solutions from the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels, in November.

Second point is, which is too much a part of your paper, it is tackled but unfortunately, nobody from the Armenian civil society forum is present on the Twenty Deliverables. And I am wondering. You either have to have monitoring, a test from someone from the EU, but he has already left, or even better, your own monitoring, and your friends are not doing it. But someone from Armenia too must start that work. It's a pity that Boghos Boghossian is not present. So, it is a test, your Twenty Deliverables are quite crucial for the European Union to develop the Eastern Partnership further. In both ways: the official deliverables and the shadow evaluation. That is a test for you and other scholars that are doing so.

The next point is Eastern policy. For sure it is a task of the European Union, but it is also a task of the member states. And I am happy, obviously

Sweden is taking over again, because others are not able to do it. Previously it was Poland, Poland starting from '15 is lost, the linkage, lost its Eastern policy. I just attended a meeting with Polish Undersecretary of State Bartosz Cichocki in Berlin; he is trying to develop Eastern policy again, he is in charge of it, but Poland has lost its drivers. Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz published a paper on this. It's a decline of Polish Eastern policy. The same in Germany. They are not allocating public speech. It is no more Eastern policy in this case. After the conflict in Crimea, it doesn't develop further. Maybe Sweden can do it, but so far, I do not see very many new ideas. Maybe after Sweden, after new member states are also prone as, you have mentioned the problem in the Netherlands the referendum has been mentioned, because the majority, due to domestic, problems are against it. But it's an issue for EU member states, in particular in the given situation.

The fourth point is history. You mentioned it, history in general terms and in Armenia in particular, the genocide issue. Fortunately, most EU member states and Germany included have recognized the genocide. And that helps because history has trends. You cannot develop the future even much better, but on the other side it is not easy. If you are getting the recognition of the history in Armenia, you are making Turkey angry. And Turkish relations with the EU and EU member states are not doing well. I also disagree with this; I also disagree with Polish, Germans that say no. I can give plenty of examples of this in both cases. The same is with Turkey. With the Erdogan government, there are many concerns. You have to find a balance. So, on your future agenda it is coming to the conclusion that coming to terms with history will make Turkey unhappy. And finding a new balance between the relations of Russia and the European Union. That was always a challenge. It was a challenge during the EU Eastern Partnership Summits in Prague (2009), Warsaw (2011), and Vilnius (2013) and in Riga (2015) and we must look for the outcome in Brussels, but we must deliver an issue. But Russia is not doing fine, it is going in a different direction, but it is a challenge and Armenia is doing well, there are brilliant people in Armenia, brilliant experts. So, for the better path for the future take a breath, attack some of the challenges, and my idea would be to develop the relationship further and have a discourse about it.

SESSION 3.

DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN AND IRAN

REVIEW ON ANNA GEVORGYAN'S PAPER "NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN"¹¹

*Hamidreza Azizi,
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Hello everyone! First of all, I would like to thank the organizers of this conference, which I found very interesting. It is my first time here in Yerevan and apart from being at this conference, being in this city and having a chance to once again meet Ambassador David Hovhannisyan, who I first met last year in Sweden, is a great pleasure for me.

About the paper on Iran's National Security, written by Anna Gevorgyan, I am not about to go into the very details that the work has. It's because the details actually were not discussed here, so I just want to share my general viewpoint towards the work, and I will try to summarize it in some general points.

First of all, it is said in the text and it was also presented here that Iran does not have a special document on its national security; yes it is true. But the main point is that we should explore the reasons behind this lack of a document. I believe that this is more than anything related to the changing nature of the threats Iran has been facing with in its periphery. For example, if we look back to the first years after the Islamic Revolution, we can see that at the time, Iran was facing with two sets of threats, from both the internal and external levels. At the domestic level, we had some separatist movements, which were trying to build upon the vacuum of power after the Islamic Revolution and to pursue their own goals. At the same time, and at

¹¹ The text is the transcription of the speech given at the conference.

the international and regional levels we experienced some pessimism towards the new political system in the making in the country. So, these were the basic levels, which were actually defining Iran's approach towards its national security. After that, we had 8 years of Iran-Iraq war which shifted Iran's attention towards its periphery and towards the Arab Middle East; because it was facing with Iraq as an enemy and with some of the Arab countries that supported Saddam Hussein. After that and for a very long period we had a controversy over the nuclear program which lasted till 2015. Again it was also related to both regional and international levels, if we want to define the level of the threats against Iran.

Thus, we could say that the threats and the level of threats and the level at which Iran could define its national interests and national security have been changing during this whole period. So, this was the main reason behind the lack of a certain document, but this does not mean that we do not have general viewpoints and general approaches towards our National Security as well as foreign policy.

I want to say that there are two general viewpoints, based on which we can approach the issue when we want to discuss the national security of our country without clear documents. First, we could approach the issue with a constructivist approach, which, I believe is the case for what Anna has done in her work. Her references are mostly to the ideological aspects of the Islamic Republic and to the viewpoints of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, etc. But I believe that to better understand Iran's views towards its national security as well as its general approaches and its foreign policy we should take a look at its national interests as well as the main threats against it; because the main problem in adopting the constructivist approach in defining Iran's national security is that you could face with controversies and controversial dimensions. I could raise a related example about the Karabakh issue and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. When I was in Baku I had a discussion with my Azeri colleagues. Some of them were saying that why Iran has better relations with Armenia, while Azerbaijan is an Islamic Shiite country? My answer was that it's because of Iran's definition of its national interests; because for a long period after the

collapse of the Soviet Union Azerbaijan diverted its focus towards the West and also established close relations with Israel, which is the main threat against Iran. So, Azerbaijan actually became an important part of Israel's encirclement policy against Iran. And it is obvious that Iran could not initiate a very close relationship with Azerbaijan in such a situation. It was just an example; but you can also see this in the other issues related to Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy.

Because of the lack of time, I just want to refer to some other points related to Iran's bilateral relations. First of all, about Iran-Russia relations; it's true that Iran enjoys very close relationship with Russia and this relationship has been developing during the recent years. But a very delicate issue we should remind is that the relationship is still far from being an alliance or even a strategic partnership. This is because of not only some specific ideological aspects or something, but it is actually related to the very specific issues about the areas of their cooperation. For example, even in Syria the two countries have some points of differences of opinion in such issues as the fate of Assad and federalism in Syria and some other points. Although we have had a very positive cooperation and a very positive partnership with Russia in some issues, it is still very soon to speak about a strategic partnership.

The other point is about Iran's view towards the Karabakh issue, as I think it's more relevant to this conference. Actually, from the early years after the break of the Soviet Union Iran has always tried to mediate in the conflicts in its neighboring regions, as it did so in Tajikistan civil war and tried to do regarding the Karabakh issue in the early years of the conflict. A very important point to consider in this regard is that due to Russia's sensitivities towards its periphery and its so-called "near abroad", Iran has always been somehow cautious not to provoke Russia's sensitivity in this regard. So Iran is willing and ready to play a constructive role in this issue, as far as it does not put into stress its relations with Russia.

My final point is about Iran-Azerbaijan relations. The text speaks a lot about Iran's influence within the Shia population of Azerbaijan. It is true that there are similarities between the viewpoints of the two countries

towards Islam, as the majority of the population of both countries are Shias. But again, there's a very delicate point. This talk of Iran's influence in Azerbaijan has so far promoted mostly by the Western media and some Western politicians and they interpret it as a potential threat; because they claim that by this Shia instrument, Iran wants to develop its influence in its neighboring regions, so not only the West but also the Russians should be worried about it and the governments of the region should be worried about it as well. However, we should remind that Azerbaijan's view towards Shia Islam has been widely influenced by the Soviet experience, so it's actually different from what we know as Shia Islam in Iran or some of the other countries. Therefore, we should be more cautious when discussing about Iran's influence in the Shia population in its neighboring countries and especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Thank you very much for your attention.

REVIEW ON SATENIK MKRTCHYAN'S PAPER "NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS OF GEORGIA (2005 AND 2011): REGIONAL, SUB-REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL SETTINGS"¹²

*Giorgi Gvalia
Ilia State University, Georgia*

Thank you. I know that I have 10 minutes. So, I will try to present the overview of Satenik's paper briefly. First of all, I would like to thank Satenik for brilliant work because I think that this is the first attempt to have a comparative analysis of Georgia's two National Security Concepts. In the first part of my speech I will briefly deal with the importance of the National Security concept as a document. Then I will demonstrate what are the similarities and differences between these two documents and as a final part of my speech, I will provide some personal observations.

National Security Concept is definitely the most important document when it comes to understanding states' national values and interests and threats and challenges to these interests and values per se. It acts as a set of general guidelines or broad roadmap that helps decision-makers to orient in the complex and globalized world. This document has clear communicative function as well; it informs public and wider international community on government's official thinking on national security priorities. At the same time, this document serves as the foundation for other conceptual and strategic policy documents of the country such as National Threat Assessment Document, Strategic Defense Review, Foreign Policy Strategy, National Military Strategy and many other documents that deal with different aspects of national security. Georgia had produced two National Security Concepts. The first one that was released in 2005, before 2008 Russia-Georgia August War and the second one that was adopted after the war, in 2011. These documents give us the possibility to conduct comparative analysis of how official thinking on National Security has

¹² The text is the transcription of the speech given at the conference.

developed over time in Georgia. Accordingly, author's decision to focus on the abovementioned documents as the source for understanding Georgia's national security views and foreign policy priorities is well-grounded and represents methodologically solid approach.

In her paper, Satenik Mkrtchyan highlights the major aspects of documents in comparative perspective. According to the author, both documents view Euro Atlantic and European integration of the country as the major policy priorities of Georgia. Both documents highlight that Georgia's *natural place* is among democratic and developed European nations and the membership of NATO and EU are seen as the major instruments for bringing Georgia back into its European family. Author rightly observes that in the document of 2005 Georgia's identity as the Black Sea nation is accentuated while the document of 2011 places emphasis on Georgia's Caucasian role as well. According to the author, 2011 National Security Concept is heavily concentrated on the role of Russia in Georgia's national security. As Satenik Mkrtchyan notes, while in the previous version of the National Security Concept, the issue of Russia was stressed in context of normalizing relations, the new document presents Russia as the major threat to sovereignty, territorial integrity and statehood of Georgia. This alteration in approaches towards Russia is natural as far as the new document reflects the changes in Georgia's security environment after Russia-Georgia war of 2008 and its subsequent occupation and international recognition of Abkhazia and Samachablo regions. 2011 National Security Concept goes even further and argues that 2008 Russia-Georgia War has resulted in worsening security environment of the whole Caucasus region generally. Besides, the role of Russia, both documents deal with the issues of regional and international cooperation with neighboring states and other regional and global actors, including, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ukraine, Iran, Central Asian States, US and others. As the author observes, both documents deal with the role of Georgia as a transit state and its importance for the wider world in terms of energy security and transportation of energy resources. To conclude, author provides detailed analysis and comparison of two documents by clearly

demonstrating the points where both documents take similar or different approaches.

If one attempts to critically analyze Georgia's National Security Concepts of 2005 and 2011 it is obvious that these documents have more similarities than differences. On the level of country's general security and foreign policy priorities both documents state that major priorities of country's security and foreign policy are integration into western political and military institutions: NATO and EU. Despite the fact that Georgia's security environment has definitely worsened since the Russian invasion and occupation of Georgia in 2008, Georgia's top foreign policy priorities remain intact.

As it was argued in the introductory part of the paper, one of the major functions of the National Security Concept is to provide guidelines for policy-makers in security affairs. Usually, such documents are based on the evaluation of the security environment (threats and opportunities) of the state. Most of the Security Studies scholars will argue that change or continuity in the security environment is the major defining of states security policies and priorities. If we analyze the case of Georgia in light of this approach, then Georgia represents an exception to the rule. Despite the fact that country's security environment has changed, the official thinking on major aspects of national security remained the same.

Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008 and then in Ukraine had signaled that when it comes to the Post-Soviet space Russia is more assertive power than the West. While United States, the NATO and EU are seen as Georgia's major allies and partners the Russia-Georgia War has demonstrated that none of them are ready to use hard power means to protect their interests in the region. The changes that resulted in Georgia's security environment since the Russia-Georgia War were adequately understood by the elites as well. While the term "misperception" is one of the major concepts in international relations theory when it comes to the cases when decision-makers have distorted understanding of objective security challenges facing their country, Georgia was not the case of elites "misperceiving" objective reality after the August War. 2011 security

concept demonstrates that political elites had fair understanding of changes in security environment after the Russia-Georgia War. A paragraph from 2011 National Security Concept clearly demonstrates this:

“International and regional developments of the last few years have significantly changed the security environment of Georgia... Moreover, the military aggression by the Russian Federation worsened the security environment in the Caucasus region as a whole.

So, what one observes in case of Georgia, we have the objective worsening of the security environment of the country, but we see no change in country’s national security and foreign policy priorities. Georgia sees integration into NATO, integration into EU as the only policy options even in light of risks and dangers that these policy options can bring for the country. Finding answers to this puzzle requires further research and exceeds the format of this particular paper.

As for the difference between the two documents, the major difference that should be emphasized is the heightened focus on the significance of the Caucasus in 2011 National Security Concept. While 2005 version of the document mentions Caucasus only twice (and makes it in the context of the North Caucasus only), in 2011 version Caucasus is mentioned 20 times and even whole section is appearing in it dealing with cooperation in the South Caucasus.

This difference between two documents in regards of role of the Caucasus for Georgia can be analyzed in light of Russia’s increased role in the region and Georgia’s desire to form united Caucasian counterbalance to Russia’s power and dominance in the region. Georgia’s discursive turn towards South Caucasus in realm of security is all the more surprising since otherwise Georgia has been trying to “leave” the region and rebrand itself as the Black Sea/East European country with European perspective alongside Moldova and Ukraine.

Besides the abovementioned similarities and differences, the 2011 version of the concept brings the wider understanding of security by emphasizing economic, social, energy, environmental, cyber, demographic challenges alongside more traditional political and military ones.

Conclusion

Satenik Mkrtchyan's comparative analysis of Georgia's National Security Concepts provides well-grounded approach towards understanding official stance on national security of the country. By demonstrating similarities and differences between the documents, the paper analyzed retrospective developments in Georgia's official thinking on the issues of national importance.

As a conclusion, it should be mentioned, that the 2011 version of the document, that largely represents the continuation of the pathos of the 2005 Concept, was adopted during the previous administration of the country. Despite the fact that current administration of Georgian Dream claims to have basically same foreign and security policy priorities as the previous administration (especially with regard to country's foreign policy orientation), still there are some important changes (e.g. observers of Georgia's foreign policy will agree that current administration puts more emphasis on cooperation with EU rather than NATO. Though, NATO still remains the only desirable political-military alliance that Georgia would like to join). It has also been trying to improve relations with Russia and pursue a low-profile foreign and security policy. Whether the existing government plans to modify or renew the National Security Concept of Georgia is still to be seen.

SESSION 4.

SECURITY SYSTEMS AND COMPETITION: REGIONAL POLITICS

THE TRANSCRIBED SPEECH OF *FERIDE INAN* AT THE CONFERENCE, SESSION 4

*Feride Inan,
Economic Policy Research Foundation
of Turkey (TEPAV)*

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to begin my talk by thanking the organizers of this event for having me here, and for organizing this very fruitful discussion.

Today, I would like to talk about a project we have done as part of the EU funded “Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process” (ATNP) program, Round 2. Our research is related to the political economy of the region, the topic of this panel.

Let me first briefly to talk about the first round of ATNP where we looked at sectoral opportunities for economic cooperation between Armenia and Turkey. We chose the IT and tourism sectors that we had identified as promising areas for cooperation in a previous TEPAV study on product and sectoral complementarities between Armenia and Turkey, especially eastern Turkey.

In the IT sector we observed that both countries are emerging suppliers of IT services, we focused on raising awareness of this fact in both countries. The report for the IT sector cooperation was written in parallel with the entrepreneurship program of the ATNP Round 1 that TEPAV carried out with our Armenian partner, the Public Journalism Club. This program included an Exchange of Entrepreneurs Start-up Weekend event which helped to shift of perceptions of Turkish and Armenian industry specialists and entrepreneurs.

The second project in the first round of the ATNP looked at the creation of tourism clusters in eastern Turkey, emphasizing cooperation between Armenia and northeastern parts of Turkey.

After the first round of the ATNP project, where we looked at specific areas of IT and tourism, we took a step back to take stock on the changing dynamics of the larger region, including increasing presence of China, as well as factors such as sanctions being lifted from Iran. We aimed to see how these dynamics influence actors in a larger Eurasian region - in the South Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia. From this study, we can move to better understand, new areas for economic cooperation between Armenia and Turkey, as well as cooperation patterns of multiple actors in the region.

The focus of our study was economic corridor development on the Eurasian landmass focusing on connections through the South Caucasus. Early in the 90's, the EU initiated the TRACECA program with an aim to develop transport corridors from Europe crossing the Black Sea to the Caucasus over the Caspian into Central Asia and to China. More recently, corresponding to this EU initiative, are trans-Caspian corridor initiatives led by regional actors, including Turkey's Middle Corridor initiative, which have the potential of being integrated into China's One Belt One Road initiative, further reinforcing objectives of the One Belt One Road initiative. In this respect, Turkey and China signed a memorandum of understanding in 2015 during the G-20 summit in Turkey on aligning the OBOR Initiative with Turkey's Middle Corridor initiative.

The Middle Corridor initiative includes countries in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South Caucasus. Although Armenia is so far not included in this initiative, it can benefit from spillovers of the regional development and trade in the South Caucasus. First, Armenia is one of the official One Belt One Road countries and it can benefit from Chinese foreign direct investment incumbent on the One Belt One Road initiative. Furthermore, it is to Armenia's advantage to have trade corridors concentrated in the Middle Corridor, where as it may be difficult for Armenia to access the northern

and southern alternatives that are being discussed in parallel. For instance, a future opening of Armenia's borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan would enable a more cost-effective alternative to the current and longer route over Georgia. There is already an old Soviet railway that passes from Turkey to Armenia and from Azerbaijan to Armenia – both have been closed for more than two decades because of the frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

There are different possibilities for economic corridor development emerging on the land route between Europe and China. So far, the northern routes have gained traction for the conduct of China-EU trade. There is a market to expand beyond these options as we observe through the large and increasing volumes of EU-China trade. Yet another alternative to northern routes is China's Central Asia-Eurasia corridor, which passes through Central Asia to Iran and Turkey and then to EU.

I want to briefly talk about the benefits of Eurasian corridors from a Chinese perspective. Here I want to underline that China is not simply interested in corridors from a transportation perspective, but is also keen on making investments along Eurasian corridors. The benefits from a Chinese perspective are as follows:

1. Faster transportation of Chinese goods to the EU, especially as China upgrades its products to high tech products, as well as given its rapidly growing e-commerce market;
2. Eurasian corridors reduce China's risk of maritime interdiction stemming from American dominance in key spots in the seas surrounding China;
3. China wants to facilitate economic development in its poor inland western regions, most notably in Xinjiang, which border Central Asian states, as well as Pakistan and Russia;
4. By unlocking investment potential along the Eurasian corridors and by creating new industrial bases, China can address its overcapacity problem.

According to one perspective (Bruno Macaes), China is attempting to reconfigure existing value chains by opening new industrial sites in One Belt One Road countries. Macaes argues that while existing value chains are dominated by multinational companies, in the context of the One Belt One Road it is projected to shift the control to the political level, to national governments and the agreements they enter with the Chinese government.

To sum up, China's concern with the One Belt One Road goes beyond exploiting transportation possibilities and lies in opening of spaces for industrial investments.

I also want to say a few words about Iran, another emerging actor in the region. Iran's economic role in the Eurasian continent was limited. However, following the lifting of sanctions, the country is likely to regain its strategic role in the region participating in both north-south and east-west trade connections. For instance, the first Silk Road train carrying cargo from Yiwu in China to Tehran was launched in 2016 suggesting a new chapter of cooperation between Iran and China in the post-sanctions era. The Iranians also pushed for the north-south railway option over Armenia to Georgia. However, Azerbaijan is also putting in substantial resources to redirect the north-south corridor in its own direction. The future of Iran's proposed link with Armenia is ambiguous as Iran has sped up work on Rasht-Astara line, linking the railway networks of Iran and Russia through Azerbaijan. Baku has made Iran a \$500 million loan for the completion of this railway. This line will enable Russian goods to reach the Persian Gulf and perhaps more importantly it will facilitate trade between Russia and India via the Indian Ocean from ports in India to Iran and to the north. I want to emphasize that India is also an important actor in the development of north-south trade. In fact, the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) initiative involving Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, can be seen as part of an Indian plan crossing the continent in parallel to China's initiatives.

Another big actor with stakes in the region is the EU. The EU is developing its economic presence in Central Asia. It has presence especially in Kazakhstan. In the South Caucasus, Georgia has the EU

Association Agreement. Azerbaijan, which is closely linked to the EU through its energy exports, is in talks with the EU for signing an Association Agreement. Armenia will most likely sign the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU. Turkey, an EU accession country, has been in a Customs Union with the EU since 1995.

On the other hand, Russia remains a very influential economic actor following the Soviet presence both in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus. Even when we look at Georgia, with which it does not have good relations, we see that Russia is one of Georgia's top trade partners.

From the perspective of countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle Corridor is an opportunity to develop their industrial bases. For our project we made field trips to Armenia and Turkey, the main foci of our research, as well as to Kazakhstan, to Georgia and Azerbaijan to observe emerging dynamics. I want to conclude with few insights from our fieldwork.

In Turkey, we observed that the country is intensifying its trans-regional involvement to the east, most importantly looking at trade and investment partners, as well as to ensure energy security. Turkey is building a regional network of relationships not only with its neighbors in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, but also further to the east with Central Asian countries and with China. Domestically, Turkey is focusing on transport infrastructure projects towards the realization of the Middle Corridor.

Armenia is attempting to diversify its economic partners looking to sign the comprehensive agreement with the EU before the end of 2017. Previously, Armenia's EU Association Agreement did not come through; this one seems likely to be signed. At the same time, Armenia is looking to enhance its links through the north-south corridor involving Iran and Georgia, albeit with limited success. As I mentioned before, the southern railway option connecting the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea via Armenia seems to be put on hold. There is another north-south highway project, which is moving slowly. Last but not the least, Armenian policy makers

and managers of free economic zones interviewed for our project, showed a lot of enthusiasm to attract Chinese investments to the country.

Georgia, together with being a loyal western ally and having signed the Association Agreement with the EU, is looking to China as a key trade partner and an investor. The Association Agreement puts Georgia in a key position to become a transit hub for Eurasian trade with the EU, as well as a key destination for FDI. In relation to Georgia's position as a transit hub, its maritime connections on the Black Sea are gaining traction. Georgian policy makers are very keen on developing a new port, Anaklia on the Black Sea in addition to Georgia's Poti Port. With Anaklia, which harbors a special economic zone and industrial clusters, Georgia aspires to become a maritime hub for the region also competing with Turkish ports. Furthermore, Chinese presence in Georgia makes Georgia very unique in the South Caucasus, as the only country to sign a free trade agreement with China. This agreement will be effective by the end of 2017. For China, Georgia is its window to the Black Sea. At the same time, through Georgia, Chinese investors may hope to link with the EU. Lastly, Georgian policy makers express interest in establishing links with Iran on the north-south route from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea over Armenia. However, as I pointed out, this connection appears to be diverted to Azerbaijan and away from Armenia and Georgia.

In Kazakhstan, we see an effort to diversify transport routes. Kazakhstan has made substantial investments to modernize its transport network in several directions. Kazakhstan sees emerging opportunities to institute itself as a key transit country especially under China's ambitious One Belt One Road initiative - Kazakhstan has the longest border with China. So far, the northern transport options for China-EU trade that cross Kazakhstan, include the Western European-Western China Highway, as well as the New Eurasian land bridge, a major rail transport route. However, Kazakhstan is not overlooking the Caspian option. An important part of Kazakhstan's infrastructure state program, "Nurly Zhol", is the modernization of the Aktau Port on the Caspian shore of Kazakhstan. Moreover, with its own funds, the Kazakh government constructed a

second port on the Caspian Sea, Kuryk. Speaking of the development of external networks, Kazakh policy makers emphasize the presence of Iran to give Kazakhstan access to the Persian Gulf.

Lastly, Azerbaijan, which has its economy largely dependent on oil exports to the EU, has traditionally pushed for the Trans-Caspian connection to increase trade between Central Asia and the EU over the Caucasus, positioning itself as an east –west hub. After sanctions being lifted from Iran, it has taken an active role in the development of north-south corridor led by India involving Iran and Russia.

I would like to end my talk with a bird's eye view. Of our three actors in the context of the EU ATNP Round 2 project (Armenia, Turkey, and the EU); both Turkey and Armenia are trying to be included in trade and investment zones that are underway in the South Caucasus into Europe linking to China in the east. The EU, on the other hand, is focusing on cultivating relations in the South Caucasus to connect to Central Asia and to China and is hoping to bypass its present reliance on Russia.

Thank you very much.

**THE TRANSCRIBED SPEECH OF VALI KOUZEGAR KALEJI
AT THE CONFERENCE, SESSION 4**

*Vali Kouzegar Kaleji,
Center for Strategic Research, Iran*

I would like to thank all my colleagues and friends in Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) for organizing this interesting meeting dedicated to security dynamics in the region. I hope that our conversations can led to better understanding from our mutual relations and current complicated situation in the region. As you know very well, we are now in a crucial, sensitive and historical situation and the Middle East current situation is comparable with European countries after First World War that political and geographical borders changed. The Middle Eastern regional system is in a permanent state of flux. As a region given to domestic unrest, intra- regional conflict, and superpower competition, it has never been marked by stability, peace and security. In recent years, we had seen security interactions between the Middle East and Caucasus in context of Iraq and Syria crisis.

Both regions can define as “Security Complex” using Barry Buzan's conceptualization. In this conceptual framework, the Middle East and Caucasus involve a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. Iran is one of important members of these aforementioned security complexes. Iran has a special and different role and place in the South Caucasus and among the three neighbors of South Caucasus, including Russia, Turkey and Iran; the latter (Iran) only has relations with all the Caucasian states. Turkish-Armenian and Russian-Georgian relations suspended in 1992 and 2008 respectively. With many ups and downs, Iran has maintained its relations with Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is considered as one of valuable and worthy capacity of Iran's foreign policy in the South Caucasus that regional and the international players including EU and

United States should pay attention to this unique role and place. According to aforementioned points, in my presentation, I would like to three important issues: first, Fundamentalism and Terrorism, second, Separatism and Ethnic Conflicts, and third, Multilateral Mechanisms in Regional Cooperation.

1. Fundamentalism and Terrorism

As a matter of fact, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Caucasus Province (Wilayah al-Qawqaz) is a serious threat for peace and stability of the region. Experts believe that some 8,000 men are from the Russian Caucasus (North Caucasus) in Iraq and Syria. Some 2,000 men are from Azerbaijan and Georgia. So, we have a total of 10,000 Caucasians fighting in the Middle East. Recently, ISIL has suffered serious defeats of late and they have lost Mosul and Aleppo in Iraq and Syria. It looks like the end of the “Caliphate” is near. So, the question is what the thousands of ISIL fighters from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia will do once that end comes?

It seems that most of those who have fled Syria and Iraq may go to Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. It is not a big wave but this is a matter of time. Therefore, return of ISIL Caucasian members to the region is a potential threat for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia as well as Iran, Turkey and Russia as neighbors of the South Caucasus. Terrorist and fundamentalist groups would be a serious threat for economic infrastructures especially transit networks and energy pipelines and facilities. Indeed, they can transform current "ethnic- territorial conflicts" in the region such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh to "Religious Conflicts" (Islam and Christian) that can led to more complexity of frozen conflict in the South Caucasus. Therefore, Iran, Turkey and Russia in collaboration with Caucasian countries can define a common framework against threat of terrorism and fundamentalism in the South Caucasus and enhance their security and intelligence cooperation in this field.

2. Separatism and Ethnic Conflicts

The overall tenets of Iran's foreign policy towards the Caucasian states are to respect their independence and sovereignty, maintain their

territorial integrity, peace, stability and security, preserve the current territorial borders without their consents, expand regional cooperation and oppose negative intervention of foreign Powers, to the detriment of regional order, stability and security. With respect to these principles, in the past two and half decades, Iran attempted to adopt a balanced approach to the South Caucasian states. In that regard, since early 1990s, Iran has actively mediated in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and never recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

You can see this position friendly about Iraqi Kurdistan referendum recently. Iran's position about separatism and conflicts is very clear. About Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, in my view, we consider some points and considerations. First, from historical background of bad behavior of the Iraqi government especially during Saddam Hussein has effected on mentality of Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan. Second issue is personal motivations and goals of Masoud Barzani. You know that Barzani and Talabani are two Kurdish famous families that have struggled for Iraqi Kurdistan independence in recent century. Therefore, in current situation of the region and Iraq, Masoud Barzani thinks that this is the best time and opportunity for independence of Kurdistan. Although Kurdistan independence is not really operational at this time and I believe that Masoud Barzani knows this point very well, but he tries to record independence of Kurdistan in the history by the name of Barzani family. Third issue is provoke of external players especially Israel in the dynamic of separatism in Iraqi Kurdistan that rebuilt the vacuum of geopolitics in the region. Generally, according to current complicated crises in the region and opposite position of Iran, Iraq, Russia, United States, Union European and other countries, I hope personally that these crises can solve peacefully and our region will not witness a new war.

3. Multilateral Mechanisms in Regional Cooperation

For enhancing regional cooperation, we need a comprehensive and realistic strategy. There are several regional organizations such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation

Organization (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and so on. But unfortunately Iran, Georgia, Russia and Armenia are not member of these regional organizations at the same time. For example, Iran and Armenia have close relations but we are not in any regional organization.

Therefore, I think that establishment of three- or four-lateral mechanisms with definite agendas, can remove a great share of the efficiencies within the regional organizations and overcome the limitations of two-lateral diplomacy. At present, a number of multilateral mechanisms have been established between Iran and its surrounding countries including Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Iran-Afghanistan-India, Azerbaijan and Iran, Azerbaijan and Iran-Russia-Azerbaijan. For complement of this process and creating of balance of power in the region, we need to other trilateral mechanisms between Iran-Armenia-Russia as well as Iran-Armenia-Georgia in the South Caucasus. As you know, Armenia is the only Caucasian country which is member of Eurasian Economic Union and can play a significant role in connection of Iran and the Union in framework of multilateral mechanisms.

Generally, it is crucial to discuss these subjects and their instances at expert level within the framework of a Joint Working Group by academicians and scholars of research and study centers (think tanks) in member states in order to reach a comprehensive approaches and then, proposals offered by foreign ministries and economic, judicial, security and defense representatives are put together to reach a final conclusion and after adoption by the officials.

At the end, I thank you Ladies and Gentlemen for your patience and I hope we all could witness more tranquility, peace, security, and stability throughout the region.

**THE TRANSCRIBED SPEECH OF PAATA ZAKAREISHVILI
AT THE CONFERENCE, SESSION 4**

*Paata Zakareishvili,
Grigol Robakidze University, Georgia*

Спасибо, я буду говорить на русском. Я благодарю организаторов за приглашение на конференцию. Очень важны такие конференции. Так как ситуация на Кавказе меняется калейдоскопически быстро, все мы очень хорошо понимаем, насколько необходимо в регулярном режиме обсуждать где мы находимся в данный момент. Я с интересом слушал выступления наших иранских коллег, поскольку они в новом и ином ракурсе показывают потенциал Кавказа.

Мы все время говорим о Южном Кавказе как о регионе. Посмотрев на карту точно можно определить контуры региона. Но, когда в узком кругу наших южнокавказских экспертов собираемся, то приходится признаваться, что о регионе, по существу мало что можно сказать. Однозначно - это географический регион. Можно говорить о культурном регионе, потому что есть многовековые культурные взаимоотношения и взаимопроникновения. Но говорить о регионе в политическом или правовом контексте практически невозможно. Это почти что нонсенс. У Южного Кавказа есть уникальные возможности продвигаться вперед, но, к сожалению, на нашем веку трудно представить, что регион может состояться как серьезный геополитический фактор, который может диктовать свои условия другим акторам, имеющим интересы на Южном Кавказе.

Это очень печально. Южнокавказским государствам приходится действовать почти, что независимо друг от друга, а иногда и вопреки друг другу. Геополитический контекст на Южном Кавказе можно сравнить с капустой, подобно лепесткам, которые друг друга перекрывают, есть три государства и сверху перекрывают три

влиятельные державы, которые имеют обоснованные интересы в регионе: это Россия, Турция, и Иран. И в сердцевине этой капусты тлеют три конфликта, которые могут вспламениться в любой момент: это абхазский, югоосетинский и карабахский конфликты. В добавок к этому, в регионе присутствуют международные организации - ООН, ОБСЕ и Европейский Союз. Не сложно догадаться, что подобная международная вовлеченность не от хорошей жизни, и они больше как пожарная команда присутствует в беспокойном регионе. Первый образ, который всплывает при упоминании Южного Кавказа это - конфликты. Три государства и множество конфликтов: Внутри Грузии два конфликта; карабахский конфликт; грузино-российский межгосударственный конфликт; не решенный до конца сложные отношения Турции с Арменией. Еще невозможно восстановление дипломатических отношений между Турцией и Арменией, но уже разрушены дипломатические отношения между Грузии и Россией. Регион, как вулкан постоянно из себя извергает только проблемы и только конфликты.

Второй образ региона это - энергетические ресурсы. Об этом факторе здесь довольно много и компетентно говорилось. Я ограничусь характеристикой ситуации в Грузии.

25 лет прошел после начало боевых действий, как в Южной Осетии, так и в Абхазии, но не одна из сторон в конфликте, за это время, не смогли добиться тех целей, которых рассчитывали достичь через вооруженный конфликт. Если вспомнить, что произошло в Европе за 25 лет после второй мировой войны, то увидим, что за это время были заложены основы Европейского Союза. Там, те поколения, которые воевали между собой, поняли, что надо менять ситуацию. Пока жива поколение, которое участвовал в той ужасной войне, надо было успеть исправить основы существования Европы. У нас, как на Кавказе, так и в Грузии, значительно меньшие масштабы разрухи и перед нами, как наглядное пособие - уникальный опыт европейцев. Но мы никак не можем сдвинуться с мертвой точки. Даже наоборот, если куда-то сдвинулись, то в сторону сохранения конфронтации. В Грузинских

конфликтах присутствуют, по крайней мере, три стороны, которые заинтересованы в разрешении конфликта через свои интересы: это Россия, Грузия и соответственно Абхазия и Южная Осетия. Ни одна из них не добилась своих целей. Россия не смогла добиться того, чтобы Грузия отказалась от западных ценностей и развернулась в сторону России. Несмотря на временные территориальные потери, Грузия с еще большей настойчивостью стремится в сторону западной демократии. Работает эффект вишневого косточка - чем сильнее ее нажимаешь, тем дальше косточка летит. Россия полностью теряет Грузию.

Чего добились Абхазия и Южная Осетия? Они хотели независимость, а получили больше зависимости... от России. Так называемые договоры, которые, за последний период были подписанный между Сухуми и Москвой, между Цхинвали и Москвой, четко показывают насколько превалируют интересы России - аннексировать эти территории и прибрать к рукам все управляющие органы этих политических образований. Однозначно видно, что от их независимости одни "рога и копыта" остаются. В Абхазии должно быть осознание того, что после Крыма наступит их черед. А Грузия чего добилась? Она тоже не смогла добиться своей территориальной целостности. До сих пор это проблема не решена.

Какие перспективы сейчас у этих сторон? Россия, скорее всего, еще долго не изменится. Там ситуация, как минимум на 7-10 лет будет сохранен в нынешнем положении. У Абхазии и Южной Осетии, если и были какие-то перспективы независимости, то они полностью улетучились и они стали еще более туманными. Их будущее больше связано с Россией, чем с независимостью. Международное сообщество не проявляет никаких желаний признать их независимость. 25 лет прошел, и они полностью формировались обществами, которые никак не могут свой собственный путь определить и следовать ему. За 25 лет, по крайней мере, абхазы, которые находятся на побережье Черного моря, могли бы по примеру Аджарии достичь определенного развития если не процветания.

А вот у Грузии, все-таки, есть определенные перспективы достичь значительных результатов на пути сближения с НАТО и с ЕС. Очень медленно, но этот прогресс налицо. Я не согласен с некоторыми экспертами, которые предполагают, что грузинские власти больше делают упор на Европейский Союз и оставляют в тень НАТО. Это не так. Это как шахматная игра - какая фигура имеет больше перспектив, та фигура и движется. Да, сегодня у нас есть достижения, в процессе сближения с ЕС. Это договор ассоциированного членства и безвизовый режим со странами Шенгенского договора. Это довольно серьезные шаги в сторону запада. Но никто не отказывается от НАТО. Наоборот, я даже считаю, что НАТО ближе. НАТО наш непосредственный сосед в отличии от ЕС. Другое дело насколько НАТО и Европейский Союз готовы сегодня и в ближайшие 5-10 лет серьезно рассматривать Грузию как потенциального члена. Лично для меня, как гражданина Грузии, не так важен окончательный результат, как процесс. Демократизация Грузии наиболее важна для меня и соответствие тем стандартам, которые предлагают и требуют от нас НАТО и Европейский Союз. Соответственно, в этом направлении у нас много чего еще недоработано.

Так как, южнокавказские государства находятся под воздействием перекрестной гравитации трех региональных игроков, то каждая из них мог бы переосмыслить безрезультативную политику по отношению к своим оппонентам. На пример, Россия могла бы пересмотреть контрпродуктивную политику по отношению к Грузии. Сегодня Президент России Владимир Путин с официальным визитом находится в Турции. Это хороший знак. Добрые отношения между Россией и Турцией только на благо региону. Турция - влиятельный и сильный игрок в регионе, который фактически охватывает все важные регионы Северной Африки, Средиземноморья, Черного моря, Кавказа и Ближнего Востока - довольно корректно и достойно ведет себя по отношению к Грузии. Грузию усиливает такая поддержка. Думаю, Россия только выиграла бы, если она построила свои отношения с Грузии также, как она выстраивает их с Турцией. Турция является членом НАТО, несмотря на это она является достойным партнером России. Так как, маршрут Грузии

необратимо выстроен по направлению к НАТО, то России было бы лучше считаться с этим фактором и соответственно прилагать усилия иметь в НАТО надежного партнера в лице Грузии, чем враждебно настроенное государство, который граничит со стороны беспокойного Северного Кавказа.

Если вернуться к началу моего выступления, то у государств и народов Южного Кавказа впервые за всю свою историю складываются условия, когда сами эти государства могут принимать решения исходя из собственных и региональных интересов. Для этого следует смотреть вперед, а не назад, и вооружиться теми ценностями, которые управляют такими объединениями как ЕС. Наши государства хорошо преуспели в наших национализмах. Мы успешно защищаем наши этнические и религиозные идентичности. Все мы древние народы. У всех у нас великие языки, глубокие истории и устойчивые религиозные институты. Но у нас почти нет никакого опыта строительства современного государства, основанное на гражданских ценностях и на демократических институтах. Я думаю, если грузинское, азербайджанское и армянское общества, плюс общества, в Нагорном Карабахе, в Абхазии и в Южной Осетии, как-то начнут продвигаться в этом направлении, то здесь можно выстроит определенные перспективы. Не обязательно, чтобы все направлялись в сторону НАТО или Европейского союза, но надо вооружаться теми ценностями и институтами, которые привели к устойчивому и поступательному развитию европейских стран. В противном случае мы надолго останемся в той яме, в котором попали 25 лет назад.

И последнее, повестка конференции настроил нас на вопросы безопасности. Она очень важна, но государства стоят на двух ногах, на двух несущих стенах - это безопасность и развитие. Я, как в недавнем прошлом политик, могу подтвердить, что властям очень легко манипулировать понятиями безопасности, но зато практически невозможно манипулировать понятиями развития. Результаты развития всем заметно. Поэтому, вместе безопасности следует обсуждать и возможности развития. Спасибо.

SESSION 5.

SECURITY SYSTEMS AND COMPETITION: GLOBAL POLITICS

**THE TRANSCRIBED SPEECH OF DANIEL FRIED AT THE
CONFERENCE, SESSION 5**

*Daniel Fried,
Atlantic Council, USA*

Thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity, and hello to Van Krikorian, I don't see you but I assume you're there.

It is a pleasure to see you all. I was asked to speak about American foreign policy in general, but specifically about Russia and then Armenia. That is a more difficult task because the foreign policy of President Trump requires explanation, especially to audiences that find it new or difficult to understand. Candidate Trump and then President Trump ran the foreign policy part of his campaign under the slogan "America First." That slogan is both innocuous on one level. All put their country first on some level. The President of Armenia puts Armenia first, as well he should, and American presidents put America first, as well they should.

The question is how do we define our respective national interests? America First is a loaded phrase, of course, because it was used by America's isolationists in the late 1930s as they argued against American involvement in Europe. Under the influence of the isolationists, who used the slogan "America First," my country was absent from Europe during the 1930s, a period in which Hitler and Stalin created grave and lasting damage to us all. So "America First" it is a loaded phrase.

To my Armenian friends, I would say also that President Trump also recalls another American foreign policy tradition, an older one which understandably has been forgotten in Europe, a tradition from the time of Andrew Jackson in the early 19th century. The Jacksonian tradition, as it has developed in the United States, is an inward-looking tradition based on populism, avoidance of anything European, and nationalism. Basically, the

Jacksonian tradition meant, more or less, America pushing aside everything in its path as we expanded our nation on the North American continent. That tradition has continued, mostly obscured and less influential, and sometimes more influential, as is the case now. President Trump's foreign policy approach also recalls a kind of Darwinian, narrow nation-first approach.

Happily, there has been some evolution. President Trump in his Warsaw speech in July of this year spoke in a different way: he spoke about the West and America as a leader of the West; he spoke of an alliance of Western nations rooted in common values, and among those values those are the rule of law, and freedom of the press and freedom of expression. In that context, President Trump reaffirmed American support of NATO in general, and NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment in particular. In his UN address last week, President Trump tried to synthesize the two strains of America First and the Warsaw Speech, which was a defense of the Western Alliance. At the UN, he talked about America believing in its national sovereignty and called on sovereign nations to unite together to fight common problems. Now that is not the way I would express America's role in the world. But my job here is to advocate for my vision of American foreign policy; it is rather to try to explain the current American administration. Again, that Trump's UN speech is not how I would express it, but even that speech gives us something to work with: it provides the basis for an American foreign policy which can include the defense of freedom generally in the world and defense of the countries under pressure from larger rapacious neighbors.

Of course, there are a number of questions about the Trump administration foreign policy which I can't answer. I cannot, for example, explain how far the Trump Administration would extend the concept of national sovereignty. Is national sovereignty, for example, an ultimate rationale for national action? President Trump indeed suggested at the UN that national sovereignty is an absolute. But in that same speech, he attacked Venezuela for its internal repression of its own people, suggesting that Venezuelan sovereignty did not necessarily provide an excuse for a

violation of human rights and democratic norms. That also means President Trump seemed to elevate democracy, and human rights as a standard to which otherwise sovereign nations could be held and for which they are accountable. Now I'm not able to explain to you the logical contradictions from Trump's speech last week except to suggest that these tensions will persist in American foreign policy.

I've spoken at the level of strategy and if you permit me, ideology. In practice, the Trump administration's foreign policy toward Europe and toward Russia has more continuity and less change than the Trump administration itself would probably admit. We have continued NATO deployment of forces to the Baltic States and American forces to Poland, in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine and Russian pressure against its neighbors. This is a continuation and reaffirmation of Barack Obama's policy, which itself reversed 30 years of American military drawdown in Europe. The Trump administration also has continued support for the sanctions against Russia. It has continued to enforce those sanctions. The Congress has locked in those sanctions, putting into law the Obama Administration's Executive orders which established the Russia sanctions program for the United States. The Trump administration signed that law.

There's also continuity in areas of personal. The Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia at the National Security Council, Fiona Hill, is a renowned Russia specialist, and is not the sort of person who would be associated with a weak or accommodations policy to Russia; she is realistic and well informed about Putin. Wess Mitchell, last night confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, has devoted his professional life to issues of Central Europe, the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the Baltic countries; and Wess appears intensely interested in what he has called the countries in between the EU and Russia on the other, including Armenia. Fiona Hill and Wes Mitchell are the last people who should be put into office if the Trump Administration were intending to do some kind of secret deal with Russia over the heads of the Ukrainians or the people in the South Caucasus or the Baltics.

So again, there is continuity in the Trump Administration's actual approach on the ground, judging by senior personnel appointments. I don't know how the Trump Administration will approach relations with Turkey judging by President Trump's positive characterizations of President Erdogan. Trump may be attempting to reach out to Erdogan just as President Bush did in his time and President Obama did in his time. As someone who worked on U.S.-Turkish relations during the Bush administration, I have to tell you that we were disappointed, to say the least, by the results of our effort to work with Turkey. Initially, we had high hopes for relations with the AKP party government. I personally was impressed with Prime Minister Davutgolu's 'Zero Problems with its Neighbors' approach to Turkey's immediate region. In particular, I had hoped (and still hope) that such a positive approach would extend to Turkish-Armenian relations. At the end of the Bush and beginning of the Obama Administration, I worked on the Turkish Armenian reconciliation talks, which first led to initialing and then the signature of an agreement, but not to ratification. I'm sorry that the Turks and Armenians weren't able to bring this process to a conclusion, and I'm sorry that Turkey, as the stronger power, did not show more leadership in achieving a successful conclusion. Success in relations with Armenia would have suited Turkey's Zero Problems with its Neighbors well; I think it would have served everyone's interests: the interests of Turkey, the interests of Armenia, the interests of the South Caucasus generally, and of Europe. I also think a Turkish-American Reconciliation agreement would have served American interests as well.

I'm not sure about Russia's interests in the South Caucasus region. With respect to the South Caucasus, Vice President Pence lead a visit to Tbilisi after a trip to Tallinn. His speech was strong, and well-received in Tbilisi. The Vice President spoke of American support of the sovereignty and European future of all the countries of the South Caucasus, and the countries that lie between the EU and Russia.

That leads me to Armenia. There are two tracks in American policy toward Armenia, beyond the obvious principles that we support Armenian

independence, sovereignty, and its internal reforms and prosperity at home. There is the track of Armenian regional relations. I have spoken of Turkish-Armenian relations, and there are other regional issues with which we are occupied, such as Nagorno Karabakh. The other aspect of US-Armenian relations depends on an answer to the question, what does Armenia want for itself and where does it see itself?

I don't have an answer for those questions. Does Armenia see itself as ultimately belonging to a wider Europe, ultimately within the European Union, or in some close association with European Union? Or does Armenia see itself as a bridge between Russia and Europe, a place in between Europe and Russia, Europe and Eurasia? I can't answer this, nor is it my place to demand an answer. My country is focused on issues big to us, including US-Russian relations, North Korea, Iran, perhaps Syria and the challenge of terrorism. The time will come when we turn our attention in a systematic way to the South Caucasus. Georgia says it wants to draw closer to Europe. Much Georgia's future will depend on Georgia's own internal reforms. I suppose the question for Armenia is how do you see yourselves in 10 years and what can the US do to help.

Now I've covered a lot of ground, and I suppose I've generated enough material for questions which I am happy to answer. Let me also say that I've enjoyed my work with Armenia and I look forward to my next trip to Yerevan. I'm sorry I can't be with you this time. But it was a pleasure to accept Van Krikorian's invitation to speak to you this way. I wish you luck, and again, I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.

**THE TRANSCRIBED SPEECH OF ANDREY YUROV AT THE
CONFERENCE, SESSION 5**

*Andrey Yurov,
International School of Human
Rights and Civil Action, Russia*

Thank You. Dear colleagues I will speak Russian. So please prepare your devices for translation.

Я буду говорить по-русски, мне это будет немножко легче, хотя вам конечно значительно сложнее. Вот, но мы здесь не для того собрались, чтобы делать друг другу легче. Мы собрались для того, чтобы осложнить друг другу жизнь. Мы задаем сложные вопросы друг другу, так, ну это нормально. Мне очень приятно оказаться на этой конференции, и не только, потому, что тема очень важная, и не только потому, что она происходит в Ереване, прекрасном, но еще и по той причине, что я вдруг понял, что я очень давно не был на конференциях совершенно другого сектора. Я сам, с одной стороны действующий правозащитник, который работает на всем постсоветском пространстве, и даже больше, в регионе ОБСЕ. С другой стороны, я немножко социальный философ, и я очень давно не бывал на конференциях политологов. Я очень давно не слышал речи в духе реал политик, такие вот очень похожие на речи даже не ООН, и даже не Лиги Наций, а такого после Венского Конгресса. Вот где ничего нет кроме интересов, экономики, большой игры, вот я давно на таких конференциях не был и я ужасно рад, потому что это очень интересно.

А есть перевод? Нет перевода. Есть, да? Хорошо. Спасибо.

И поэтому действительно, мне кажется, что такие межсекторные встречи очень нужны, потому что, часто, политологи не знают на каком языке разговаривают правозащитники, а правозащитники, видимо, тоже не очень хорошо понимают, как разговаривают аналитики, политологи и другие специалисты. У меня несколько тезисов, каждый из которых можно развернуть даже не в выступление а в тему большой сессии, может быть даже конференции, я их просто предлагаю, как тезисы для дальнейшего размышления, не сегодняшнего. И может быть, они породят какие-то дискуссии сегодня вечером, еще как-то, да, в нашем круге.

Тезис первый. Когда-то, давным-давно, как вы все знаете, после Второй мировой войны был установлен некий новый мировой порядок, связанный с системой ООН, связанный, внимание, с ограничением суверенитета, ну во имя, понятно, прав человека и ряда других ценностей, ну и многими другими вещами. В каком-то смысле, венцом на пространстве севера нашей планеты стали соглашения, совещания, а потом и организации по безопасности сотрудничества в Европе, где по большому счету была предъявлена идея, что, с одной стороны политика, с другой стороны экономика и развитие, и с третьей стороны человеческие измерения или права человека неразрывно связаны, и мы должны их рассматривать только вместе. Все остальное бессмысленно. И ОБСЕ сыграла очень важную роль в самом конце 80-ых и в середине 90-ых годов. Тем не менее, мы сейчас наблюдаем крушение самой этой системы, в целом, когда формально мы все еще живем в поствоенном мире, но на самом деле мы живем в мире пост-поствоенном, где многие институты международные носят исключительно, бутафорский характер, исключительно ритуальный характер, они уже больше не решают реальных

вопросов. Реальные вопросы решают реальные, очень крутые дяди и тети. Вот они решают самые настоящие реальные вопросы, а вовсе не те международные организации. И в этом смысле мы действительно возвращаемся даже не к началу 20-ого века, после первой мировой войны, мы возвращаемся к ситуации до первой мировой, когда, нет больше ни принципов, нет больше международного права, есть интересы и есть большие игры, и мы рассуждаем какой из «паханов» будет крышевать какую малую страну. Совершенно серьезно вот мы это обсуждаем в 21-ом веке, когда готовимся, так сказать, к совершенно новому человечеству. Ну, вот так мы, ну что делать, такой мир. Мы вынуждены вернуться к нему, как будто, на сто лет назад. Нет, не на сто, на двести. Венский конгресс 1814-1815 год, прошу прощения, я ошибся на сто лет.

Вторая вещь. То есть первый был тезис, что поствоенный мир рухнул и мы с этим должны что-то делать: либо его восстановить, либо смириться с тем что есть, либо построить что-то новое. Второй момент связанный как раз с идеей триады ОБСЕ, но я не про саму ОБСЕ, хочу сказать. То есть мы либо говорим о том, что экономика, политика, безопасность и права человека являются важнейшими общими составляющими, либо мы действительно их разделяем и мы говорим о том, что вот экономически как хорошо, вообще хорошо, и, например, ради энергетической безопасности торговать с диктаторскими режимами. Не, что вы, что вы, я не про присутствующих, я про Центральную Азию, все совпадения случайны. Это же хорошо, так здорово торговать, например, с Туркменистаном и поддерживать совершенно людоедский режим. Это ведь нормально, зато- экономическая независимость. Понимаете, вот для меня это довольно сложная штука: насколько, мы говорим о единстве принципов и ценностей, и безусловно, развития, либо

мы их разделяем и говорим только о том, где и какой коридор проложить, в притом, что забываем, что через пятнадцать лет благодаря солнечным батареям в виде черепиц Илона Маска или его ракетам, все эти транспортные коридоры энергетической безопасности не будут иметь никакого смысла, вообще. Все, о чем мы здесь рассуждаем через пятнадцать лет будет просто забавно, но мы продолжаем это делать.

Третий вещь. По поводу НАТО, как не странно, хотя я в общем мало в этом что понимаю. У меня единственная большая такая проблема, такой вопрос, прежде всего к Западу: действительно ли НАТО остается политической организацией, в том числе продвигающей такие ценности как демократия, права человека и верховенство прав. Или это давно уже стало ложью и продвигаются исключительно узко-политические интересы. Неизвестно чьи, я не политолог. Вот для меня это принципиальный важный вопрос, потому что, например, вся кампания за выступление Украины или Грузии в НАТО идет не вокруг безопасности, а вокруг того, что мы наконец вступим в клуб самых демократических и самых правозащитных стран в мире. Вот для меня это очень важная вещь связанная, подчеркиваю, как правозащитника, с тем насколько такая риторика является лживым. Потому что мне, например, кажется, что самым большим вызовом НАТО является не Россия, не Китай, не Иран, а нынешняя, я имею в виду только последний год, нынешняя ситуация в Турции: когда десятки правозащитников брошены в тюрьмы, сотни журналистов, тысячи преподавателей университета таких же, как этот уволены, и эта страна член НАТО. То есть, возникает вопрос, внутри НАТО можно все это делать? Это норма? Это нормальная ситуация? То есть для меня, например, это очень серьезный вызов, это не плохо, не хорошо, я не собираюсь

критиковать политику Турции. Я как правозащитник, я естественно, критикую те конкретные нарушения прав человека, какие есть, а все остальное не мое дело, я не участвую в политических или военных дискуссиях. Но для меня это очень серьезный вызов к Западу. Насколько он осознает, что, все таки, то, что он строит, это про ценности или, все таки, это про жесткие геополитические интересы и жесткую большую игру. Этот вам ответ, к сожалению, придется давать. Тем более при нынешних сменах различных правительств.

Четвертый тезис. Может быть, но это уже очень узкая вещь, но это тема здесь звучала, с точки зрения прав человека, именно прав человека, в каких-то минимальных стандартов верховенства права, именно Кавказ мог бы стать инициатором единых подходов к территориям с, скажем так, специальным статусом. Я имею в виду стать локомотивом таких дискуссий в ООН, в ОБСЕ, в Совете Европы. Это прежде всего вопрос прав человека и вопросы гуманитарные, допуска туда журналистов независимых, допуска туда правозащитников, и так далее. То есть, до сих пор, мы живем в состоянии, ну в общей неопределенности, а так как количество таких территорий на пространстве даже не мира, а Совета Европы как-то так, почему-то увеличивается, то возможно пришло время поставить какие-то общие вопросы: как что и как с этим быть.

Пятый момент, это скорее мой вопрос правозащитника к политологам, вопрос открытый, вопрос риторический. Вот, мне очень интересно, когда мы рассуждаем про вопросы безопасности в тех или иных странах, насколько на вопросы безопасности влияет то, насколько эта страна открытая, демократическая, там соблюдаются права человека и верховенство права. Или наоборот, открытость и демократия в этой стране делают ее слабой. И вообще-то хорошо для

безопасности, иметь у себя диктаторский режим. Это очень серьезный вопрос, очень непростой. То есть, кажется, вроде бы, у нас все убеждают, что прямой путь к безопасности всеобщей, это всеобщая демократия. Я как правозащитник, с этим хотел бы согласиться, но насколько с этим согласно население, насколько с этим собственно согласны даже, так сказать, не элиты, но значительная часть более-менее просвещенного общества этих стран. Это принципиальный вопрос, от которого в последние двадцать лет все стараются уходить, понятно постоянно используя всю эту риторику демократия и верховенство права, и так далее, для того чтобы естественно получать бесконечное количество западной помощи, потому что если ты не будешь говорить этих слов, никакой западной помощи, конечно же, не будет. Это ритуальное заклинание, для меня очевидное, и я никого не ругаю, я понимаю зачем эти заклинания происходят. Две последние вещи.

Шестое, это роль неправительственных организаций. О чем здесь тоже несколько раз упоминалось. Вот, с моей точки зрения, самое, наверное, неприятная вещь, которая произошла за последнее 20-25 лет в мире, и в том числе в регионе ОБСЕ, гражданское общество тоже очень ослабло, и особенно оно ослабло как единое, более-менее солидарное международное, оно разделилось на маленькие кучки национальных организаций, которые сами по себе очень слабы внутри стран и очень слабо поддерживают друг друга. Иногда очень слабо, потому что не могут, иногда очень слабо, потому что не хотят, в связи с тем, что они тоже подписываются под общенациональные конфликты, значит, как это, конфликтуют государства, гражданское общество к сожалению, тоже включается в этот конфликт и мы это видим в последние, там 5-10 лет и очень активно, отдельные лишь единичные случаи,

когда есть сильное противостояние собственному тренду, тренду собственному государству во имя солидарности и взаимоподдержки. А что с этим делать, как развивать, как противостоять этому тренду - очередной открытый вопрос.

И последний, такой же открытый вопрос, может быть в таких процессах как Транскавказский, и, вообще, сложные, современные процессы, связанные с безопасностью и одновременно процветанием, правами человека, демократией и так далее, снова, быть может, будет повышена роль интеллектуалов, и не только академических интеллектуалов, но и интеллектуалов в целом. Вот способны ли сейчас интеллектуалы ставить такие вопросы как они ставили между двумя мировыми войнами или 60-ые годы, когда в общем роль интеллектуалов европейских как левых, так и правых была колоссальной для, вообще, реформы всей современной Европы, как мы ее ныне знаем. Для меня это уже вопрос открытый и так как я намного меньше общаюсь, к сожалению, с академическими структурами, в том числе с академическими интеллектуалами, для меня это скорее вопрос к своим друзьям и партнерам, тем правозащитным сообществам, с которыми я непосредственно работаю. Большое спасибо. Надеюсь, я вас не очень утомил.

Thank you, also thank you for keeping the time.

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND ARMENIA

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The article summarizes the main contents and characteristics of China's foreign policy in different time, and looks forward to China's future foreign policy. As an important part of the overall strategy for building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, the report of 19th national congress clearly states that the diplomacy of the big country with Chinese characteristics should promote the building of a new type of international relations and continue to promote the building of a community of human destiny.

I. Main contents of China's foreign policy

1. Judgment of the times is different: Mao Zedong based his thinking on the belief that global war was inevitable, Deng Xiaoping proposed that large scale global war will not occur for a considerable time, and there is hope that world peace will be maintained.

On Maoist concepts primarily centered on conducting a People's War to focusing on fighting and winning local, informatized wars. Dan Xiaoping imported his own theory into the Chinese political system which does not claim to reject Mao Zedong thought or Marxism–Leninism, but rather seeks to adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of China. Deng also stressed that China should be open to the whole world, implement a "one state, two systems" mechanism. The theory included the need to economically develop the country, economic reforms were based on the theory of the Chinese President's "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics".

2. China's main interests are divided into three groups:

- Security: Preservation of China's political system and national security;

- Sovereignty: Preservation of territorial integrity. From this point of view, the priority concerns of Beijing are primarily concerned with Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet;

- Development: Economic Development, for which a peaceful regional environment is considered as a priority;

3. China develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party;

4. Emphasizing the fairness of the international order and the status of the United Nations. Hegemonism and power politics remain key factors, international security and global economic development is uneven, the only legal body which can deal with international security is the United Nations.

5. Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (one road and one belt) initiative is important part of China's foreign cooperation, China is willing to coordinate development strategies with world states, support each other's advantages and implement potentials in order to enhance cooperation in infrastructure construction. China is willing to cooperate with world states to promote the new type of cooperation mechanism featuring openness and reciprocity, mutual benefit, and win-win results.

6. The relationship between China and the world's major regions and countries: "Good, Secure, Rich Neighborhood" policy. "The peripheral diplomacy under the new situation is: persist in being good to neighbors, make neighbors our partners, strengthen friendship with them, intensify regional cooperation and bring exchange and cooperation with neighborhood countries to a new level. "Good neighborhood", "Secure neighborhood", and "Wealthy neighborhood" is an important part of the strategy for China's own development.

China's Several Major Relations with neighboring countries. China-Japan relationship in particular will remain as a basic determinant of the regional security environment. Territorial disputes between China and Japan, like many other disputes between them, are politically sensitive in both countries. The U.S. alliance with Japan is also key factor in understanding Beijing's strategic animus toward Tokyo.

China's rapid development has led to its pretentiousness in the Indian Ocean, expanding to South Asia, which contradicts India's strategic plans. To

this end, China wants military cooperation with Pakistan as a counterbalance to NATO and the US in the region.

China plays a key role in the *Asia-Pacific region*, and its policy has its influence there. The 2012 Concept focused on Beijing's concerns regarding Washington's rebalancing policy, as the United States is starting to take more active steps to be involved in the Asia-Pacific region's security. Beijing is trying to counteract Washington's policy, and the first and most important step taken in the contribution to the growth of regional organizations where the US is not a member, such as the SCO. Due to this, Beijing's main goal in the region is military cooperation with Russia. China also places great importance to ASEAN.

Chinese-Arabic mutual cooperation was based on the political will to preserve peace in the Middle East. China is willing to have pragmatic cooperation in the principle of mutual benefit and win-win results with Arab states.

China's interests in *the South Caucasus* are essentially derived from its wider foreign policy goals: securing access to new sources of raw materials where possible, creating a stable environment around China's extended periphery, and, to an extent, opening up new markets for Chinese companies to expand into. China's interest lies in maintaining regional stability in the South Caucasus. Two strategic projects have been proposed which, if implemented, would significantly increase the region's importance for Beijing: One is a rail link from western China to Turkey via Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (with a ferry link across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Baku). The other is the construction of a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP).

The Armenian and Chinese Presidents signed the Joint Declaration on Further Development and Enhancement of Friendly and Cooperative Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, more than a dozens of documents aimed at the promotion and strengthening of mutual cooperation between the two countries in a number of areas were signed.

Relations between China and African countries are strengthened the solidarity and cooperation with the Africa.

7. China's nuclear strategy "Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and

adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature". The document went further, stating that the nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. "China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China".

II. Relations between China and Armenia

Understanding and supporting each other on matters concerning their core interests and major concerns is the political basis for the sound and stable development of the relations between China and Armenia. Strengthening high-level exchanges between the two countries has the leading role in the development of cooperation between the two governments, legislatures, political parties, armed forces and social groups and the exchange of government and governance.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Armenia will play an important role in deepening the pragmatic cooperation between the two countries and will continue to use the committee to optimize the trade structure between the two countries, enrich the forms of cooperation and broaden the channels of cooperation so as to gradually improve the trade and investment environment.

The initiative to jointly build "One Road One Belt" has provided new historical opportunities for the all-round cooperation between the two countries. Both parties will actively implement the relevant agreements signed and jointly promote the construction of "One Road One Belt" and open up new broad prospects for their cooperation. We will further expand and improve cooperation in the fields of education, culture, science and technology, environmental protection, public information, sports and tourism between the two countries, as well as constantly enhance mutual understanding and friendship between peoples of the two countries and consolidate the friendship between generations of both countries.

PARTICIPANTS' BIOGRAPHIES

Of

*The International Conference "Regional and National Security
Dynamics: Armenia-Turkey Relations",
29 September 2017, Yerevan, Armenia*

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Dr. Azizi obtained his PhD in Central Asia and the Caucasus Studies from the University of Tehran and has many publications both in Persian and English, including two books. His research interests include: security and geopolitical issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Iran's foreign policy and Iran-Russia relations.

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Mr. Ünal Çeviköz is the President of Ankara Policy Centre, and a columnist in *Hurriyet* and *Hurriyet Daily News*.

Mr. Çeviköz started to serve at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in 1978; following his service in Ankara, he worked at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow as Second Secretary and at the Turkish Consulate General in Bregenz, Austria, as Consul. After completing his duties as the Chief of Section at the East European Department of the Foreign Ministry in Ankara, he was assigned to Turkish Embassy in Sofia as the counselor of Embassy. In 1989, he started a job at NATO's International Secretariat, first at the Economics Directorate, then at the Political Directorate. He prepared the NATO-Russia Founding Act and in 1997 he returned to his duty at Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, Turkey. After completing his duty as Head of Balkan Department and then as the Deputy Director General for Caucasus and Central Asia at the Foreign Ministry in Ankara, he served as Turkey's Ambassador between 2001-2004 to Azerbaijan and between 2004-2006 to Iraq. From 2007 to 2010, he was back in Ankara as Deputy Undersecretary for bilateral Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, in 2009, he prepared the protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia. In 2010, he was appointed as Ambassador to London. After completing his duty in the summer of 2014, he returned to Turkey, retired and left the government service. Since then, he is active in civil society and think-tank activities.

Mr. Çeviköz graduated from Boğaziçi University (former Robert College) with a BA degree in English Language and Literature in 1974 and in Political Science in 1978. He received his Master's degree in International Relations in 1993 from Brussels University.

Fried, Daniel

Having retired from the Foreign Service in April 2017, Ambassador Fried is currently a Distinguished Fellow with the Atlantic Council.

In his forty-year Foreign Service career, Ambassador Fried played a key role in designing and implementing American policy in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. As Special Assistant and NSC Senior Director for Presidents Clinton and Bush, Ambassador to Poland, and Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (2005-09), Ambassador Fried crafted the policy of NATO enlargement to Central European nations and, in parallel, NATO-Russia relations, thus advancing the goal of Europe whole, free, and at peace.

In 1977, Ambassador Fried joined the U.S. Foreign Service, serving overseas in Leningrad (Human Rights, Baltic affairs, and Consular Officer), and Belgrade (Political Officer); and in the Office of Soviet Affairs in the State Department.

As Polish Desk Officer in the late 1980s, Ambassador Fried was one of the first in Washington to recognize the impending collapse of Communism in Poland, and helped develop the immediate response of the George H.W. Bush Administration to these developments. As Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw (1990-93), Fried witnessed Poland's difficult but ultimately successful free market, democratic transformation, working with successive Polish governments.

Ambassador Fried also served as the State Department's first Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo (GTMO) Detainee Facility. He established procedures for the transfer of individual detainees and negotiated the transfers of 70 detainees to 20 countries, with improved security outcomes.

Ambassador Fried majored in Soviet Studies and History at Cornell University (BA magna cum laude 1975) and received an M.A. from Columbia's Russian Institute and School of International Affairs in 1977.

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Ms. Anna Gevorgyan is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Civilization and Cultural Studies at the Yerevan State University. Ms. Gevorgyan is also working at the National Defense Research University (NDRU) of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia. She serves as the Head of the Scientific-Educational Center of the National Institute for Strategic Defense and Security Education of NDRU. She is also engaged in research projects of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of NDRU.

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Dr. Alexander Grigoryan is currently the Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs at Yerevan State University (YSU). Since 2006, Dr. Grigoryan has been the Associate Professor at the Chair of Education at YSU. Academic courses covered by Dr. Grigoryan include Credit System in Higher Educational Institutions and Educational Policy in Higher Educational Institutions.

In 2000-2006, Dr. Grigoryan served as the Head of the Department of Academic Affairs and the Head of the Educational Laboratory of the Faculty of Radiophysics at YSU.

Dr. Grigoryan also led a number of projects funded by OSI Assistance Foundation aimed at the improvement of management system and the development of quality assurance procedures for YSU study programmes. Since 2008, he has been a member of the National Workgroup on Quality Assurance.

Dr. Grigoryan completed his post-graduate studies in Theoretical Physics at the Faculty of Radiophysics of Yerevan State University in 1996, and obtained his Ph.D. in 2000.

Gvalia, Giorgi

Dr. Giorgi Gvalia is professor of Politics and International Relations and the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. His academic interests include theories of international relations, small states in international relations, Europeanization in the Post-Soviet Space and Post-Soviet politics and international relations. His recent publications have appeared in the journals *Security Studies* and *Foreign Policy Analysis*. His current research is focused on the Russia's role in the Europeanization of the South Caucasus.

Besides academic positions Dr. Gvalia has worked at several state and non-state institutions, including National Security Council of Georgia (2008-2013) and Georgian Foundations for Strategic and International Studies (2006-2007).

Hovhannisyan, David

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Prof. Hovhannisyan is currently the Director of the Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University and also serves as a professor at Yerevan State University's Department of Arabic Studies. Prof. Hovhannisyan teaches several courses, including History of Islam and History of Arab-Muslim Civilization.

In 1998-2003, he served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia as an Ambassador at Large, and was awarded the diplomatic range of Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary. In 1992-1998, Prof. Hovhannisyan was posted to the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to Damascus, Syria as full Ambassador, and in 1990-1992, he was assigned to the Presidential Staff of the Republic of Armenia as the Chief Expert on Middle Eastern Affairs.

Prof. Hovhannisyan is also a member of the Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission (TARC) and Transcend. Since 2000, he has been the founder and a member of the South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security. Since 2013, Prof. Hovhannisyan has been a member of the "World Economy and International Relation" Journal Editorial Board.

Over the past decade and a half, Prof. Hovhannisyan has participated in over 100 conferences and seminars related to International Relations, International Economics, Regional Cooperation and Security, Arabic and Islamic Studies. Prof. Hovhannisyan has also published over 110 scientific articles and three monographs on Arabic and Islamic Studies, as well as on issues pertaining to Philosophy, Methodology, Political Science and International Relations.

İnan, Feride

Ms. Feride İnan is a policy analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). In 2015, she was the Think-20 (T20) coordinator at TEPAV which was selected to lead T20 activities by the Turkish G20 Presidency. In her role as T20 coordinator, she was responsible for developing content and coordinating content inputs from a wide network of scholars, businessmen, experts from a diverse set of disciplines to feed into the agenda of the Turkish G20 Presidency. She also provided content support to other G20 engagement groups including the Business-20 and Civil-20. She has written on a range of G20 working areas including macroeconomic coordination and financial stability, development, employment as well as trade and investment.

Since joining TEPAV in 2012, Ms. İnan has been working on various projects on regional economic cooperation in the South Caucasus and Eurasian transport

corridors; conducting research on higher education and innovation policy and on women's economic participation in Turkey. In 2006-2008, she worked as a research assistant with Kirti Singh (then a member of the Law Commission of India) and specialized in revising legislation and drafting new laws about gender policy in India. Ms. İnan also conducted field survey on private higher education in India as part of her Masters dissertation.

Ms. İnan holds a BA in Economics from Columbia University and an MSc in International Development from the University of Amsterdam.

Kaleji, Vali

Mr. Vali Kaleji is a Ph. D. Student in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies at the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Tehran. He is also a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), affiliated to Iran's Expediency Council in Tehran, Iran.

Mr. Kaleji is author of several research and policy papers on Central Asia and Caucasus. His recent publications (in Persian) are: *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Goals, Functions and Perspectives* (2010); *South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex*, foreword by Shirin Akiner (2014); *Iran, Russia and China in Central Asia; Cooperation and Conflict with US Foreign Policy in Central Asia*, Foreword by Sergey Markedonov; *US Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Process and Perspectives* (2015); *Iran and the South Caucasus Republics* (2017).

Kavala, Osman

Mr. Osman Kavala is a renowned businessmen and philanthropist and is currently heading Anadolu Kültür that is implementing arts and culture programs throughout Turkey and in the region to promote a pluralistic understanding of culture, human rights and reconciliation.

Mr. Kavala was involved in the establishment of a number of NGOs including TURSAK (Turkish Audiovisual Cinema Foundation), TEMA (Foundation to Fight Soil Erosion), Helsinki Citizens Association and Thessaloniki based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in the Southeast Europe. He served on the boards of TESEV, a leading research and advocacy organization and the Open Society Institute - Turkey.

Kempe, Iris

Dr. Iris Kempe is currently acting as Senior Advisor at the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Stockholm. Dr. Kempe has more than 20 years of experience of close

cooperation with senior political figures to advise on policy approaches to political and economic conditions in Russia, the Western CIS, the South Caucasus and the Countries of the Baltic Sea Region. Dr. Kempe monitored and analyzed political and economic developments in these countries, assessed country-level political risks, contributed to country strategies.

Dr. Kempe also worked as director of the OXFAM in the Russian Federation from 2011-2013, as well as headed the Tbilisi-based South Caucasus Regional Office of the Heinrich-Boell-Foundation from 2008-2011. In 2010-2011, Dr. Kempe was an elected member of the Steering Committee of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum.

Dr. Kempe is an author of numerous publications and articles on international affairs, east-west relations, Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and transition problems. She is the founding editor of the Caucasus Analytical Digest.

Dr. Kempe holds Ph.D. from the Freie University in Berlin.

Kocharyan, Hayk

Dr. Hayk Kocharyan is a Senior Fellow Researcher at the Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University, with a focus on security and political developments in the South Caucasus and the Middle East region. Dr. Kocharyan also acts as the Head of Arabic Studies Department of Yerevan State University.

Dr. Kocharyan is a regular contributor to the local and regional media and provides expertise on political and security issues in the South Caucasus and the Middle East.

Dr. Kocharyan holds a Doctorate Degree in History from the Institute of Oriental Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, as well as an MA Degree in Arabic Studies from Yerevan State University. Dr. Kocharyan also spent substantial time conducting research at CEU and the Universities of Cairo and Damascus.

Krikorian, Lena

Ms. Lena Krikorian is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University. She worked for the United States Congress for Congressman Eliot Engel and Senator Chuck Schumer, the International Trade Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce International Division's Americas Team, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations. Currently, her research interests include (but are not limited to) U.S.-Cuban relations after living

in Havana in 2015, U.S. foreign policy towards the Caucasus and Greater Middle East region, and migration and diaspora studies.

Ms. Krikorian recently earned a B.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, with dual Concentrations in International Economics and International Development, and a minor in sociocultural anthropology.

Kyureghyan, Shushan

Ms. Shushan Kyureghyan is currently a Junior Research Fellow at the Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at the Yerevan State University, focusing on Russia's foreign policy towards Middle Eastern countries and the Armenian-Arab relations.

In 2014-2015, she studied at the Kuwait University Language Center and worked at the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in Kuwait providing translation services of up-to-date news coverage of Kuwaiti newspapers.

Ms. Kyureghyan graduated from Yerevan State University in 2014, and she has a Master of Arts degree in Oriental Studies in the Arabic Studies field.

Li, Yonghui

J.D. Yonghui Li is a professor, Senior Research Fellow, Deputy Head of the Russia's Foreign Policy Department of the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). She is also an expert of the research center on "One Road and One Belt" of CASS.

J.D. Yonghui Li was a visiting scholar at the George Washington University in the United States in 2002, as well as at the Lenin Pedagogical University in Russia in 2003-2004. In 2008-2014 she worked in the Embassy of China in Ukraine, and in the Embassy of China in Azerbaijan. Her main scientific focus is on the foreign policy of Russia. J.D. Yonghui Li has more than 80 scientific papers on Russian politics in Asia, CIS countries, including her monograph on the study of Russia-Japan relations.

Mkrtchyan, Satenik

Dr. Satenik Mkrtchyan is a research fellow at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, as well as at the Center for Civilizational and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University. She has more than ten years of experience in program evaluation, social, policy and ethnographic research. Her numerous publications mostly focus on ethno-national identity, textbook research, school anthropology, diaspora studies, Georgian

studies, etc.

Over the past years of her research experience, Dr. Mkrтчyan has been involved in more than 20 research projects across the Caucasus in cooperation with international organizations and universities, including ASCN, Universität Fribourg, Universität St. Gallen, the World Bank, and the Caucasus Research Resource Center.

Dr. Mkrтчyan is a recipient of prestigious research fellowships, such as Heinrich Böll Foundation's Regional scholarship programme for social scientists, and Norwegian Institute of International affairs (NUPI). Most recently, she successfully designed and implemented two cross-border (Armenian-Georgian) projects for social science students under Heinrich Böll Foundation's grant scheme.

Dr. Mkrтчyan holds a Doctorate Degree in Anthropology from Tbilisi State University, a Master's degree in Ethnology from Yerevan State University and a Bachelor's Degree in Sociology from the same University.

Mkrтчyan, Tatevik

Ms. Tatevik Mkrтчyan is a PhD student and junior researcher at the Centre for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University. In 2011-2014, she was a lecturer of Arabic language at Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences. Her PhD thesis focuses on Shi'a religious doctrine and discourse in the Nahj al-Balagha. Her field of specialization is Arabic and Islamic Studies, with her most recent research interests being the Shi'a religious political governmental system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran's relations with the South Caucasus.

Ohanyan, Anna

Dr. Anna Ohanyan is Associate Professor of Political Science at Stonehill College. She is the first recipient of Richard B. Finnegan Distinguished Professorship in Political Science and International Relations, and the Chair of Political Science and International Studies Department College. Dr. Ohanyan is a Fulbright Scholar and previously served as a doctoral fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Her research has been supported by IREX, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (USA), the German Marshall Fund, the U.S. State Department and Eurasia Foundation among others.

Dr. Ohanyan has also consulted for numerous organizations such as the United Nations Foundation, the World Bank, the National Intelligence Council Project, the U.S. Department of State, the Carter Center, and USAID.

Dr. Ohanyan's latest book is *Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management* published by Stanford University Press (2015). She also authored NGOs, IGOs, and

Network Mechanism of Post-Conflict Global Governance in Microfinance with Palgrave Macmillan (2008).

Petrosyan, Tatevik

Ms. Tatevik Petrosyan is a Junior Research Fellow at the Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at the Yerevan State University, with focus on China's foreign policy towards Middle East region and South Caucasus countries.

Ms. Petrosyan earned Bachelor's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from Yerevan State University. She also has an M.A. in Global Politics. In 2013, she completed the "Political Science: French Institutions" program carried out at the University of Aix-Marseille III, France.

Poghosyan, Benyamin

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan has been the Vice President for Research, Head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense Research University in Armenia (NDRU) since 2016. Dr. Poghosyan has also been acting as the Executive Director of the Political Science Association of Armenia since 2011.

In 2013, Dr. Poghosyan was a Research Fellow at the U.S. National Defense University. His primary research areas are geopolitics of the South Caucasus, US-Russian relations and their implications for the region. Dr. Poghosyan was also a Research Fellow at the National Strategic Studies (predecessor of NDRU) back in 2009 where he was appointed as INSS Deputy Director for Research in November 2010. Dr. Poghosyan also worked as a Foreign Policy Adviser to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia. He also served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences; adjunct professor at Yerevan State University, as well as at the European Regional Educational Academy. Dr. Poghosyan is an author of more than 40 academic papers in various leading Armenian and international journals. He is a graduate from the U.S. State Department Study of the U.S. Institutes for Scholars Program on U.S. National Security Policy Making. He holds a PhD in History and is a graduate from the Tavitian Certificate Program on International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Sukiasyan, Sona

Ms. Sona Sukiasyan is currently an analyst, article writer and monitoring specialist at the Armenian Razm.info analytical news website focusing on the military and politics of Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Ms. Sukiasyan participated in a number of social, educational and scientific programs, summer schools and conferences locally and abroad, including “YavaşGamats” summer school in Turkey; “Islam in Russia” summer school at the European University of St. Petersburg; Student Research Initiatives within the project “Strategies for Armenian-Georgian Cooperation through Academia and Student Inclusion -2.”

Ms. Sukiasyan obtained her Bachelor’s degree in Turkish studies from Yerevan State University, where she is currently pursuing her Master's Degree.

Świtalski, Piotr Antoni

H.E. Piotr Antoni Świtalski, Ambassador, Head of the European Union Delegation to the Republic of Armenia, started his mission in Armenia in September 2015.

Prior to the mission to Armenia, H.E. Piotr Antoni Świtalski served as a Director of the Department for Asia and the Pacific in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland in 2015, as well as a Director of the Directorate for Policy Planning in Council of Europe in 2010-2014. H.E. Piotr Antoni Świtalski also served as the Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Poland to the Council of Europe from 2005-2010; the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland in 2005; the Counsellor (DHM) in the Embassy of Poland in Nairobi from 1999-2002; and the Counsellor of Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE, Vienna from 1990-1993.

Ambassador Świtalski holds a Ph.D. degree from the Moscow Institute of International Relations.

Ter-Gabrielyan, Gevorg

Dr. Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan is an international development leader and writer with 26 years of experience working in public and private spheres in transitional countries across the Balkans and Central Asia with a primary focus on Armenia.

Throughout his career, Dr. Ter-Gabrielyan has specialized in civil society, youth, media, regional studies, the European dimension and peace building. He became the Executive Director of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF) in Armenia in 2007. At EPF, Dr. Ter-Gabrielyan leads and implements large-scale multiple-year projects, oversees grant management, develops organization’s strategy and designs programs.

Dr. Ter-Gabrielyan has also worked as a Eurasia Program Manager and Senior Policy Advisor at International Alert, an organization working on conflict transformation and peace-building from London. He writes prolifically, contributing fiction and essays in Armenian and Russian, or journalism pieces in Armenian, Russian and English to a variety of media outlets, on topics ranging from

international relations to conflict transformation and peace-building to European integration to Armenia's development issues; etc.

Dr. Ter-Gabrielyan has a Ph.D. in Turkic Linguistics from USSR Academy of Sciences, 1989; M.A. in Society and Politics from Lancaster University, UK, 1994; and MPA in International Administration from Bowling Green State University, USA, 1996.

Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram

Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan is the Head of the Turkish Studies Department at the Institute for Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Armenia and Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, American University of Armenia.

Dr. Ter-Matevosyan was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of California at Berkeley, CA, and a Visiting Professor at Duke University, NC. His main research interests include republican history of Turkey with a particular focus on Kemalism, political Islam and foreign policy. His previous work has been published in Armenian, Russian, European and American academic journals and periodicals (Turkish Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey, Europe-Asia Studies, Eurasian Geography and Economy, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Iran and the Caucasus, Études Arméniennes Contemporaines, Turkish Review, Caucasus Analytical Digest etc.). He authored an award-winning monograph *Islam in the Social and Political Life of Turkey (1970-2001)* in 2008 and co-authored *History of Turkish Republic* in 2014. He has chapters in edited volumes published by Routledge, London; HDV Yayınları, Istanbul; and UC Berkeley Armenian Studies Program, Berkeley, CA etc.

Dr. Ter-Matevosyan earned his Doctor of Philosophy degree from Bergen University (Norway); Candidate of Historical Sciences degree from the Institute of Oriental Studies (Armenia); Master's degree in history from Lund University (Sweden); and Bachelor's degree from Yerevan State University (Armenia).

Vorkunova, Olga

Dr. Olga Vorkunova is currently a Senior Researcher at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. She also works as the Director of the Center for Development and Peace Studies FORUM and the President of the Russian Academy of Peace. In her capacity of the TRANSCEND International CIS regional convener and a Board Member of TRANSCEND Russia,

she has been researching and practicing the TRANSCEND approach for nearly two decades.

Dr. Vorkunova has published and edited numerous articles and books on issues of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, peace education, regional security and cooperation. She is a board member of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Council; European Peace Research Association (EUPRA), as well as a member of the International Studies Association (ISA) and Non-North American Members at Large of the ISA Governing Council (2013 – 2015).

Dr. Vorkunova has earned her Ph.D from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Yurov, Andrei

Mr. Andrei Yurov is a well-known international human rights activist, philosopher, co-author of the concept of "humanitarian antifascism / Human Integrity", scientific leader of the International School of Human Rights and Civil Action. He is the Honorary President of the International Youth Human Rights Movement (YHRM); an expert of the Council of Europe, a member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights. Since March 2014, Mr. Yurov has been heading the Crimean field mission on human rights, which conducted a permanent monitoring of the observance of human rights on the territory of the peninsula.

Since 2010, Mr. Yurov has been involved in the work of human rights missions in Belarus to monitor massive human rights violations after the presidential elections; in Bishkek and Osh, Kyrgyzstan in connection with interethnic collisions; as well as in Chechnya (periodically from 2009 as part of the Consolidated Mobile Group), and in Georgia (in connection with the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008).

Mr. Yurov is the winner of the first prize of the Moscow Helsinki Group in the field of human rights protection in the nomination "For the development of traditions of human rights protection among young people."

In 2015, Mr. Yurov became the winner of the prestigious international award - Helsinki Civil Society Award "for continuous efforts to organize campaigns of solidarity and observation missions in the OSCE region in the face of massive violations of human rights."

Zakareishvili, Paata

Mr. Paata Zakareishvili served as the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality in 2012-2016. Mr. Zakareishvili currently is a professor at the Grigol Robakidze University in Tbilisi.

Over the past 25 years, Mr. Zakareishvili worked in various state institutions and civil society organizations in Georgia, focusing on human rights, conflict transformation and peacebuilding. In 2009-2012, Mr. Zakareishvili acted as the Chairman of the Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflict (ISNC). Prior to this, he was the Georgian coordinator of the "Schlaining" Dialogue Process under the Conciliation Resources (London) and the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin). In 2000-2001, Mr. Zakareishvili was the Deputy Head of the Penitentiary Department under the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. In 1995-2000, he was the Chief of Staff of the Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic Minority Affairs in the Parliament of Georgia. Over the period from 1995 to 2012 Mr. Zakareishvili was the Georgian coordinator of the programme "Abkhaz-Georgian Peacebuilding and Cooperation Among Multiple Initiatives" initiated by the University of California, Irvine (USA).

Mr. Zakareishvili graduated from Kazan State University. He is also a graduate of the Theological Academy in Tbilisi.

Zolyan, Mikayel

Dr. Mikayel Zolyan is a political analyst and historian, specializing in ethnic conflict, politics of nationalism and ethnicity, as well as in issues of democratization and nation-building in the post-Soviet context. Dr. Zolyan currently serves as an Assistant Professor at the Brusov Yerevan State Linguistic University's UNESCO Chair of Democracy, and he was previously a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations and Political Science at the Russian-Armenian State University in Yerevan. He is also affiliated with the "Regional Studies Center" think tank, as well as with the "Yerevan Press Club."

Dr. Zolyan has been a Visiting Scholar at both the Institute of Slavic, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley (February-June 2010) and at the University of California Los Angeles' (UCLA) Department of Sociology (January-May 2008), as well as a Visiting Researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy (TEMPUS Individual Mobility grant; 2004).

Dr. Zolyan has published over two dozen academic articles and book chapters in Armenia and abroad, in Armenian, as well as in English, Russian, and German. His analytical articles on current events in Armenia and the region are frequently published in Armenian and international media.

Dr. Zolyan holds a Ph.D. in History from Yerevan State University and an M.A. in Nationalism Studies from the Central European University in Budapest.

THE CENTER FOR CIVILIZATION AND CULTURAL STUDIES AT YEREVAN STATE UNIVERSITY

The Center for Civilization and Cultural Studies at Yerevan State University has been established in 2007 (<https://cccsysu.com/en/>). Since then, the Center has been involved in different national and international projects aiming to promote intercultural cooperation, people to people dialogue across open and closed borders as well as deepening understanding among different religions and civilizations. The research-based activity of the center has been anchored in the several theories authored by the founder and the director of the center, Ambassador David Hovhannisyán. Those theories, among them, the “Theory of Three Seas System”, and the “Theory of Network States” and the “Theory of Adaptation Mechanisms” have been the subject of discussions and publications both in Armenia and abroad.

The staff of the center includes researchers specializing in different areas from Georgian, Iranian and Arabic studies to China studies and beyond. They are doing research from the perspective of cultural anthropology, security studies, religious studies and so on. This diversity of the research areas gives a special capacity to the center enabling to observe, analyze and understand different aspects of foreign relations from the divergent angles. This capacity gives also an opportunity to cooperate with different state and non-governmental organizations: the center itself and its members individually are working with the partnership of the Institute of Anthropology of NAS, with the Department of Arabic Studies of YSU, with the National Defense Research University of Ministry of Defense, with the NGO’s and international foundations like “Hazarashen”, “SMIL” foundation, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Heinrich Boell Foundation, the CIVIC-Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, Hrant Dink Foundation and others.

In the scope of research interests of the center have been the transformation mechanisms of the Middle East societies, the changing Islam of Turkey, the adaptation mechanisms of Iran’s Shia Islam, the ways of construction of the histories in Armenia and Georgia, the current problems of higher education in Armenia and ways of resolving those

problems. On the basis of the research results the Center is publishing the Analytical Bulletin twice a year, as well as separate policy papers.

In addition to the analytical and research publications, the Center organizes round table discussions and seminars on the regional politics regularly, and its researchers are among the experts that give public presentations and media talks to share their expertise both situation-based and as broader knowledge.

“Three Seas System” as an analytical and prognostic model

The “Three Seas System” theory has been developed and formulated as a result of YSU Center of Civilization and Cultural studies’ (CCCS) staff’s scientific and research activity. The director of the center, Professor David Hovhannisyan, has had several speeches in different international conferences on the topic. Besides, the professor has delivered several lectures in different research centers, including the Carnegie Foundation.

The concept of “Three Seas System” enables to present modern geopolitical, geo-economical, political and informational processes in the change of the categories of time and space, in other words in the principally new conditions of the creation of worldview and the image of the world. The concept with integrated approach monitors and analyzes the new features that have changed the essence of the perception of modern political, economic, cultural and social phenomena. Focusing on the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas, and on the spaces between their communicational areal, the concept analyzes in its entirety the developments of this mega-region and reveals the true reasons of different conflicts, explains the true motives of global power centers’ decisions and implemented programs. The concept pays special attention to the global process of networking.

The study of different divergences in the “Three Seas System” enables to predict the development of the events in the mega-region with high accuracy.